

They were regarded rather as a sort of speculative investment to be used for bargaining purposes some time in the future. Thus the Vlachs with the aid of Roumania pressed the Porte for the same privileges as enjoyed by the Greeks and Bulgars. This policy naturally aroused much resentment, particularly among the Greeks, for the Vlachs had hitherto been counted as Greeks in population estimates. As a result the Roumanians during these years tended to look towards Constantinople rather than to the other Balkan capitals. Djuvara, for example, received the following instructions on June 24, 1896 when he arrived in Constantinople as Roumanian envoy extraordinary: "We have great interest in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. In Macedonia the interests of Roumania are linked with those of Turkey so that the Macedonian Roumanians might not be submerged, by the Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian elements."⁵⁵

Turco-Roumanian relations were therefore close on the eve of the Greco-Turkish war and on March 20, 1897 the Sultan asked Djuvara what the attitude of Roumania would be in case of a war with Greece. A little later the Sultan suggested that a secret military convention be concluded between the two countries. On August 31 a defensive alliance was again proposed but Sturdza, the Roumanian foreign minister, made it clear that the recognition by the Porte of a Roumanian Metropolitan in Macedonia was a prerequisite for any entente. The Porte, however, was unwilling to accept this condition, chiefly because of the opposition of the Patriarchate which stood to lose revenues,⁵⁶ the hostility of Russia to the scheme⁵⁷ and the fear of recognizing still another nationality in strife torn Macedonia.⁵⁸ It does not appear that the Roumanians were themselves very anxious to sign an alliance in return for an extension of Vlach rights in Macedonia. Thus nothing came of these negotiations and Turkey was forced to fight Greece without the aid of any Balkan state.

The Greeks, on the other hand, were no more successful than the Turks in their search for an ally. The Bulgarians and the Serbs were aroused early in 1897 by the possibility that Greece might secure Crete while they gained nothing. In January, therefore, a Bulgarian agent was sent to Athens with the proposal that Greece, Serbia, and

⁵⁵ T. G. Djuvara, *Mes missions diplomatiques* (Paris, 1930), 20.

⁵⁶ On February 9, 1898 Djuvara reported, "Tewfik Pacha said to the German ambassador that the question of our church is a question of money for the Patriarchate." *Ibid.*, 48.

⁵⁷ Djuvara was received on November 27, 1897 by the Sultan who discussed in a low voice the Vlach question for fear of being heard by the Russian *chargé d'affaires* in an adjoining room. "Abdul Hamid was very humble before even the shadow of the Muscovite colossus." *Ibid.*, 47.

⁵⁸ On February 26, 1898 Djuvara reported, "Baron Testa told me that the Sultan had pronounced exactly these words, 'Is it wise, at the very moment when I have been able to extinguish one fire, to light another one?'" *Ibid.*, 48.

Bulgaria should together lay before the ambassadors of the Powers at Constantinople their demand for reforms in Macedonia according to the provisions of Article XXIII of the Treaty of Berlin. The obvious advantage of such a move was that it would demonstrate the common aims of the three Balkan states and would place them on record in demanding certain reforms. The Delyannis cabinet, however, refused to have anything to do with this proposal on the ground that the Turkish promises of reform were useless. Instead the Greeks suggested a definition of spheres of influence in Macedonia. This the Bulgarians were loath to do but it is said that they did agree to leave Old Serbia as far south as Uskub to Serbia and Thessaly as far north as the Monastir vilayet to Greece. Then Bulgaria would take the vilayet of Monastir together with the whole territory between Eastern Roumelia and the Aegean Sea as far east as the district of Adrianople. Greece was to obtain all the islands of the archipelago, Mount Athos was to be made neutral and Salonica was to go to the power which, in case of a war with Turkey, made the most military efforts and sacrifices.⁵⁹ Despite the imminence of war the Greek government rejected this offer. An effort was made a little later to reopen negotiations but war had broken out by then and the Bulgarians were unwilling to be embroiled.

In the meantime public opinion in Serbia was in favor of action but the government was in no position to make war. Diplomatically, both Austria-Hungary and Russia were opposed to the reopening of the Eastern Question, and militarily, Serbia had far from adequate munition supplies. Accordingly it was decided that in place of taking sides in the Greco-Turkish war, an agreement should be concluded with Bulgaria. In the last days of February King Alexander paid a visit to Sofia and came to a three-point gentlemen's understanding on March 1 with the Bulgarian government. Every question affecting Bulgarian and Serbian interests in the Ottoman Empire was to be settled by agreement; neither party was to undertake any unilateral political or military action that might disturb the *status quo*; and neither party should put obstacles in the way of the other but should provide mutual aid in all national, ecclesiastical and educational questions. Montenegro was to be invited to adhere to this agreement. In addition to this official understanding there existed during this period a very considerable popular sentiment, especially among the youth, in favor of a genuine and more binding Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Norman, *loc. cit.*, 411, 412.

⁶⁰ Jovanović, *Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića*, I, 366, 367; Stragnakovitch, *Oeuvre du rapprochement*, 20, 21.

The Serbian government, however, was not ready to depend solely on this agreement with Bulgaria. It suspected the existence of an anti-Turkish and anti-Serbian understanding between Bulgaria and Greece. Accordingly the Serbian foreign minister, Vladan Georgevich, journeyed to Constantinople in October 1897 and proposed to the Sultan a defensive and offensive alliance, which the other Balkan states should be free to join, in the hope that a general Balkan alliance would thereby be eventually formed. By this time, however, the Greeks had been decisively defeated and the Turkish government was therefore uninterested in these overtures.⁶¹ The significance of this diplomatic activity is that the Greeks found themselves in a war with Turkey without the support of any of their Balkan neighbors.

The same looseness in inter-Balkan ties characterized the years immediately following the Greco-Turkish War when several futile attempts were made by the Balkan states to conclude bilateral agreements amongst themselves. In the spring of 1899, because of her strained relations with Turkey, Serbia turned to Greece and suggested an agreement regarding their interests in Macedonia. King Alexander's secretary, Milichevich, was sent to Athens where he received a plan in which the Greek government demanded the withdrawal of Serbian consulates from southern Macedonia, particularly from Salonica, Serres and Monastir, and claimed the region as far north as Nevrokop, Melnik, Strumitza, Prilip, Krushevo and Strougo. The Serbian government considered these conditions excessive and required that, aside from any entente, its candidate Firmilien should be appointed to the Uskub bishopric. This the Greek government was unwilling to consider and by the end of the year the negotiations had been dropped.

In the following year there was much talk of a Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement. The Russian government did its utmost to bring the two states together. In January 18, 1901 Prince Ferdinand visited Alexander in Belgrade and the two rulers ostentatiously despatched a common telegram of New Year's greetings and good will to the Tsar. Later in the year Russian military officers visited both Belgrade and Sofia, and French and Austrian papers talked of an imminent military convention between Serbia and Bulgaria. All this activity, however, finally proved fruitless. For months Alexander had planned to visit St. Petersburg with his bride but the arrangements were repeatedly postponed and finally cancelled. This disappointed Alexander deeply, especially because of the particularly warm recep-

⁶¹ Georgevich, *Srbija i Turska*, 310-338. See also the following works by the same author: *Die Serbische Frage* (Stuttgart, 1909), 142-146; *Das Ende der Obrenovitch. Beitrage zur Geschichte Serbiens 1897-1900* (Leipzig, 1905), 74, 75.

tion which Ferdinand received in St. Petersburg. Thus in spite of the efforts of the Russian foreign minister, Count Lamsdorff, who visited Belgrade, Alexander now moved closer to Austria-Hungary, and by November 20, 1902, a new pro-Austrian government had been established.⁶²

In the meantime Vienna had been concerned about Russian diplomatic activity in the Balkans and had sought to form a Greco-Roumanian entente which could counter-balance a possible pro-Russian combination. As early as August 1898 King Carol had expressed a desire to meet King George and the Athens cabinet urged that such a meeting be arranged. Despite this advice the Greek king was reluctant to take any steps and the matter was dropped.⁶³ In 1900, however, the Vienna government secured from Carol the promise that should Bulgaria order a general mobilization directed against Turkey, then Roumania would attack Bulgaria. This agreement was also aimed indirectly against Russia in case that Power went to the aid of the Bulgarians.⁶⁴ On December 19 of the same year a commercial treaty was signed by Roumania and Greece which accorded to each other most-favored-nation treatment. King Carol expressed once more the desire to see the Greek King and at the suggestion of the Austrian government a meeting was arranged at Abbazia. For five days the two kings discussed various questions without the presence of ministers. They agreed on the necessity for a common front against Bulgaria and Carol minimized the importance of the Roumanian propaganda in Macedonia, but no agreement was signed. The affair, however, received much publicity. The newspapers made references to a definite alliance and to a united front against the Slavs.

Actually the Abbazia interview was merely a manifestation of good will which did not influence Greco-Roumanian relations for long. Carol continued to make friendly speeches, while Roumanian students were given a warm welcome in Athens in September 1901, but the initial enthusiasm soon passed away. King George complained of the Roumanian demand that the Porte recognize the Vlach communities, and Carol in turn protested that Greece was not bringing pressure to bear on the Patriarchate in favor of Roumanian interests as had been agreed. The climax was reached in 1905 when the Roumanian ministry obtained from the Porte the recognition of the

⁶² *Documents diplomatiques français*, 2nd series, vol. I, no. 38; vol. II, nos. 319, 400, 424, 460, 469, 481, 494, 496, 527, 543, 547; Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique*, IV, 483. At the insistence of Russia, some moves had also been made in the direction of a Serbian-Montenegrin understanding. See *Documents diplomatiques français*, 2nd series, vol. I, nos. 78, 233, 313.

⁶³ Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique*, IV, 481, 482.

⁶⁴ Lascaris, "Coup d'oeil sur la question d'Orient au début XX^e siècle," *loc. cit.*, 7.

Vlachs as a separate nationality with the right of worshipping in their own language. Chauvinists in Athens denounced the Roumanians, anti-Greek riots took place in Roumania and diplomatic relations between the two countries were actually broken off for several years.⁶⁵

In the meantime the Russians had been fully aware of the Austro-Roumanian agreement of 1900 and of the Greco-Roumanian negotiations. When a delegation of Bulgarians in June 1902 visited St. Petersburg they were informed of the Austro-Roumanian agreement and were persuaded to create a counter-weight against it. Dr. Danev, the Bulgarian President of the Council, first broached the subject of the union of all the Bulgarian people but General Kuropatkin, the Russian minister of war, made it clear that he did not want to disturb the peace of Europe. He promised, however, that at the earliest opportunity Russia would settle the Bulgarian problem along the lines of the Treaty of San Stefano. It was then agreed that the alliance should be concerned only with Roumano-Bulgarian relations and on May 31, 1902 a secret convention was signed at St. Petersburg. It was strictly defensive, anticipating only an attack by Roumania, in which case Russia agreed to aid Bulgaria. There were also several clauses dealing with technical military matters but these also were concerned only with Roumania and not with Turkey or Austria-Hungary.⁶⁶

With Russia behind Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary behind Roumania and no possibility of an agreement with her Balkan neighbors because of the Macedonian question, Greece now turned to Turkey. As early as November 1898 and again in the spring of 1899 Turkey had suggested an agreement to Greece, but the Athens government insisted that outstanding questions should first be settled. In April 1901 the Sultan informed Mavrocordatos, the Greek representative in Constantinople, that the Greco-Turkish rapprochement should take a more concrete form and by the end of 1902 the Porte was talking of a definite alliance. Numerous other friendly moves were made by the Ottoman government but no effort was made for the actual conclusion of an agreement and the Greek government realized that the Porte was merely carrying out a diplomatic manoeuvre. In the

⁶⁵ Relations had been interrupted once before between 1892 and 1896 because the Roumanian courts declared illegal the legacies of the Greek Zappa brothers who had founded the Zappeion in Athens. See Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique*, IV, 484-486.

⁶⁶ The question of whether a time limit clause was included still remains obscure. During the 1912-13 crisis the Bulgarian government appealed for aid on the basis of this convention but Sazanov took the stand that it had lapsed. See E. C. Helmreich and C. E. Black, "The Russo-Bulgarian Military Convention of 1902," *Journal of Modern History*, IX (December, 1937), 471-482.

words of the Greek envoy in Constantinople, "They seek to tie our hands."⁶⁷

Such, then, was the situation in the Near East at the turn of the century. Because of the Macedonian question and the influence of Great Power diplomacy, the Balkan nations after 1878 had been unable to agree on any common policy. The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 and the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 revealed the extent of the lack of cohesion between the Balkan states. Moreover the defeat of Greece in 1897 revealed that there was still plenty of fight left in the "sick man" and that he could well take care of himself. Henceforth the Balkan states did not talk with such levity of dividing this or that portion of the empire between them. Finally the international situation during these years was distinctly unfavorable for any Balkan alliance or alignment designed to upset the *status quo*. On May 8, 1897 Russia and Austria reached the Goluchowski-Muraviev agreement for the professed purpose of "... eliminating the danger of a rivalry disastrous to the peace of Europe on the seething soil of the Balkan Peninsula." The agreement provided that the *status quo* should be maintained as long as possible and that when it could no longer be upheld the two parties should cooperate to prevent any other power from acquiring territory in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary's special interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Albania were recognized with reservations by Russia, while the question of Constantinople and the Straits was declared to be of an "eminently European character."⁶⁸ The Dual Monarchy now concentrated its attention on internal problems while Russia, after the Nelidov plan had been rejected as impracticable,⁶⁹ abandoned temporarily her designs on Constantinople and turned to the Far East. With the Great Powers united in their desire to preserve peace and to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire there was little incentive, even if it were possible, for the formation of a Balkan entente.

The period from 1878 to the end of the century witnessed the usual quota of schemes for the partition of the Ottoman Empire and for the creation of a Balkan federation of one type or another. An interesting example of the pan-Hellenist aspirations of these years is the Phylsenzides plan of 1879. The ultimate collapse of Turkey

⁶⁷ Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique*, IV, 487-492. Public opinion in Greece, during this period, remained strongly anti-Russian and generally anti-Slav. See *Documents diplomatiques français*, 2nd series, vol. I, nos. 564, 507.

⁶⁸ Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, 184-195.

⁶⁹ On the occasion of the Armenian massacres of 1896, Nelidov, the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, recommended the occupation by Russia of Constantinople and the Asiatic coast of the Black Sea. A council of ministers decided against the proposals by a six to four vote. W. L. Langer, "Russia, the Straits Question and the European Powers," *English Historical Review*, XLIV (January, 1929), 61, 62.

was taken for granted, and its place was to be taken by two federative groups. The first was to consist of Greece, Albania and two other states centering around Constantinople and Smyrna, while the other was to be composed of Armenia, Syria, and the lands of the Kurds and Druses. The latter group was to be placed under the protection of the Great Powers while the former was to be organized along the lines of the German Confederation with the king of Greece taking the role of the Prussian king. Little comment need be made about this scheme. Its pan-Hellenic nature and its impracticability are both apparent.⁷⁰

More moderate and feasible was the plan of Demetrius Bikelas, the well-known Greek literary figure.⁷¹ Rather than await the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, he was of the opinion that Turkey would and should keep Constantinople and Thrace because of the international complications that otherwise would arise. "Then there could be in the Balkan peninsula a real confederation of independent and satisfied states, united by their interests, and turning their efforts only toward progress and civilization, and the Eastern Question would cease to preoccupy and disturb Europe."⁷²

Equally in favor of a Balkan federation was the Serbian statesman, Milan Pirochanats, formerly President of the Council under King Milan and champion of the policies of Prince Michael and Garashanin. In 1889 he published in Paris under the pseudonym of Dr. Stefan Bratimich, a brochure in which he urged a federation of the Balkan states in order to put an end to Russian and Austro-Hungarian interference in the affairs of the peninsula.

We are convinced that we should have no more illusions of hope as regards Russia and Austria-Hungary . . . and that a federative alliance of the eastern peoples for the defense of their common interests, is the first and last word of the policy which they could and must follow in the present as well as in the future.⁷³

An important and notably thoughtful contribution to the federation literature of this period was the work of Vladimir Karich, professor of history and later Serbian consul at Uskub. Karich argued that it was essential for the Balkan states to band together because of their weakness and the proven cupidity of Russia and Austria-

⁷⁰ N. Phylssenzides, *L'arbitrage international et l'établissement d'un empire grec* (Brussels, 1897), 213, 214.

⁷¹ For a summary of his career, see A. Andreades, "Un précurseur de l'union balkanique: Demetrius Bikelas 1835-1908," *Les Balkans*, IV (May-June, 1933), 11-33.

⁷² D. Bikelas, *Le rôle et les aspirations de la Grèce dans la question d'Orient* (Paris, 1885), 43, 44.

⁷³ Cited by Pinon, "Une confédération balkanique," *loc. cit.*, 816. The above mentioned brochure by Pirochanats, entitled *La Péninsule des Balkans*, was not available for this study.

Hungary. Moreover such a league should include Turkey and not be directed against that country since it also was threatened by the Great Powers. After raising the question of the feasibility of such a league, Karich pointed out the cultural similarities and the common historical background and economic interests of the Balkan states. As a practical first step he proposed a customs union of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia as the most likely combination, and expressed the hope that Roumania and Turkey would later join. He also urged Bulgarian and Serbian writers to create a common literature and to work for a unification of their two languages. This he considered a prelude to an ultimate Yugoslav union. Finally he made a plea for mutual concessions on the part of the Balkan races. It was essential, he concluded, for the Turks and Christians to overcome their traditional conflicts, for the Serbians and Bulgarians to forget the 1885 war, and for the Greeks to abandon their Byzantine "Great Idea."⁷⁴

Note should also be made of a Turkish scheme for closer inter-Balkan cooperation. Colonel, and later Marshal Izzet Pasha, prepared in 1899 a memorandum on the diplomatic and military situation of the Ottoman Empire. It is interesting to note that one of his proposals was the granting of autonomy to Macedonia in order to satisfy the reform demands of the Great Powers and to curb the expansionist aspirations of the Balkan states. Another recommendation was "to form a Balkan alliance under the presidency of the Turkish Empire," including a defensive and offensive military pact and a common assembly based on the Frankfurt Diet. He accused the Turkish officials of blind religious prejudice in rejecting Stambulov's alliance offer and he argued that the proposed league would be the equivalent of a Great Power and would therefore be able to prevent the interference of foreign states in Balkan affairs.⁷⁵

Not all of the plans of this period were of Balkan origin. Very interesting and statesmanlike were the theories of Professor L. Kamarowski of the University of Moscow. His premise regarding the inevitable downfall of the Ottoman Empire was similar to that of the pan-Slavs but his conclusions and proposals were far different from theirs. He pointed out that when the Empire collapsed there were four possible substitutes to take its place. In the first place the Greek Empire could be reconstituted, and this plan, Kamarowski believed, was feasible in the days of Catherine but ". . . today the Greeks have neither sufficient power nor the least right to halt the

⁷⁴ V. Karića, *Srbija i Balkanski Savez* [Serbia and the Balkan League] (Belgrade, 1893), *passim*.

⁷⁵ *Denkwürdigkeiten des Marschalls Izzet Pascha. Ein kritischer Beitrag zur Kriegsschuldfrage* (Leipzig, 1927), 84-88.

progress of the political life which has sprung up in their neighborhood amongst the Slavs."⁷⁶ Secondly the Ottoman Empire could be absorbed by one of the Great Powers but this he rightly dismissed as impractical. Thirdly the Empire could be partitioned, and Kamarowski showed how this possibility had been proposed by numerous writers but he rejected it as incompatible with the peace of the Balkans and Europe as a whole. The last alternative was the setting up of independent states and this plan Kamarowski was prepared to support. His specific recommendations were that European Turkey be divided into independent states on the basis of nationality and that Europe should follow a policy of non-intervention once these states were erected. Then these newly formed nations should band together with Constantinople as the capital of a Balkan federation. Kamarowski specifically rejected Danilevski's proposal that Constantinople be made the capital of Slavdom and be occupied temporarily by Russia. Instead the city should be a purely Balkan center and the Straits should be neutralized and all fortifications destroyed.⁷⁷

Much less clear were the views of the English historian, Edward Freeman. The notorious "Bulgarian horrors" perpetrated by the Turkish irregulars in 1876 aroused his interest in the oppressed Balkan races. In numerous articles and speeches he mercilessly lashed Disraeli's foreign policy and supported Gladstone's proposal to drive the Turks out of Europe.⁷⁸ As for the future, he foresaw the break-up also of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with the German sections joining Germany and the Slav areas uniting with the Balkan Yugoslavs to form a new empire with Constantinople as its center. "The New Rome must ever be the New Rome; she must be the head of something . . . But of what is she to be the head? I need hardly speak my own mind—of a federation, if federation is to be had; of an empire, if federation is not to be had."⁷⁹ To head this federation of south-eastern Europe Freeman proposed the King of Hungary

⁷⁶ L. Kamarowski, "La question d'Orient," *Revue de droit international public*, III (1896), 408.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 409–419. A somewhat similar federation proposal is to be found in C. Santerne, *La question d'Orient populaire* (Paris, 1897), 117–122.

⁷⁸ W. R. Stevens, *The Life and Letters of Edward A. Freeman* (London, 1895), I, 12, 13, 107, 108, 148–152, 232; D. Harris, *Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876* (Chicago, 1939), 119–122, 338–340. When Disraeli was defeated in the ensuing elections, Freeman gleefully wrote: "The victory of the elections is pre-eminently a moral victory, a triumph of right over wrong. It is a victory of sound European and English feeling over the empty brag and tawdry tinsel of Asiatic imperialism. . . . Lord Beaconsfield has never turned European, he remains as purely Asiatic as if he had never left Ur of the Chaldees. . . . It is no small feat from his point of view to have turned an European Queen, the daughter of Cedric and William, into an Asiatic Empress of his own making." "The Election and the Eastern Question," *Contemporary Review*, XXXVII (June, 1880), 965, 966.

⁷⁹ "Geographical Aspects of the Eastern Question," *Fortnightly Review*, CXXI (January 1, 1877), 85–87.

who would no longer have any connection with Austria. By 1899, however, his views had changed:

Now when we dreamed of a King of Hungary, head of a South-Eastern Confederation, we at least assumed that he would cease to be Duke of Austria. But we have left off dreaming about the matter. We see the stern realities of the history of our own wonderful age. We see that the rising nations of South-Eastern Europe are surrounded by three enemies, Turkish, Russian and Austrian, and that of these three the Austrian is the most dangerous. . . . the House of Habsburg, representing, not a nation but the selfish interests of a family, never can be either just or generous. And a King of Hungary above all, as long as the Magyar is the ruling race of his kingdom, never can be just or generous to Slaves or Roumans. The outlook is dark.⁸⁰

The views of Francesco Crispi on the Eastern Question are significant as representative of the attitude of Italian liberals towards the Balkan peoples during these years. In 1889, for example, Crispi became alarmed by the strained relations between Russia and Roumania and the possibility of Russian aggression.⁸¹ On April 20 he telegraphed the Italian embassy in Vienna to urge on Count Kálnoky " . . . the advisability of promoting a federal military compact between Servia, Roumania and Bulgaria, so that in case of war, their forces may from the first be directed by one head and follow one line of action."⁸² Similar communications were also sent to the Italian ministers in Belgrade and Sofia, and they were asked to report whether such a military federation would be favorably received by Serbia and Bulgaria. Kálnoky received Crispi's plan coolly, arguing that Russia had no intention of going to war and that the proposed plan could not be carried out except when events threatened immediate developments. Crispi replied that, "As regards the Balkan federation, I am of the opinion that it should be prepared in times of peace and not when events become imminent."⁸³ Finally, however, nothing was done.

Although Crispi's proposal in 1889 was designed primarily to check Russian expansion, nevertheless the Italian statesman was genuinely interested in the future of the Balkan peoples. Like Mazzini, Crispi had faith in the force of nationalism. At the time of the uprising in Bosnia-Herzegovina he praised the valor of the rebels and accepted their struggles as proof of their right to freedom. A few

⁸⁰ "The House of Habsburg in South-Eastern Europe," *Fortnightly Review*, CCLXXX (June, 1889), 851.

⁸¹ The tension arose because King Carol, resentful of the Russian annexation of Bessarabia in 1878, was erecting fortifications along the Seret, thus blocking Russia's easiest path for invasion of the Balkans.

⁸² *The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi* (London, 1914), II, 382–384.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, II, 385.

years later, on February 3, 1879, he stated before the Italian Chamber of Deputies:

I, gentlemen, have the conviction that the Balkan Peninsula can be reorganized on the basis of nationality. I profoundly believe that those peoples [of the Balkans] are pervaded with the breath of liberty which could revive, civilize, and place them on that great road which has been trodden for several centuries by the other nations of Europe.⁸⁴

In a public letter of April 1897 he even went so far as to write that:

The national Italian party would like to see a Balkan confederation formed with Constantinople as the capital. Here the Turks could find their place if they wished to behave like brothers rather than masters.⁸⁵

In addition to these individual proposals, there began to appear during this period organizations for the specific purpose of furthering the federation cause. One of these was a Greek association founded in 1884. Very little is known of this body. "The Eastern Question," it held, "can be resolved only by peaceful means, that is to say by forming the states of the Balkan Peninsula into a Confederacy, this being the only arrangement possible which will not offend one of the Powers."⁸⁶ The association also published a paper entitled *Eastern Confederation*, and it sought to include Turkey, as well as the strictly Balkan states, in the projected federation. In 1885 it proved necessary to suspend activities temporarily because of the racial hatred generated by the war of that year, but two years later the association "resumed its labors more resolutely than ever." In all probability, however, it did not last very long nor exert much influence.⁸⁷

Much more important was the "International League for Peace and Liberty," which passed resolutions in favor of a Balkan federation at its 1869, 1876, 1877 and 1886 congresses. At the last of these the resolution adopted read as follows:

The clearest and most efficient way of avoiding unwholesome covetousness would be a federative organization sanctioned by a neutrality guaranteed by Europe. Such is the ideal, such should be the goal of the efforts of the Balkan peoples and of all the cabinets which are anxious for justice.⁸⁸

Under the auspices of this league there was formed in 1894 the

⁸⁴ F. Crispi, *La Quistione Orientale* (Rome, 1879), 19, 22-24. See also his *Memoirs*, III, 248.

⁸⁵ Cited by Loiseau, *Le Balkan slave*, 272, 273.

⁸⁶ Cited in *The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, III, 272.

⁸⁷ The only references to this association are in Crispi's memoirs and in M. Ban, *Solution de la question d'Orient, par l'Europe ou par la Porte* (Belgrade, 1885), 51.

⁸⁸ Cited by Pinon, "Une confédération balkanique," *loc. cit.*, 809. See also Djuvara, *Cent projets*, 501.

"League for Balkan Confederation."⁸⁹ The organizational meeting was presided over by Magalhaes Lima, the eminent Portuguese socialist, and among the delegates were Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians, Roumanians, Armenians and other nationalities. The main speech of the meeting was delivered by the Greek socialist, P. Argyriades, who was elected president of the League. Argyriades pointed out that there were two main obstacles to a Near Eastern federation. The first was the existing Ottoman Empire, but that was of a temporary nature and would, sooner or later, disappear. The other was the Macedonian question, and that would be solved by the granting of autonomy to Macedonia as a part of the general confederation of the Near East. This confederation he explained, was to consist of the following countries: 1. Greece and the isle of Crete; 2. Bulgaria; 3. Roumania; 4. Serbia; 5. Bosnia-Herzegovina; 6. Montenegro; 7. Macedonia and Albania; 8. Thrace with Constantinople as a free city and the center of the confederation; 9. Armenia; 10. Asia Minor coastal regions. The nature of this confederation he described as follows:

Each one of these states will have complete autonomy; each one will be administered internally according to its own will. But the general interests of the confederated states will be regulated by their delegates meeting at Constantinople, by all the measures destined to assure the maintenance of a federative pact, to prevent or settle conflicts among them and, finally, above all, to place all the strength of the confederation at the disposal of any state whose independence or integrity is attacked from without.⁹⁰

Apparently this League for Balkan confederation did not exert much influence as no reference to it is available other than that describing its organization. The League is important, however, as representative of the attitude of pacifists and radicals towards the Eastern Question. During the first decade of the twentieth century, as the Macedonian question became more dangerous to the peace of Europe, other bodies for the solution of the Eastern Question were to be organized, with prominent public figures in their ranks and with a correspondingly greater influence on their times.

⁸⁹ The following resolution was passed at the 1894 Congress of the Peace League. "The Congress expresses its satisfaction at the organization in Paris of the League for Balkan Confederation, having for its aim the unification of the people of the East into one unit." *Bulletin officiel du VI^{me} congrès international de la paix tenu à Anvers (Belgique) du 29 août au 1 septembre 1894* (Antwerp, 1895), 167.

⁹⁰ P. Argyriades and P. Lagarde, *Solution de la question d'Orient. La confédération balkanique. Compte-rendu de la conférence tenue au Grand Orient de France sur cette question (tiré de la Revue socialiste) et la Macédoine; relation sur ce pays (tirée de l'Almanach de la question sociale de 1896)* (Paris, 1896), 6. See also P. L. [Argyriades] "Le fédéralisme et la question d'Orient," *Revue socialiste*, XXII (August, 1895), 202-213.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND BALKAN ALLIANCE SYSTEM, 1903-1914

At the beginning of the twentieth century the movement for Balkan cooperation and unity had been brought to a standstill by the 1897 Goluchowski-Muraviev agreement and by the struggle for Macedonia. The wave of terrorism and violence which culminated in the general Macedonian insurrection of July 1903 made matters worse. European sympathy had been alienated by the destructiveness of the Bulgarian revolutionaries and the Sultan seized this opportunity to strike. Troops, regular and irregular, were let loose upon the hapless peasantry; more than a hundred villages were totally destroyed by fire and tens of thousands of inhabitants were rendered homeless and destitute. Such a state of affairs could not continue indefinitely. Austria-Hungary and Russia, the two powers most immediately interested, drew up the modest Mürzsteg Program of reform for the three Macedonian vilayets of Salonica, Monastir and Kossovo. They recommended that the gendarmerie be reorganized and put under the command of a foreign general and a staff of foreign officers. In addition the country was to be divided into districts and assigned to five of the Powers with Austria and Russia responsible for the general supervision of the program.¹ A Russian and an Austrian civil agent were to accompany the Turkish inspector-general on his tours and report on conditions.

Since the Powers supported this reform scheme the Sultan felt obliged to accept it but its sole result was to increase the disorder. A clause in the program provided that when the work of pacification was completed a new delimitation of administrative districts should be made in favor of a more regular grouping of the various nationalities represented in Macedonia. Realizing that their future claims would therefore depend on the vigor and effectiveness of their propaganda, the activities of the Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek bands became more feverish than ever. Thus the Mürzsteg Program was a complete failure because it did not reach to the roots of the matter, that is, it did not solve the claims of the rival aspirants to the succession of Macedonia. More than ever before the Balkan states were deadlocked in a furious campaign of propaganda and terrorism for the possession of Macedonia.²

¹ The spheres were assigned as follows: Kossovo to Austria-Hungary; Seres to France; Monastir to Italy; Drama to Great Britain; Salonica to Russia. Germany refused to participate in the police work for fear of offending the Porte and imperilling the Bagdad Railway plans.

² An excellent analysis of this subject is available in Colonel Lamouche, *Quinze*

Beginning with 1903, however, a series of events took place which ultimately led to the Balkan alliances of 1912.³ The first of these was the murder in June 1903 of King Alexander, Queen Draga and the queen's male relatives. The results of this brutal crime were far-reaching. The pro-Austrian, decadent, Obrenovich dynasty was now eliminated and Peter Karageorgevich came to power with the support of the powerful, pro-Russian, Radical party. Henceforth Serbian foreign policy, instead of being dictated from Vienna, was definitely anti-Austrian. Serbia now found herself in a peculiar position. She had turned her back upon Austria but she could not look to Russia for support since that country was engaged at war in the Far East with Japan. One alternative was Sofia. The Radical party favored an agreement with Bulgaria, for it would strengthen their government and enhance the economic welfare of their country, while King Peter, with an uncertain crown upon his head and still unrecognized by various European powers, was also eager to strengthen his position by an alliance. Thus in a conversation with the Bulgarian attaché in Belgrade, Hesapschiev, on February 1, 1904, Peter discussed the question of an agreement. The suggestion was favorably received by the Bulgarian government and M. Rizov, then Bulgarian minister at Cetinje, was dispatched to Belgrade to aid the attaché in carrying on the negotiations. The result was the signing on April 12, 1904 of two treaties.⁴

The first was a general treaty of friendship dealing with cultural and economic matters. It provided for the setting of common postal and telegraph rates, the introduction of the cyrillic alphabet in telegraphic communications between the two countries, the abolition of passport requirements, the drawing up of conventions for the extradition of criminals, the common circulation of coinage, and the encouragement of trade by the reduction of freight and passenger rates. The most important article was the first, by which the signatories agreed, "To permit the free importation of their respective products (of domestic origin), at the same time attempting to conduct similar customs policies with respect to other states, aiming at an eventual customs union (Zollverein)."⁵ It was the attempt to put

ans d'histoire balkanique (1904-1918) (Paris, 1928), 7-66. Lamouche was the French delegate for the reorganization of the gendarmerie. A detailed account of the policies of the Great Powers regarding Macedonia is given in W. D. David, *European Diplomacy in the Near Eastern Question 1906-1909* (*Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences* vol. XXV, no. 4, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1940), ch. II.

³ The following account of the diplomacy leading to the formation of the Balkan League is based primarily on the standard work by E. C. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913* (*Harvard Historical Series*, no. XLII, Cambridge, 1938).

⁴ An English translation of the texts is available in Helmreich, *op. cit.*, appendix II. ⁵ Cited by Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 465.

this article into practice that led to the Austro-Serbian tariff war.

The second treaty, which provided for a political alliance between the two countries, was not known until published in 1929 by Toshev.⁶ The first article of this treaty approved of the Mürzsteg program and pledged the support of both states for its attainment. The next article provided for reciprocal military aid against an attack, regardless whence it came, . . . "on the present territorial unity and independence of their respective states, or on the security, and inviolability of the reigning dynasties." Undoubtedly this clause must have been very welcome to King Peter whose position in Serbia was none too secure. United action was also called for in case of an unfriendly action in Macedonia or Old Serbia (article 3). It was further agreed that should the occasion arise the Albanian problem should be handled in such a manner as to pave the way for an alliance between Serbia and Montenegro (article 5).⁷ The next two articles called for the discussion of all questions arising from the treaty and provided that, in case no agreement was reached, the dispute be submitted to the Tsar for arbitration, and if the latter refused, then the dispute was to be referred to the International Court of Arbitration at the Hague. It might be noted that this principle of Russian arbitration was included also in the 1912 Serbo-Bulgarian alliance but that the Hague Court was not then mentioned. In the last article it was provided that the pact should be kept secret and that it should be communicated to a third state only after previous agreement between the allies. No time limit was set for the treaty but it was to be revised after five years should this prove necessary.

On April 13, 1904 there was signed a final protocol or covering document for the two treaties which more minutely defined the various clauses of the treaties in order to avoid misinterpretation. It was first agreed that the proposed customs union should not affect existing commercial treaties with other countries and that efforts should be made to establish telegraphic relations with Russia in the Cyrillic alphabet. The most important explanatory note specifically stated that the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar was considered a part of the Kossovo vilayet. In other words, Bulgaria had pledged herself to oppose Austrian annexation of a region then occupied by Austrian forces. The final article provided that the treaties be kept in the personal archives of Peter and Ferdinand and that the foreign offices be given copies of only the economic treaty.⁸

Negotiations were now started for the conclusion of the customs

⁶ Toshev, *Balkanskite voïni*, I, 153-158.

⁷ The previous article provided for a special military convention which was to be drawn up to take care of the eventualities mentioned in articles 2 and 3.

⁸ Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 6, 7.

union foreseen in the first treaty. By July 1905 a tariff agreement was reached which was to go into effect the following March and remain in force until March 1, 1917, after which it was to be replaced by a common tariff rate for both countries. It was hoped that by March 1, 1906 the two countries would have concluded their separate agreements with Austria-Hungary so that the treaty could be put into operation. This, however, was not to be the case. The first difficulty arose when on January 2, 1906 the Bulgarian government, without consulting Belgrade, lay the tariff agreement before the Söbranje where it was passed by acclamation.

Serbia had already begun negotiations with Austria-Hungary but this revelation of the tariff agreement so alarmed the Monarchy that on January 11 Aehrenthal demanded of Serbia that the provision for an ultimate customs union be dropped. Serbia's answer was tantamount to a refusal so that Vienna refused to continue negotiations unless Serbia made a declaration to the effect that she would not ratify the Bulgarian agreement while negotiating with Austria and that should a Serbo-Austrian treaty be concluded, Serbia would undertake all the modifications of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty demanded by Austria. The Serbian government accepted the first demand and sought to change the second so as to call for only such changes as the Austro-Serbian Treaty required. Vienna rejected this offer; Belgrade refused to yield further, and an impasse was reached. The Austrian frontier was closed to the import of Serbian livestock and the famous "pig war" began. The Serbian merchants rallied to the support of the government and Pashich in the Skupshtina made his well-known speech in which he termed the Austrian demands as incompatible with the dignity of Serbia and stated that the Serbian government desired the friendship, not only of Austria, but also of the Balkan states, for only in this manner could the ideal, "The Balkans to the Balkan peoples" be realized.

Austro-Serbian negotiations were recommenced, however, on the understanding that if a treaty were concluded, Serbia would drop the term Zollverein from the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty and a number of changes would be made on points which conflicted with the most favored nation principle. The negotiations again collapsed when Austria demanded preferential treatment for her industries in Serbian governmental contracts particularly in the case of artillery orders. Serbia now turned to other nations. A commercial treaty based on the most favored nation principle was concluded with Bulgaria in December 1906 and other agreements were negotiated in 1907 with Roumania, France, Russia, Switzerland, Sweden, Italy and Belgium.⁹

⁹ *Ibid.*, 7-10.

This Austro-Serbian estrangement was not, however, accompanied by a corresponding Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement. As long as the Petkov ministry remained in power in Sofia the relations between Bulgaria and Serbia retained, at least outwardly, their friendly character, but with the assassination of Petkov and the appointment of Stanchov to the foreign ministry in March 1907, matters took a turn for the worse. Stanchov made visits to Vienna and Berlin; Austro-Bulgarian relations became close; the Bulgarian press vigorously denounced Serbian policy in Macedonia and a number of incidents occurred which aroused much ill-feeling in both countries. The fundamental difficulty, of course, was the Macedonian question, the Bulgarians wishing it to be considered a purely Bulgarian matter to the exclusion of the Serbians. On April 2, 1908 J. B. Whitehead, the British representative in Belgrade reported the situation as follows:

To sum up the whole situation as regards the relations between Serbia and Bulgaria, it is clear that they can never be cordial and stable until the competition between the two nationalities for an eventual acquisition of the Slav countries still under Turkish rule comes to an end. M. Pashitch was in favour of cooperating with Bulgaria for common aims, and of deferring the discussion of the rights of the two nations to the expected inheritance until it should actually fall due, but his intentions were frustrated by the uncompromising claim of the Bulgarians to the whole of the territory awarded to them by the Treaty of San Stefano.¹⁰

Thus the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of April 1904 was practically still-born, and as the relations between the two countries rapidly cooled, it ceased to be regarded as binding. By 1908 Serbia had broken away from Austrian economic and political tutelage and struck out on an independent nationalist policy of her own, but inter-Balkan relations remained as unsatisfactory as before.

The year 1908, however, witnessed a series of events which completely changed the Near Eastern situation. The first of these was the "Young Turk" revolution of the Macedonian "Committee of Union and Progress." This Committee consisted mainly of young men who had acquired a veneer of western ideas and who had come to the conclusion that the Ottoman Empire could survive only if it could be technically and politically modernized. Having gained the support of the army in Macedonia, the Committee on July 23, 1908 proclaimed the Turkish constitution of 1876 and prepared for a march on Constantinople. The wily Sultan Abdul Hamid immediately protested that the Committee had merely anticipated the wish dearest

¹⁰ *British Documents*, V, 118. See also M. Boghitchewitsch, *Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens 1903-1914* (Berlin, 1928-31), I, 120-135.

to his heart and promptly proclaimed the constitution in Constantinople, summoned a parliament, guaranteed personal liberty and equality of rights to all subjects irrespective of race, creed or origin, and abolished the army of 40,000 spies.

This sudden revolution produced tremendous enthusiasm, both in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire itself. Enver Bey, the leader of the Young Turks, exclaimed that "arbitrary government" had "disappeared." And for a time it seemed that such was the case. At Seres the president of the Bulgarian Committee embraced the Greek archbishop; at Drama the revolutionary officers imprisoned a Turk for insulting a Christian; in Athens a crowd gathered before the Turkish embassy shouting "Long live the Ottoman army, long live the Sultan." The first results of the revolution were thus most promising. It seemed that at long last the Eastern Question was to be eliminated by the simple process of Turkey becoming occidental in government, social life and technical equipment.¹¹

These rosy prospects were not, however, of long duration. A series of rude shocks followed one upon the other. The first of these was the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bulgarian declaration of independence. In 1906 the timid and cautious Count Goluchowski was replaced in the Austrian foreign office by the energetic and ambitious Aehrenthal who aimed to strengthen the Dual Monarchy by putting an end to the Serbian menace which he believed threatened to disrupt the Hapsburg Empire.¹² His first move was the announcement on January 27, 1908 that Austria would build a railway from Uvatz through the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar to Mitrovitza, thus connecting the existing Turkish line and giving Austria direct access to Salonica. The Russian foreign office interpreted this step as signifying the termination of the 1897 Goluchowski-Muraviev agreement and declared that a Danube-Adriatic railway would be built through Serbia for the benefit of Russia and Serbia.¹³

Isvolski, the Russian foreign minister since October 1906, was, however, more interested in the Straits than in the Sanjak or Bosnia-Herzegovina. In July 1907 he had concluded an agreement with the Japanese ending the Manchurian difficulties and in August of the same year he had signed the entente with Britain, hoping thereby

¹¹ A sympathetic, first-hand account of the revolution and its repercussions is given in H. Diamantopoulou, *Le réveil de la Turquie* (Alexandria [1909]), 56-82. A brief summary of the Young Turk movement with excellent bibliographical references is to be found in David, *op. cit.*, 60-64.

¹² For a keen analysis of Aehrenthal's Serbian policy see J. M. Baernreither, *Fragments of a Political Diary* (London, 1930), 14-22, 35-43.

¹³ Details in David, *op. cit.*, ch. III. An excellent map of the rival railway projects is available in *British Documents*, V, no. 230.

that England would not oppose a change in the Straits regime. Having secured the consent of the cabinet to evolve a plan for the pacific occupation of the Bosphorus without a declaration of war against Turkey he next sought the cooperation of Austria and in the summer of 1908 offered to Aehrenthal to make the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina the object of a "friendly conversation." Aehrenthal agreed and at the Buchlau interview of September 15, 1908 Isvolski consented to the Austrian annexation of the provinces while Aehrenthal in return promised to look with favor upon Russia's interests in the Straits and to evacuate the Sanjak.

There was, however, a misunderstanding regarding the precise date of annexation and to Isvolski's astonishment Aehrenthal proclaimed the union on October 7, two days after Bulgarian independence had been declared. The details of the violent diplomatic aftermath of these events need not be related here but their effect on the Balkan situation is of first rate importance.¹⁴ The most obvious result was the hatred engendered in Russia and Serbia against the Central Powers. The Slav press in Russia preached the inevitability of war between Slavdom and Teutondom while the government undertook a sweeping reorganization and increase of the army and navy. In Serbia, preparations for war were made as soon as the annexation was proclaimed and it was only the assurances of Isvolski that Russia would support the future realization of a "Greater Serbia" that induced the Serbian government to accept the Austrian *fait accompli*. But formal acceptance was meaningless. Neither Isvolski nor the Serbian government ever accepted the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a final settlement. It was regarded rather as a Serbian Alsace-Lorraine—as a temporary arrangement to be overthrown at the earliest possible moment. And one of the means by which the Serbians and Russians hoped to attain this end was the formation of a Balkan League which would serve as a barrier to further Austrian aggression and which could strike with the force of a Great Power when the opportunity appeared.¹⁵

Balkan unity after 1908 was stimulated not only by the reaction from the Bosnian crisis but also by the severe Turkification policy of the Young Turks. Together with western constitutionalism the Turkish reformers had adopted western nationalism in its most uncompromising form. Consequently a rigid policy of Turkification

¹⁴ For details, see B. E. Schmitt, *The Annexation of Bosnia 1908-1909* (Cambridge University Press, 1937); M. Nintchitch, *La crise bosniaque 1908-1909 et les puissances européennes* (Paris, 1937), 2 vols.; David, *op. cit.*, ch. V, VI.

¹⁵ Boghitschewitsch, *Die auswärtige Politik Serbiens*, I, 125; *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914. Diplomatische Aktenstücke des Österreichisch-Ungarischen Ministeriums des Äussern* (Vienna, 1930), IV, no. 3928. (Hereafter referred to as *Ö.-U.A.*).

and centralization was adopted. The result was a wave of revolts, both in the Asiatic and in the European sections of the Empire. The revolutionary bands in Macedonia once more took to the hills and again plunged the region into its familiar anarchy. In Albania the centralization tactics fanned the flames of nationalism and produced a war of liberation. Rather than unifying and regenerating the empire, the Young Turks by their mistaken policies were antagonizing their Christian subjects and forcing them to combine for self protection. In 1909 the London *Times* correspondent, James Bourchier, was already prophesying that "... the question of nationalities in Turkey, which the Young Turks are not approaching in the right way, will prove an insuperable obstacle to the realization of their programme." On October 4, 1912, after the Balkan league had been formed, he wrote in the *Times* that it was "... the insensate efforts of the Young Turks to stifle national sentiment among the various races of the Empire..." that made possible the alliances.¹⁶

As a result of this reaction from the Bosnian Crisis and Young Turk nationalism, the Balkan states after 1908 entered, with active Russian encouragement, upon a series of negotiations which culminated in the alliance of 1912.

As soon as the annexation had been announced in Vienna the Serbian government sent Stojan Novakovich, the head of the Progressive Party, to Constantinople to come to an understanding with the Porte. By the end of October the draft of a secret Serbo-Turk convention had been prepared, which provided for mutual aid in case of war. The Serbs, however, were more interested in the immediate problem confronting them and proposed three amendments, the most important providing that neither party should accept any proposed solution of the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina without the previous agreement of the other. Turkey accepted these changes but countered with an amendment to the effect that in case of a victorious war against Bulgaria the conquered territory should be divided between Serbia and Turkey, the former taking the western portion and the latter the eastern. The Serbian government was unable to agree to this amendment since an article hostile to Bulgaria would render the convention useless as the basis for a wider coalition of the Balkan states as contemplated at the outset and because Europe would never consent to Turkish rule being reimposed on Christian territory. Thus the negotiations were dropped and Turkey on April 15, 1909, came to a separate agreement with Austria regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁷

¹⁶ Grogan, *The Life of J. D. Bourchier*, 134.

¹⁷ For details, see Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 13-19; David, *op. cit.*, 84, 85.

With the failure of the negotiations with Turkey, Serbia, with the support of the Entente turned to Bulgaria. On December 25, 1908 Isvolski made a speech in the Duma in which he openly favored the creation of a Balkan league. Sir Edward Grey wired to Nicolson three days later, "Isvolsky's speech seems to me very satisfactory . . . I am glad he emphasized the need for community of feeling between the Balkan States and the combination of all three of them with Turkey for defence of common interests. I am quite in favour of this and will encourage it, whenever I can."¹⁸ Bülow and Aehrenthal now became suspicious and the latter started negotiations with the Bulgarians. Before much progress could be made, however, the Bulgarians had agreed to the settlement of their indemnity dispute with the Porte at Russian expense and were considering Russian alliance proposals. Isvolski produced a draft treaty but it was so favorable to Russia that the Bulgarian government rejected it. However, the assumption by Russia of the Bulgarian indemnity improved Russo-Bulgarian relations and represented a step in the direction of a Balkan league.¹⁹

In the meantime the Serbians had been negotiating with the Bulgarians for an agreement. In March 1909 Milovanovich, the Serbian foreign minister, visited Sofia where he was warmly received. As usual the Macedonian question broke up the negotiations. The Serbians were interested primarily in an anti-Austrian agreement and were willing to partition Macedonia on terms favorable to the Bulgarians. The latter, however, wished to avoid an anti-Austrian policy and were unwilling to give up any portion of Macedonia. Consequently nothing came of the conversations.²⁰

The scene now shifted to Constantinople where Charikov, the new Russian ambassador to Turkey, sought to form a Balkan League including Turkey. This plan was not taken very seriously by anyone excepting Charikov himself, but a series of visits and conversations in the autumn and winter of 1909 aroused much interest and speculation. Ferdinand visited Belgrade, St. Petersburg and Constantinople; King Peter also journeyed to the Russian and Turkish capitals; and the Roumanian war minister was warmly received by the Grand Vizier in Constantinople. Actually these visits counted for little. Assurances of friendship were exchanged and some trade agreements concluded but nothing important was accomplished.²¹

The situation changed completely when war broke out in September 1911 between Turkey and Italy. Immediately the exponents

¹⁸ *British Documents*, V, no. 493.

¹⁹ Kratchounov, *op. cit.*, 37, 38; Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 20, 21; David, *op. cit.*, 86-89.

²⁰ Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 21-25. ²¹ *Ibid.*, 25-32.

of Russia's three distinct Balkan policies set to work to put their theories into practice. Isvolski still sought to open the Straits with the consent of the Great Powers; Charikov thought that Turkey would now certainly join a Balkan League; and Nicholas Hartvig and A. V. Neklyudov, the pan-Slav Russian ministers in Belgrade and Sofia, worked for the creation of a Balkan League exclusive of Turkey. The Russian diplomats were further aided by the fact that Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, was ill and that his assistant, Neratov, was weak and easily influenced. Thus Isvolski, at his own request, was instructed to secure French approval for a change in the Straits regulations and, again on Isvolski's advice, Charikov was instructed to request a revision of the 1900 Russo-Turkish railway agreement, and if successful, to suggest a discussion of more important questions such as the Straits. Charikov saw the opportunity and urged Neratov to link the Straits question with that of a Turco-Balkan League.

Before receiving Neratov's authorization Charikov submitted to the Porte on October 14 an unofficial draft embodying changes favorable to Turkey in a revised railway accord, foreseeing the possible abolition of capitulations; suggesting alterations in the Straits regulations, and emphasizing the advantages of a Turco-Balkan League. Rumors now were circulated that Italy was planning a naval campaign in the Aegean and the Straits and Charikov, excited by this possibility, resubmitted the draft. This time it was presented officially and changed so that the alterations in the Straits regulations should not be subject to the agreement of the Powers but merely be a matter between Russia and Turkey. However, Assim Bey, the Turkish foreign minister, realizing that Europe was not behind Charikov, delayed replying immediately and finally on October 17 flatly refused to consider the draft. Thus Isvolski's and Charikov's plans failed but the Balkan League scheme championed by Hartvig and Neklyudov proved successful.²²

In March 1911 a new pro-Russian government had been formed in Bulgaria under Geshov and Danev. Relations with Russia quickly became cordial and foreign minister Geshov, with Russian encouragement, sought an understanding with Serbia in order to combat Turkish persecution of Bulgarians in Macedonia.²³ Rizov, the Bulgarian minister to Rome who had participated in the negotiation of the 1904 Serbo-Bulgar treaty, was sent to Belgrade and negotiations

²² O. Bickel, *Russland und die Entstehung des Balkanbundes 1912. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges* (Berlin, 1933), 81-95; W. L. Langer, "Russia, the Straits Question and the Origins of the Balkan League, 1908-1912," *Political Science Quarterly*, XLIII (September, 1928), 343-356.

²³ I. E. Gueshoff, *The Balkan League* (London, 1915), 1-10.

were begun just as the Italo-Turkish war was beginning. The general outlines of an agreement were first drafted and then Rizov left for Vienna where he met Geshov and Stanchov, the Bulgarian minister to Paris. These three agreed and King Ferdinand gave his consent that:

1. The 1904 treaty should serve as a basis of the new treaty;
2. If unable to obtain autonomy for Macedonia then the area should be divided;
3. The treaty should be defensive against all states and the *casus foederis* should arise if Austria-Hungary or Turkey should try to occupy any area in the Balkans or if the interests of Bulgaria and Serbia demanded that the Turkish question be settled;
4. The treaty should provide for the participation of Montenegro;
5. The approval of Russia should be a *conditio sine qua non* for the conclusion of the treaty.

Geshov now met the Serbian premier, Milovanovich, and discussed the thorny problem of the division of spoils. Milovanovich suggested that Serbia should receive all the land north of the Shar mountains while Bulgaria was to have Adrianople and the bulk of Macedonia. He was of the opinion, however, that for the present it would be better not to draw a definite boundary line but to reserve this partition to the arbitration of the Tsar. Geshov apparently raised no objections and both premiers departed satisfied with the progress made.²⁴

On his return to Sofia Geshov found the cabinet and the public excited by the concentration of Turkish troops in Adrianople. With the aid of the Great Powers the crisis was successfully passed, but it made the Bulgarians realize the necessity for an alliance with Serbia and, if possible, with Greece.²⁵ On November 3, 1911, Spalaikovich, the Serbian minister to Sofia, presented a draft of the proposed alliance but the Bulgarians objected to it because, "... the Serbians were reserving for themselves the right to declare war without (Bulgarian) consent, and article four not only said nothing of Macedonian autonomy but actually proposed that the two vilayets of Salonica and Monastir should be reserved for the arbitration of the Russian Emperor." The Serbians therefore modified their draft, proposing this time three zones in Macedonia, "... an uncontested Serbian zone, a contested zone to be reserved for the arbitration of the Russian Emperor, and an uncontested Bulgarian zone."²⁶ This did not meet with full approval either, since no mention was made of Mace-

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 13-27.

²⁵ Bickel, *op. cit.*, 109-111; Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, 28.

²⁶ Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, 23.

donian autonomy and the Bulgarian government always had the Macedonian Revolutionary committees to consider. Thus there was a lull in the negotiations. King Peter and Milovanovich now paid a visit to Paris where Stanchov informed them that the present draft could never be accepted by Bulgaria.²⁷

By the end of December all points except the question of boundaries had been settled and on this matter Milovanovich and Geshov each refused to make concessions and each begged Russia to bring pressure to bear on the other. Hartvig, Neklyudov and especially Romanovski, the Russian military attaché in Sofia, worked hard to bring about an agreement. By January 30 the boundary near Struga on Lake Ochrida was the last disputed point. For a time a cabinet crisis in Serbia threatened to disrupt the negotiations but finally Serbia yielded and on March 7 the preliminary protocol was signed and six days later on the anniversary of the death of the Tsar Liberator the treaty with its secret annex received validity.²⁸

By this treaty the two states agreed to aid each other in case either were attacked (article 1) and to take joint action against any Great Power which tried to occupy any Balkan territory under Turkish suzerainty, even though only one of the signatories considered the attempt injurious to its interests (article 2). This was obviously aimed at Austria. It was also provided that the two parties should not conclude peace except jointly (article 3) and that a third party could be admitted into the alliance after a preliminary understanding between the original signatories (article 7). The other articles were concerned with the mode of ratification of the treaty and provided for the conclusion of a military convention.

In the secret annex to the treaty it was agreed that all territory won by the allies was to be administered at first by a condominium but was to be liquidated according to the arrangements of the treaty within three months after the conclusion of peace. The territorial claims were defined as follows: the territory north and west of the Shar Mountains, that is, Old Serbia and the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, was to go to Serbia; the territory east of the Rhodope Mountains and the Struma River to Bulgaria; the intermediate regions of Macedonia "lying between the Shar Mountains and the Rhodope Mountains, the Archipelago, and the Lake of Ochrida" were, if possible, to be formed into the autonomous province long desired by Bulgaria, but if such an organization of this territory appeared to the two parties to be impossible it was to be divided into three zones: Bulgaria was to

²⁷ Langer, *loc. cit.*, 357; Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, 24-26; Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 50, 51.

²⁸ Text in Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, 112-114.

have the region around Ochrida; Serbia was to get an additional strip in northern Macedonia, while the unassigned portion was to be subject to the arbitration of the Tsar.²⁹

In order to give the treaty additional solemnity it was signed not only by the ministers but by the sovereigns of the two states. At the end of April the Tsar notified his acceptance of the difficult function assigned to him under its provisions. A separate military convention was concluded at Varna on May 29 and a further agreement between the general staffs was signed in June and August.³⁰

Thus a Serbo-Bulgarian accord had at last been concluded. Its importance is apparent. The two Balkan states with the greatest military power and with the most conflicting interests had settled their differences and agreed on a plan of action. The way was now paved for further inter-Balkan agreements. The basis for a Balkan League had been laid.

The Serbo-Bulgarian alliance of March 1912 was the result of a long series of negotiations dating from 1904 but the Greco-Bulgarian alliance of May 1912 had no such background. In fact relations between Athens and Sofia had been strained for years because of the Macedonian question, and when Bulgarian independence was declared in 1908, Greece sought to obtain Crete in return for lending support to Turkey. This offer was rejected and the Greeks realized that the Young Turks would not yield Crete without the use of force, particularly in view of the recent loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina.³¹ Greece, however, was in no condition to wage war. The government was weak; the military forces were inadequate; and the country was torn by political dissension. In reaction to this state of affairs a Military League was formed which gained control of the government and brought Eleutherios Venizelos from Crete. This proved to be an extremely significant step. Internally Venizelos reorganized and strengthened the army and navy, reformed administration, improved the education system and in general rejuvenated the country. In foreign affairs Venizelos, being a Cretan, did not base his policy entirely on the Macedonian question but sought closer relations with his Balkan neighbors. Diplomatic relations with Roumania were resumed in 1911 and Bulgarian students received a warm welcome in Athens. As early as February 26, 1910 Bouchier recorded in his diary, "Venizelos came to see me at 11 P.M., and stayed till 1 A.M.; unfolded all his views—even Bulgarian Alliance . . ."³²

²⁹ Text in *ibid.*, 114–117. An excellent map is available in Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 56, 57.

³⁰ Texts in Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, 117–127.

³¹ Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique*, IV, 74ff.

³² Cited by Grogan, *The Life of J. D. Bouchier*, 136.

Numerous such talks were held by Venizelos and Bouchier during the winter of 1910 and the spring of 1911 until an alliance plan was evolved with the consent of the king. This provided for an entente with a view to common action for the defence of the privileges of the Turkish Christians and an eventual defensive alliance against a Turkish attack on either party. This proposal, together with long letters to Geshov and King Ferdinand, were handed by Bouchier to a Mr. Butler, who had formerly acted as Bouchier's assistant in Montenegro, and who was instructed to deliver them to Wickham Steed in Vienna. Without divulging the contents of the sealed package, Steed persuaded the Bulgarian minister in Vienna to send a special courier to Sofia and at the end of April 1911 Geshov received the Greek proposal. No immediate reply was forthcoming as King Ferdinand was afraid of being drawn into war over the Cretan question but in September Bouchier persuaded Geshov and Ferdinand to entrust him with a verbal request that the problem be put on a diplomatic basis. King George and Venizelos agreed to this request and D. Panas, the Greek minister in Sofia, was entrusted with the negotiations.³³

On October 16, 1911 Panas informed Geshov that the Greek government was ready to promise aid to Bulgaria in case of an attack by Turkey, if Bulgaria in turn would reciprocate if Greece were attacked by Turkey. Geshov was afraid, however, that once the alliance was signed Greece would adopt a reckless policy in Crete and drag Bulgaria into a war with Turkey. The Russian foreign office was also cool to the idea of Greco-Bulgarian alliance and Neklyudov emphasized upon the Sofia cabinet the necessity of first concluding an alliance with Serbia. Thus Panas was stalled off with the promise that Bulgaria was willing to come to the assistance of Greece on conditions which should be specified in a defensive treaty.³⁴

Nothing further was done until the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty had been almost concluded. Then on February 6 Geshov entrusted Bouchier with a verbal communication to Venizelos in which he expressed satisfaction with the Greek proposals and invited additional discussions.³⁵ Negotiations were immediately begun and on April 27, 1912 Panas presented a draft treaty of alliance. "In this preliminary project," according to Geshov, "not only was nothing said about autonomy for Macedonia and Thrace, but even those privileges which had been granted to the Christian provinces of European Turkey by various international acts, particularly Article 23 of the

³³ H. Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years 1892–1922* (New York, 1924), I, 360, 361; Grogan, *op. cit.*, 136.

³⁴ Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, 38; Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 74, 75.

³⁵ Grogan, *op. cit.*, 137.

Treaty of Berlin were passed over in silence."³⁶ Geshov therefore objected and suggested a formula providing for Macedonian autonomy, but this was rejected by Panas. The Greeks at first also refused to agree to a clause recognizing the right of Bulgaria to go to war for the rights of the Turkish Christians based on treaties on the ground that the Bulgarians were thereby providing for Macedonian autonomy by falling back on article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin.³⁷ Geshov, however, stuck to his demand until Panas yielded and on May 30, 1912 the treaty was signed.

It provided first that if either of the signatories were attacked by Turkey the other would come to its aid (article 1). In addition the two states should act jointly in their relations with Turkey and the Great Powers and should make joint representations to the Porte for the protection and defence of the Greek and Bulgarian populations in Turkey. In an annex the alliance was declared inoperative in the case of a war arising between Greece and Turkey over the admission in the Greek parliament of Cretan deputies against the wishes of Turkey.³⁸

The military convention foreseen by the treaty was not concluded until October 5, five days after general mobilization had been ordered in each country. In addition to the purely military clauses it was provided that if one party were attacked by a third state other than Turkey, then the other party would be bound to friendly neutrality (article 4). In article six the restriction with regard to Crete was modified: "If after Bulgaria and Greece have mobilized or commenced a joint war, the latter country should find itself obliged to settle the Cretan question in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of Crete, and, in consequence of that action is attacked by Turkey, Bulgaria undertakes to assist Greece. . . ."³⁹ By this clause the way was prepared for precipitating war by the admission of Cretan deputies to the Greek parliament after Montenegro had started hostilities.

In this manner a Greco-Bulgarian treaty was finally signed. Significantly enough it differed from the Serbo-Bulgarian accord in that it had no provisions regarding the division of territory. Geshov states that this omission was due to lack of time but actually when the Greeks had sought to obtain a territorial delimitation in Macedonia, the Bulgarians had refused to promise more than Crete and the Aegean Islands.⁴⁰

³⁶ Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, 38.

³⁷ This article provided that laws similar to the Organic Law of 1868 for Crete be introduced into the other parts of Turkey in Europe for which no special organization had been provided by the treaty. Text in E. Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty* (London, 1875-1891), IV, 2779.

³⁸ Text, *ibid.*, 130-133.

³⁹ Text in Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, 127-130.

⁴⁰ Driault and Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique*, V, 80; Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, 40.

The last of these Balkan agreements were the alliances of Montenegro with Serbia and Bulgaria. It has already been noted that the relations between the Obrenovich dynasty and Prince Nicholas of Montenegro were never very cordial because of the rivalry for the leadership of the Yugoslavs. The accession of Peter Karageorgevich in 1903 did not decrease the rivalry between the Serbian and Montenegrin dynasties, particularly since Nicholas had hoped to succeed the Obrenovich line.⁴¹ Relations became particularly strained in October 1907 when a plot for the murder of Nicholas was uncovered which had connections with some circles in Belgrade. The Bosnian Annexation crisis, however, brought the two countries together and both protested against the Austrian action. On October 16, 1908 General Yanko Vukovich left Cetinje for Belgrade but was arrested by the Austrian police on the way at Agram. Arriving finally at Belgrade in an anti-Austrian mood, Vukovich concluded an agreement which provided for close cooperation between the two countries and for a further treaty and military convention to be drawn up at a later date.⁴²

This Serbo-Montenegrin friendship rapidly evaporated, however, when evidence of a Serbian plot against Nicholas was uncovered in the spring of 1910 and when in October 1910 Nicholas assumed the royal title. King Ferdinand attended in person the festivities connected with the latter event and, according to one account, the Montenegrin and Bulgarian kings agreed that Montenegro should obtain the western third of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar if Turkey ceded it of her own free will or under duress.⁴³ The agreement, however, was probably not committed to writing. In June of the next year Nicholas sent a letter to King Ferdinand through the Dutch correspondent, Baron de Kruffy, who had a long talk with Ferdinand and conveyed a reply to Nicholas via the Montenegrin envoy in Trieste. The results of these exchanges are not known.⁴⁴

During the Italo-Turkish war Montenegro offered to aid Italy and proposed united Balkan action but Italy refused for fear of involving the whole Balkans. Nicholas then turned to Austria and offered an offensive and defensive alliance but was rejected. Serbo-Montenegrin relations were still so cool that Nicholas was not asked to take part in the alliance being negotiated between Bulgaria and Serbia. Conversations were begun in Vienna, however, between Nicholas and his prime minister, Gregorevich, on the one side, and

⁴¹ A. Rappaport, "Montenegros Eintritt in den Weltkrieg," *Berliner Monatshefte*, VII (October, 1929), 944.

⁴² Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 80-83.

⁴³ C. Nicolaides, *Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkankriegen 1912-13* (Vienna, 1914), 260.

⁴⁴ E. Durham, *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle* (London, 1920), 222, 223.

King Ferdinand and Geshov on the other. The most important problems were financial aid to Montenegro and territorial compensation. No written agreement was signed, but the following oral agreement was reached:

1. Both sides pledged themselves to begin war with all their forces; Montenegro not later than the 28th of September and Bulgaria not later than one month after the Montenegrin action;
2. Montenegro agreed to involve as great a number of Turkish troops as possible;
3. Bulgaria agreed to pay Montenegro 70,000 francs during every month of the war;
4. Montenegro was to retain all territory conquered by her forces;
5. Postponement of the beginning of the war was to be permitted if Bulgarian preparations were not completed in time.

This verbal agreement was therefore of an offensive character designed to start hostilities by preliminary action on the part of Montenegro, to be followed by the other Balkan powers.⁴⁵

On October 6, 1912 the last of this series of Balkan alliances was concluded in Switzerland between Serbia and Montenegro. According to Helmreich a copy of this treaty is to be found in the Serbian archives but it has never been completely published.⁴⁶ It was apparently similar to the Bulgaro-Montenegrin Treaty and was directed against Austria and Turkey. As regards the Sanjak, some portions of it were declared disputable and arbitration was left to one of the other Balkan rulers. It might be noted further that Montenegro, in all probability, also came to some agreement with Greece but it appears to have been of a defensive and oral nature.⁴⁷

With these Montenegrin agreements the second Balkan alliance system had been completed. Once before, in the eighteen sixties, the Balkan states had succeeded in banding together, but at that time circumstances had prevented them from taking action. On this occasion circumstances were more favorable.

In the first place the Balkan states were now much more powerful than in the eighteen sixties and the Ottoman Empire was relatively weaker. At the time of the first Balkan league the Bulgarian state had not yet been formed, the very existence of Roumania was threatened by internal dissension, while Greece and Serbia had no armed forces worthy of the name. By 1912 the Balkan countries had not only built up efficient military establishments, but also political and military conditions within Turkey were chaotic. In March 1911 the

⁴⁵ M., "The Balkan League, History of its Formation," *Fortnightly Review*, IX (March, 1913), 430-440; Gueshoff, *op. cit.*, 41, 42; Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 84-88.

⁴⁶ Helmreich, *op. cit.*, 88, f. 32. ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 89, f. 37.

Albanians, formerly the chief props of Turkish rule in Europe, revolted against the rigid centralization policies of the Young Turks, and were induced to lay down their arms only by promises of reform. A few months later Turkey found herself at war with Italy over Tripoli. To add to the difficulties the internal political situation was unstable. In April 1912 elections were held and by dint of coercion and bribery the Committee of Union and Progress obtained 215 out of 222 seats. But this majority proved valueless. The Albanians, antagonized by the arbitrary measures employed during the election and emboldened by clandestine Montenegrin aid, revolted once again in May. This time the uprising was not crushed, for a mutiny broke out among the troops sent to restore order. A new ministry was established in Constantinople but nothing was accomplished because of the unrelenting opposition of the Committee to all governmental policies. Moreover the strength and morale of the army was seriously undermined by these political squabbles. In an effort to get rid of unreliable elements the government conducted a wholesale purge, with the result that when mobilization took place, there were about fifty thousand new and untrained recruits in the army. Thus the situation was ideal for action by the Balkan allies, and they lost no time in seizing the opportunity to turn against Turkey.⁴⁸

A second advantage which the Balkan states enjoyed during this period was their favorable position with respect to the Great Powers of Europe. In the eighteen sixties the opposition of a Great Power, such as Austria, to change in the Balkan *status quo* was sufficient to check any concerted anti-Turkish action. Thus even Ignatiev, who had striven so earnestly to unite the Balkan states, took it for granted that no move could be made unless Austria's attention was absorbed elsewhere, as was the case in 1866.⁴⁹ By 1912 the diplomatic situation was completely altered. Austria-Hungary was still opposed to the partitioning of European Turkey and was still capable, militarily speaking, of keeping the Balkan states in check. But the division of Europe into two hostile camps meant that any intervention in Balkan affairs was bound to have continent-wide repercussions. It now was necessary for every Great Power to consult its allies and even the members of the opposing camp before making any move. Thus although Berchtold on August 13 was the first to propose that an attempt be made to secure reforms from Turkey and to restrain the Balkan states, it was October 7 before a policy could be worked out that met the approval of all the Powers. On the next day Russia and Austria issued the agreed warning to the Balkan states to the effect

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 90-102.

⁴⁹ *Izvestiya* (1914), book III, 99, 100; book IV, 92.

that if war broke out, no modifications of the territorial *status quo* would be tolerated. It was too late. On the same day Montenegro declared war on Turkey and was speedily joined by her allies.⁵⁰

At the time of the formation of the first Balkan League Ignatiev had commented as follows:

But we must not have any illusions about the sincerity and stability of the entente. It is inevitable that once the struggle with the Turks is ended, race rivalries will reappear and nothing stable will be built in the Balkan Peninsula until many years have elapsed. But sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.⁵¹

Since war did not follow, the accuracy of his analysis was not tested. Now, half a century later, his statement was proven prophetic. The Balkan states had been able to unite in 1912 only because of the short-sighted policies of the Young Turks and because Russia, estranged from Austria-Hungary since the Bosnian Crisis, desired a bloc that would support her in the Near East against the Dual Monarchy. Mutual trust or any conception of some sort of a Balkan federation never entered into the picture. In fact, when the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty was about to be ratified, Pashich frankly told his colleagues that he had no faith in Ferdinand and that, despite the provisions of the treaty, he did not believe that Bulgaria would come to the aid of Serbia in case of an attack by Austria. Nor had the allies definitely settled their divergent claims in Macedonia. Thus once the war had started and the Turks had been defeated, there was nothing left to hold the League together and it dissolved into warring factions.

The history of this tragic debacle is well known and the details need not be repeated. When Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece joined Montenegro in the war against Turkey, they surprised all but a few well-informed experts by the rapidity and completeness of their victories. The Greeks drove northward, besieged Jannina and occupied Salonica. The Serbs swept over the whole upper valley of the Vardar, the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar and the northern part of Albania, while the Montenegrins surrounded the fortress of Scutari. The Bulgarians invested Adrianople and hammered the main Turkish army back through Thrace to within a few miles of Constantinople. Confronted by these disasters the hard-pressed Porte applied to the Powers for mediation and an armistice was concluded on December 3. The delegates of the belligerent powers met at London to draw up a peace treaty with the assistance of representatives of the six Great Powers.

Some progress had been made when on January 23, 1913, Enver Bey executed a *coup d'état* at Constantinople which again put the

⁵⁰ A detailed account of the steps to war is given in Helmreich, *op. cit.*, ch. VI-IX.

⁵¹ *Izvestiya* (1914), book III, 108.

bellicose Young Turks into power. Thus on February, the peace conference broke up. Three days later the Bulgarian army, reinforced by Serbian contingents, renewed its attack upon Adrianople and entered the city on March 26. The Greeks successfully stormed Jannina on March 6 while the Montenegrins by April 22 had starved Scutari into submission. A new armistice was signed, with the Turks retaining nothing but Constantinople and its immediate environs. Finally on May 30, 1913 the Treaty of London was signed by which the island of Crete and everything west of the Enos-Media line were ceded to the allies and the questions of Albania and of the Aegean Isles were left in the hands of the Powers.⁵²

With the Turks practically ousted from Europe, dissension now developed amongst the allies. The problem was how to divide the spoils. A part of the territory which in the original Serbo-Bulgarian treaty had been assigned to Serbia was now reserved for the new Albania. The Serbs accordingly demanded a larger share of Macedonia and this the Bulgarians indignantly refused. Similarly the treaty between Greece and Bulgaria had said nothing of Macedonia and both states were now laying claim to the Salonica area. Moreover Roumania, as recompense for her neutrality, demanded a part of the Dobrudja which had remained in the hands of Bulgaria after the Congress of Berlin. The question was arbitrated by a conference of the Great Powers and a very small boundary rectification was finally granted. Roumanian statesmen blamed Austria for the failure to obtain greater compensation and they continued their hostility to Bulgaria.

The situation was further complicated by the conflicting policies of the Powers. Russia was anxious to preserve the unity of the League and was concerned, therefore, by the inter-allied differences. The Belgrade and Sofia governments were reminded of the stipulation in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty providing for Russian arbitration in case of failure to attain agreement by direct negotiation. In contrast Austria strove to disrupt the Balkan League by bringing together Bulgaria and Roumania. This proved unsuccessful as the Bulgarian government believed that its differences with Serbia and Greece could be settled peacefully and therefore refused further concessions to Roumania. Actually the relations between the allies deteriorated rapidly with the result that Serbia and Greece drew closer together. Under pressure of repeated reports of skirmishes with Bulgarian forces in Macedonia, the two countries on June 1st signed a treaty of alliance. It was agreed that no separate treaty would be concluded

⁵² Helmreich, *op. cit.*, ch. X-XV.

with Bulgaria regarding the partition of the newly-won territories, and that a common Greco-Serb frontier would be drawn in the area west of the Vardar River. If there should be disagreement with Sofia over the delimitation of the frontiers, the two Powers engaged to ask for the mediation or arbitration of the Triple Entente or of other European Powers. Should Bulgaria refuse and war thereupon ensue, the two states were to aid each other with all their forces. Not only did the Serbs and the Greeks negotiate an alliance between themselves but they also set out in realistic fashion to win the support of the other Balkan states. Roumania refused to commit herself in advance but the Montenegrin foreign minister announced on June 27 that in case of war between Bulgaria and Serbia, Montenegro, in accordance with alliance obligations entered upon the previous year, would join Serbia. Even Turkey was approached and, although no definite agreement was reached, the way was paved for Turkish intervention at a later date.

The stage was now set for the fratricidal war. Venizelos did begin short-lived negotiations with the Bulgarian minister at Athens, but he was restricted by the signed agreement with Serbia. Moreover Greek troops were being transferred as rapidly as possible to Macedonia where frequent clashes were occurring with Bulgarian forces which were being shifted from the Chatalja lines. Bulgarian relations with Serbia were even worse than those with Greece. Not only were Serbia's claims in Macedonia rejected but some Bulgarian statesmen, with considerable popular support, were now demanding the whole of Macedonia. The situation reached such a state that on June 8 the Tsar sent a personal telegram to the Bulgarian and Serbian statesmen advising them to ask for the arbitration foreseen by the alliance treaty. Both replies were evasive but the Russian foreign minister, Sazonov, invited the minister presidents of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece to come to St. Petersburg where all pending questions could be settled.

The Bulgarian government was now pressed by its general staff which, because of the growing restlessness of the army, demanded either action or demobilization within ten days. Accordingly a request was made that Russia should make the award within seven days. Because of a misunderstanding Sazonov did not take cognizance of this request. The Bulgarian prime minister, Danev, now rashly despatched the fateful telegram terminating the negotiations. Sazonov, who was suffering from a "severe gastric attack complicated by kidney troubles," was so incensed by this sharp action that he washed his hands of Bulgaria. "Now, after your declaration I com-

municate ours to you! Do not expect anything from us, and forget the existence of any of our engagements from 1902 until today."⁵³

Danev was greatly upset by this communication and attempted to mollify Sazonov. But events had now gone too far. Public opinion in Bulgaria was strongly for war. The Macedonian groups even threatened Danev and King Ferdinand with assassination if they accepted arbitration at St. Petersburg. The general staff assured the government that the army was ready for action. On June 28 King Ferdinand, with the knowledge and apparent approval of Danev, ordered General Savov to attack the Serbian and Greek lines in Macedonia. The attack, which took place on the night of June 29-30, seems to have been intended as a means of strengthening Bulgaria's position in the settlement which was to come through the mediation of Russia. In other words, the advance was considered a political demonstration rather than a military measure. The Serbians and the Greeks, however, seized the opportunity, and answered the Bulgarian "demonstration" with a declaration of war. Sazonov refused to make any move and thus Bulgaria was left to her fate.

On July 10 Roumania also declared war on Bulgaria and two days later Turkey followed suit. Attacked from all sides, Bulgaria was incapable of putting up serious resistance. Both Serbs and Greeks won easy victories; Enver Bey reentered Adrianople; and the Roumanians occupied the Dobrudja. On July 31 an armistice was concluded and on August 10 peace was signed by the Christian states at Bucharest. Greece received Salonica, Kavalla, and the greater part of the coast of Macedonia; Serbia was granted north and central Macedonia, including the city of Monastir; Roumania was allowed to keep a generous slice of the Dobrudja; Montenegro extended her frontiers slightly until they touched Serbia; and Bulgaria retained only a small portion of Macedonia as the reward for her efforts during the first war. A few weeks later (September 29) Bulgaria and Turkey signed a treaty by which Turkey regained the greater part of Thrace, including both Adrianople and Kirk-Kilissé. Finally on August 11 the ambassadors of the Great Powers completed their arrangements for an independent Albania, although Serbia evacuated the territories she had occupied only after an ultimatum from Austria.⁵⁴

The effect of the Treaty of Bucharest on inter-Balkan relations is not difficult to surmise. Viscount Grey summarized the results as follows:

It left Bulgaria sore, injured, and despoiled of what she believed be-

⁵³ Cited, *ibid.*, 361.

⁵⁴ Details, *ibid.*, ch. XVI-XIX.

longed to her. Any future Balkan peace was impossible so long as the treaty of Bucharest remained. Turkey, of course, was also sore and despoiled. Thus when the great war came a year later, there were two Powers, Bulgaria and Turkey, hungering for a *revanche* and ready to take whichever side would give them a prospect of obtaining it. This naturally was the side of Austria and Germany. For Serbia was at war with Austria, while Greece and Roumania were sympathetic to Serbia or to the Western Powers.⁵⁵

Such was the stormy history of the second Balkan League. It had enabled the Balkan states to put an end, finally, to Turkish rule in Europe, but aside from that, nothing constructive had been accomplished. Instead the second Balkan War had so embittered relations between the former allies that conditions in the peninsula were more chaotic and more explosive in 1913 and 1914 than in the preceding years. For a few months in 1912 the Balkan states had been able to present a united front and to adopt and pursue a policy of their own in spite of the opposition of the Great Powers. After the Treaty of Bucharest the situation was completely altered. The Balkan League was smashed. Bulgaria refused to accept the peace settlement as final, while Greece, Serbia, and Roumania were equally determined to maintain the *status quo*. This disunity was heightened by the Great Powers and especially by Austria and Russia, who pulled the Balkan states this way and that in their scramble for allies. Russia strove to promote the closest relations between Roumania, Serbia and Greece, and if possible, to bring about a reconciliation between Bulgaria and Serbia. In other words Russia was seeking to recreate a Balkan League under her auspices and thus to eliminate Austrian influence in the Balkans. Austria, on the other hand, sought to organize a counter-league, with Bulgaria as its pivot, and including Roumania, Greece, and Turkey. This would not only blast Russia's ambitions, but also isolate Serbia and paralyze her irredentist agitation. Thus inter-Balkan relations during this period were the product of the hatreds and rivalries engendered by the Balkan Wars, and of the conflicting diplomatic policies of the Great Powers.⁵⁶

In the case of Bulgaria, Austrian policy was on the whole successful. Russian diplomacy during the Balkan Wars, and especially Russia's consent to the Roumanian intervention, had strained Russo-Bulgarian relations and culminated in the establishment of the Austrophil Radoslavov government. The new cabinet promptly proposed

an alliance with the Dual Monarchy. This was agreed to in principle by Vienna but not actually concluded because of Berchtold's insistence on a Bulgaro-Roumanian rapprochement. Further evidence of this pro-Austrian policy was King Ferdinand's autumn visit to Vienna and his acceptance of a German loan on less favorable terms than were offered by Parisian bankers. Furthermore, during the winter of 1913-1914, the Radoslavov government with the encouragement of Austria carried on negotiations with Turkey for an alliance. The Turks proved willing to conclude a pact but minor difficulties delayed its signing. Nevertheless, although neither an Austro-Bulgarian, nor a Turco-Bulgarian alliance had been consummated by July 1914, the Russian program of a new Balkan League had failed. Bulgaria remained estranged from her former allies and was drifting closer to the Triple Alliance, while Turkey was coming more and more under German economic and military influence.⁵⁷

In the other Balkan countries Russian diplomacy was more successful. Rumors were current of a secret alliance between Roumania, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro,⁵⁸ as well as of bilateral alliances between Greece and Roumania,⁵⁹ and Serbia and Roumania.⁶⁰ Although none of these appear to have been actually concluded, the reports do reflect the cordial relations between these states and their distrust and fear of Bulgaria. In spite of the urgings of Vienna, the Roumanian government refused to consider closer relations with Bulgaria or with Turkey. Instead Roumania drifted toward the Entente Powers. The traditional Austro-Roumanian alliance had been weakened by Austria's support of Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars and by the perennial Transylvanian problem. In the spring and summer of 1914 the Roumanian and Russian royal families exchanged visits and on June 24, 1914 Sazonov was able to report to the Tsar that in case of war Roumania was not bound to act with Austria but would instead "take the side which will be strongest and which will be in a position to promise her the greatest gains."⁶¹ In Greece both Germany and Austria were pushing for a Greco-Turkish alliance, and King Constantine apparently favored such an entente as part of a Balkan bloc under German tutelage. But this project failed because of the dispute over the Aegean Isles which had been occupied by Greek forces during the first Balkan War and which were still claimed by Turkey. In fact the two countries were on the verge of war over this

⁵⁵ Grey, Viscount of Fallodon, *Twenty Five Years, 1892-1916* (New York, 1925), I 254.

⁵⁶ A detailed analysis of this period is to be found in M. Faissler, *European Diplomacy in the Balkans, August 10, 1913-June 28, 1914* (University of Chicago MS, 1936), and in H. N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey, A Diplomatic History 1913-1923* (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1931), 60-77.

⁵⁷ Faissler, *op. cit.*, 160-167; Howard, *op. cit.*, 61ff.

⁵⁸ *British Documents*, IX (2), nos. 1240, 1257; X (1), no. 339.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, X (1), nos. 334, 335, 339, 344.

⁶⁰ Boghitchewitsch, *Die auswärtige Politik Serbiens*, I, 423, 424; *British Documents*, X (1), nos. 339, 344.

⁶¹ S. B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (New York, 1934, 2nd rev. ed.), I, 475-495; Faissler, *op. cit.*, 147-157.

issue when news arrived of the assassination at Sarajevo and the islands question was overshadowed by the general European crisis.⁶²

Serbia's position was the clearest of all. After the Treaty of Bucharest her relations with Bulgaria remained embittered, while those with Greece and Roumania were cordial except for minor disputes over the treatment of minorities. With Montenegro negotiations were being carried on for closer cooperation between the two countries. In an attempt to bolster his regime which was threatened by financial difficulties and by the unpopularity of his sons, King Nicholas had sought a partial union with Serbia. By June 1914 the Serbian government had agreed to a common general staff and diplomatic corps and to the unification of the finance, customs, postal and telegraph systems. With the assassination of Francis Ferdinand these negotiations were dropped for fear of unduly antagonizing Austria. Finally the ties between Serbia and the Entente Powers were being further strengthened during these months. A French loan of two hundred and fifty million francs was granted to Serbia on January 12, 1914, and discussions were going on for the sale of Russian war materials to Serbia. Conversely these developments in Serbian foreign policy had the effect of increasing the apprehension of Austria and thus sharpening the conflict between the two countries.⁶³

In conclusion it is apparent that the Treaty of Bucharest had settled nothing. The period between August 10, 1913 and June 28, 1914 proved to be but a breathing spell in which the Balkan states jockeyed for position in preparation for future developments. Thus when the World War broke out there was neither a united Balkan front nor a common Balkan policy. Rather, each state stood ready to throw in its lot with whichever side seemed most likely to satisfy the national ambitions.

The outstanding characteristic of the non-official Balkan federation movement and plans during the period preceding the World War was the increasingly wide popular support which they received. Many of the leading scholars and intellectuals of Europe actively sought to establish peace and order and, if possible, a federation in the Near East. A list of such persons drawn up before 1914 would have looked much like a contemporary *Who's Who in Europe*.⁶⁴

The most effective work accomplished during these years, however, was that of organized groups rather than individuals.⁶⁵ In Feb-

⁶² S. G. Chaconas, *Greek Foreign Policy 1914-1917* (University of Chicago MS, 1937), 4-8; Howard, *op. cit.*, 65, 66.

⁶³ Faissler, *op. cit.*, ch. VII.

⁶⁴ See Argyriades and Lagarde, *Solution de la question d'Orient*, 3.

⁶⁵ It should be noted, however, that, as in other periods, a number of books and pamphlets were published proposing various federation plans. Outstanding was the work of a Roumanian writer who signed himself "Latin." He urged that a Balkan

ruary 1907 a meeting was held of the Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbians and Roumanians resident in Geneva. Resolutions were passed denouncing the Turkish government for its failure to put into effect the reforms promised by the Treaty of Berlin, and condemning the chauvinists who kept the Balkan peoples separated. Their recommendation was autonomy for Macedonia, Armenia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the formation of a Balkan Confederation which they believed was "... alone capable of safeguarding the common interests and establishing harmony and equality among the different races and religions."⁶⁶

More influential than the above little group of emigrants was the "organosis," a committee organized in Constantinople at the beginning of 1908 by John Dragoumis, then secretary to the Greek legation, and Athanase Souliotis, a lieutenant in the Greek army. This committee was modeled after a similar organization which had been founded in 1906 in Salonica to combat the Bulgars. The Constantinople committee grew steadily; most of its members being Greek deputies of the Ottoman chamber, Greek journalists, merchants, professionals, and officials connected with the Patriarchate. Until the proclamation of the Ottoman constitution on July 14, 1908 the "organosis" sought to diminish the internal dissension among the Greeks of Constantinople and to check Bulgarian propaganda in Thrace. As the Greco-Bulgarian duel in Macedonia became more intense the leaders of the "organosis" realized that only by cooperation amongst the peoples of the Balkans and Asia Minor could peace and prosperity be restored. Thus when the Ottoman constitution was proclaimed with the ideal of equality for all races, it received the support of the committee. Despite the fraudulent nature of the first elections the "organosis" backed the Young Turks during the reactionary counter-revolution of April 1909 and then issued a manifesto urging the true application of the constitution. When, however, the Young Turks started on their Turkification policy the "organosis" turned against them.

By this time the committee wielded considerable power. It had organized the "Greek Political League of Constantinople" and it was publishing two weeklies, the *Political Review* and the *Tribune of the*

federation be formed under the guardianship of Italy. No Balkan power, he argued, could take such a role, while the other Great Powers were too directly interested in the Near East to be acceptable. Italy, on the other hand, was connected with both alliance systems, was situated close to the Balkan peninsula, and her king, Victor-Emmanuel, was better acquainted with the Near East than most monarchs. *Une confédération orientale comme solution de la question d'Orient* (Paris, 1905), ch. XII. As might be surmised, this and other individual plans exerted no appreciable influence. ⁶⁶ Cited in *Journal de Genève*, February 16, 1907.

Nationalities. The latter, published in French, exerted much influence over the other Balkan nationalities as well as the Greeks. Thus the committee now became the center of the Christian opposition in the Ottoman chamber. It planned bills and questions, organized press campaigns and drew up petitions. Identical memoirs were presented to the Turkish government by the Patriarchate and Exarchate in favor of the rights of nationalities and they were supported by the various Christian national organizations and by the press. The leaders of the "organosis" even visited Sofia and Athens in an effort to bring joint Greco-Bulgarian pressure to bear on the Porte in favor of the nationalities. The organization was interested, however, primarily in furthering cooperation among the Christian subjects within the Ottoman Empire and was not concerned with the wider problem of inter-Balkan relations. Thus with the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and the liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe, the "organosis" was heard of no more.⁶⁷

A better known and more influential organization was the Balkan Committee in London. Although this body was not concerned directly with the problem of a Balkan federation it was interested in bettering the lot of the Balkan people and in improving the relations and strengthening the ties between the Balkan states. This committee was formed in 1903 when Mr. Noel Buxton conceived the idea of forming a permanent association of public men, writers, statesmen, historians and travelers, who would formulate views about Balkan affairs, create an informed public opinion and attract the support of influential people. The committee was loosely organized, possessed no funds or headquarters, and met in the House of Commons at irregular intervals. With the acceptance of the presidency of the body by Lord Bryce in July 1903, it quickly secured the support of influential people. The Archbishop of Canterbury, several bishops, the chief leaders of the nonconformist churches, the heads of some of the Oxford and Cambridge Colleges, members of both Houses of Parliament, ministers, consuls, travelers, and scholars, all took part in the opening campaign.⁶⁸

The Committee's first problem was the administration of Macedonia. The general revolt and the Salonica bombings of 1903 had attracted the attention of the world but the resulting Mürzsteg Program merely permitted Russia and Austria to act as the mandatories of Europe and increased the conflict of the rival nationalities

⁶⁷ "L'entente balkanique et l'Organosis de Constantinople 1908-12," *Les Balkans*, no. 6 (March, 1931), 1-6.

⁶⁸ For a list of names, see T. P. Conwell-Evans, *Foreign Policy from a Back Bench 1904-1918* (Oxford University Press, 1932), 4.

because of the provision for a future delimitation of administrative districts. The position taken by the Balkan Committee on the Macedonian question was presented in a joint statement issued by Lord Bryce and Mr. Buxton in 1904.

English public opinion [they pointed out] never approved the policy of a mandate to Austria-Hungary and Russia to settle the Balkan question. . . . The two Empires have now had the field to themselves since February 1903, a whole year. . . . What has been the result? . . . The answer is nothing. [The solution, they maintained, lay in] the appointment of a Christian Governor, not himself a Turkish subject, for Macedonia. . . . This Governor should when appointed be independent of Turkish control, and responsible, not to the two Empires alone, but to the six Great Powers.⁶⁹

This agitation of the Balkan Committee strengthened the hands of the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, at a moment when Austria-Hungary and Russia were reluctant to press for the reforms embodied in the Mürzsteg Program. Accordingly he urged the creation of a commission which "would be given administrative and executive power and would in the first instance be instructed to frame without delay schemes for the effective control of the administration of finance and justice."⁷⁰ In the midst of this attempt the government changed and the matter was dropped. Lansdowne's successor, Sir Edward Grey, was generally indifferent to the Macedonian question for fear that any action might offend Mohammedan feeling in Egypt.⁷¹ By means of widespread agitation the Committee was able to induce Grey to seek a revision of the Mürzsteg Program but nothing was accomplished because of the apathy of the Powers.⁷²

⁶⁹ Cited, *ibid.*, 9.

⁷⁰ *Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth Series, CLXXXIV (February 12, 1908), 166.

⁷¹ Mr. Robert Graves, then British Consul General at Salonica, writes that at the time "it had even been suggested to me that I might draw less attention to such unpleasant happenings as were recorded in my monthly bulletins reporting band activities, political murders, and cruelties inflicted mainly on the innocent in the ruthless repression of alleged revolt. I could not bring myself to act on this suggestion, and I continued to report undoubted facts as they were brought to my attention, although I knew that my despatches would suffer considerable mutilation before their publication in Blue Books, if they were not entirely suppressed, since it was not opportune that public opinion should be excited by such tales of horror when England was not prepared to take a strong line in Macedonia, as she had taken in Crete a few years earlier." Graves, *Storm Centres of the Near East*, 228.

⁷² Conwell-Evans, *op. cit.*, 10-13; Noel Buxton, "Diplomatic Dreams and the Future of Macedonia," *Nineteenth Century*, LXIII (May, 1908), 729; *Parliamentary Debates*, Fourth Series, CLXXXIV (February 25, 1908), 1698. While the Committee sought to bring pressure to bear on the British government, it urged the Balkan states at the same time to try to work out some common program regarding Macedonia. In a manifesto dated March 18, 1907, the Committee stated that: ". . . the chief obstacle that has been encountered in the endeavour both to concentrate British public opinion and to overcome the unwillingness of the Great Powers to effect a solution has been the failure of the Balkan and Danubian States . . . to adjust their policies to one another and to agree upon a common solution. . . . Should it be possi-

With the accession to power of the Young Turks and their promise of reform from within, the nature of the problem was changed. Men of experience such as Mr. Buxton and Mr. Bouchier were skeptical of the Young Turk promises but when Mr. W. A. Moore, an emissary of the Committee, gave a favorable report of the friendly attitude of the non-Turkish communities, it was decided to give qualified support to the new regime. Accordingly the Committee first sought to prevent new disturbances following the revolution and sent telegrams to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and to the Young Turk leader, Enver Bey, urging peace and reconstruction.⁷³

To further this policy of cooperation, Mr. Buxton and other representative members of the Balkan Committee accepted an invitation from the Committee of Union and Progress to visit Constantinople. They were warmly received by the Young Turks who welcomed their views as indicating the existence in England of an honest and widespread sympathy for Turkish liberalism. Europe at this time, however, was in the midst of the Bosnian annexation crisis. The Young Turks declared a boycott of Austrian goods; Serbian opinion clamored for war; and the Buxton party, to its surprise, found its activities suspected by the Central Powers. Baron Von Marschall reported from Constantinople that Mr. Buxton, "who let himself be fêted here like a Turkish national hero," was encouraging Turkish resistance to Austria,⁷⁴ while Aehrenthal even asserted that Buxton "disposed of considerable funds and that he employed a large number of agents in the nefarious work of propagating aspirations among the ignorant Serbian population."⁷⁵ Grey, however, defended Buxton's activities and informed his ambassador to Vienna that, "I have now discovered that he [Buxton] told the Servians not to expect any support from the Balkan Committee for British Naval assistance in case of war between Servia and Austria, and seems to have endeavored to exercise a moderating influence."⁷⁶

On his return to England Mr. Buxton gave Sir Edward Grey a

ble, as the result of a frank and friendly discussion between the States concerned, for an agreement to be reached, and should the Powers then be informed of the solution which would meet the wishes of the States most closely bound by ties of blood and language to the various sections of the Macedonian population, the Committee is convinced that such an important pronouncement could not be entirely disregarded, and that a very great impetus would be given towards the long-deferred solution of the most vexatious question in European politics," *Hellenic Herald*, I (March, 1907), 75, 76. See also *ibid.*, II (February, 1908), 54, 55.

⁷³ Grogan, *Life of J. D. Bouchier*, 133; Conwell-Evans, *op. cit.*, 16, 17.

⁷⁴ Baron von Marschall to German Foreign Office, December 5, 1908. *Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, no. 9329.

⁷⁵ Cartwright to Grey, December 23, 1908. *British Documents*, V, no. 489. See also *Ö.-U.A.*, I, no. 768.

⁷⁶ Grey to Cartwright, January 26, 1909. *British Documents*, V, no. 533. See also *ibid.*, V, nos. 480, 505.

summary of the situation in Turkey as he saw it. There was a possibility, he pointed out, of a return to the old ways, so that he deemed it "essential that the eyes of the Young Turks should be kept upon England. They are inclined now, to use a slang phrase, to play up to England, and even if we do no more we may keep them in this state of mind, which forms the necessary influence in their reforming ambition, without risky or expensive sacrifices."⁷⁷ The Foreign Office, however, despite an official visit to London of the Young Turk leaders, Talaat and Djavid, was too hesitating and half hearted in its tactics and British prestige, which had been paramount at the beginning of the revolution, gradually declined. Despite this fact the Committee continued its qualified support of the Turkish Government, although not without grave misgivings. Almost from the beginning the Young Turks began to divide into Liberals, who favored full representation of all the races of the Empire, and the Nationalists, who were much stronger and who demanded the rule of Turkey by a strictly Turkish party. With the triumph of the Nationalist faction the Committee withdrew its support and reverted to its former role of critic of Turkish administration.⁷⁸ As a final effort the Balkan Committee recommended and obtained the appointment, by the Turkish government, of a commission to assist the administrators in Macedonia to establish a better order. Unfortunately the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish and Balkan Wars put an end to these feeble efforts at reform.

When the Balkan League was formed the Committee supported it whole heartedly. Assured by the support of public opinion and by the statement of the British prime minister that "the Powers would not oppose the territorial changes resulting from the victory of the Allies," the Committee then devoted itself to a campaign in London in favor of a peace settlement in accordance with the wishes of the liberated nationalities. The coming of the second Balkan War put an end to these efforts, and the Committee then sought to revise the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest which it branded as unjust and harmful. "As for the Treaty of Bucharest," wrote Bouchier to Buxton on July 28, 1914, "it is the *fons et origo malorum*, and so long as it stands there will never be peace in the Balkans."⁷⁹

By this time, however, the great days of the Committee had been passed. The first five years of its existence were the most effective.

⁷⁷ Cited by Conwell-Evans, *op. cit.*, 21.

⁷⁸ For example, at its annual meeting, held on July 17, 1910, the Committee expressed its regret at "... what appears to be the undue influence of certain advocates of racial dominance in Turkey ... and the delay in the establishment of equal justice for all races and creeds. ..." *Hellenic Herald*, IV (July, 1910), 120. A year later, however, the Committee passed a resolution protesting in the strongest terms against the policies of the Young Turk government. *Hellenic Herald*, V (May-June, 1911), 50.

⁷⁹ Cited by Grogan, *op. cit.*, 158. See also Conwell-Evans, *op. cit.*, 32.

The support that the Committee attracted was so widely representative of British national life that no government could dismiss its agitation as the artificial product of a propagandist society. The reputation of the Committee spread to the continent where, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, it acquired a legendary fame which lasted to the outbreak of the war. However, in the years just preceding Sarajevo, the Balkan problems became so inextricably intertwined with European diplomacy and the conflict of alliances had become so clear and sharp that the effect of public opinion became less and less. Moreover British diplomats were generally hostile to the Balkan Committee and regarded its activities as amateurish and annoying. When the Committee representatives visited Turkey in 1908, the British minister in Vienna described Noel Buxton to his German colleague as "un imbecile" who was not to be taken seriously,⁸⁰ while Tyrell, Grey's private secretary, assured Mensdorff, the Austrian ambassador to London, that Buxton was an honorable and able man, but a visionary, "an intelligent ass."⁸¹ It is not surprising, therefore, that during the Balkan and World Wars the Balkan Committee's stand for a peace settlement based on nationality rights was disregarded.⁸²

Much more effective and significant than the work of these various organizations was the agitation carried on by the international socialist movement and especially by the Balkan socialist parties.⁸³ It has already been noted that a few pioneer Balkan socialists had preached the unity of the Balkan peoples as early as the eighteen seventies.⁸⁴ At that time, however, the industrial backwardness of the peninsula was such that it was impossible to build up a powerful socialist movement which could influence appreciably the course of events. By the first decade of the twentieth century the situation had changed. The Balkan socialist parties still could not be compared to the working class organizations in Western Europe, but considerable advance had been made. A brief survey of this progress will furnish a background for the anti-war and pro-federation campaigns of the Balkan socialists during the Tripolitan and Balkan Wars.

The movement was strongest in Bulgaria. After the death of Botev in 1876 a considerable period elapsed before a definite socialist or-

⁸⁰ Von Tschirschky to Von Bülow, December 21, 1908. *Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, no. 9164.

⁸¹ Mensdorff to Vienna, December 11, 1908. *Ö.-U.A.*, I, no. 725.

⁸² A complete history of the Balkan Committee is given in L. S. Stavrianos, "The Balkan Committee," *Queen's Quarterly*, XLVIII (1941), 258-267.

⁸³ A general survey of the pre-1914 Balkan socialist movement in relation to Balkan federation is given in Khr. Kabakchiyev, *Kum Balkanskata Federatsiya [Towards Balkan Federation]* (Sofia, 1914). Kabakchiyev was one of the leaders of the "narrow" Bulgarian Socialist Party.

⁸⁴ Cf. *supra*, 115-119.

ganization was established. In 1891 the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party was founded but within a year it had disintegrated because of dissension over the question of political activity by the proletariat. In July 1894, as a reaction to the repressive policies of the Stambulov government, the party was reunited and in the 1894 and 1902 elections it won two and eight seats respectively in the Sobranje. The growth of the Party was seriously hampered, however, by that perennial question which has plagued working class parties throughout the world, namely, collaboration or non-collaboration with the progressive bourgeois parties. The final result was a split in 1903 into the orthodox, radical, "narrow" Socialist Party led by Dimităr Blagoev, and the moderate "broad" Socialist Party led by Yanko Sakūzov. In spite of this cleavage the Socialists gained nine out of thirty seats in the September 1911 municipal elections in Sofia (seven "broad" and two "narrow") but when the Balkan Wars broke out Sakūzov was the sole Socialist representative in the Sobranje.⁸⁵

In Serbia, after the very considerable success attained by Markovich and his followers during the eighteen seventies, the movement declined somewhat because of governmental persecution and because of the lack of a large, class-conscious proletariat which led to a tendency in the direction of radical democracy rather than socialism. The *coup d'état* of June 3, 1903 and the new constitution which guaranteed freedom of the press and civil rights stimulated the labor movement greatly. Within a month the Serbian Social Democratic Party was organized as a regular political party and in the elections of September of the same year a Socialist candidate was elected to the Skupshchina. As in Bulgaria, dissension arose over the question of collaboration with the bourgeois parties but a split was avoided as the "collaborationists" left the Socialist ranks and joined the Young Radical Party. After this the progress of the Socialist Party was steady. In the legislative elections of April 1912 it was very active. Many pamphlets and over 400,000 leaflets on current issues were distributed and two Socialist candidates were elected. The Serbian Socialist Party also aided the socialist groups in the Yugoslav provinces under Turkish and Austrian rule. Advice, funds, propaganda material and experienced or-

⁸⁵ A socialist account of the pre-1912 Bulgarian working class movement is given in T. Tchitchovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Bulgaria* (London, 1931), 9-21; and a communist account in Khr. Kabakchiyev, "Bolgarskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya," *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 41-71. Numerous articles in the various socialist periodicals are also available, especially on the "broad"-"narrow" issue. J. Sakazoff, "Die Spaltung in der Bulgarischen Sozialdemokratischen Partei," *Die Neue Zeit*, XXI (1) (1903-1904), 472-475; A. Zankov, "Der Sozialismus in Bulgarien," *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, (2) (August, 1904), 624-631; S. Manoff, "Ce qui se passe en Bulgarie," *Le revue socialiste*, XLV (March, 1907), 254-263; Dimker, "La crise socialiste en Bulgarie," *Le mouvement socialiste*, XIII (May 15, 1904), 65-76.

ganizers were sent to Macedonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Vojvodina.⁸⁶

In Greece the working class movement began in the eighteen seventies on the island of Syra, then a commercial and manufacturing center, and subsequently spread to Athens, Piraeus, Patras, Volos and other large cities. One of the early leaders was the lawyer Platon Drakoules, who founded a socialist paper in 1885, organized the League of the Working Classes of Greece in 1908, and a year later, the Greek Socialist Party. A later leader with a firmer grasp of Marxism was N. Giannios who, persecuted in Constantinople by the Young Turks, fled to Athens in 1911 and founded the Socialist Center of Athens.⁸⁷ On the whole the working class movement in Greece was much weaker than that in Bulgaria and Serbia. Many of its leaders were vain and ambitious intellectuals who quarreled with one another, who had little real contact with the masses, and who had a weird conglomeration of ideas based on Marx, Blanqui, Bakunin, Proudhon, Kropotkin and others. Moreover they found few to listen to their arguments at a time when the great national concern was over the fact that more Greeks remained under Turkish rule than under Greek. By 1912 no Socialist had been elected to the Chamber of Deputies, but at least a number of working-class political organizations and trade unions existed and exerted some influence in limited circles.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ A socialist account of the pre-1912 Serbian working class movement is given in D. Lapchevich, *Istoriya Sotsializma u Srbiyi* [History of Socialism in Serbia] (Belgrade, 1922), 21ff. Among the most important articles on this subject are M. Popovitch, "Die sozialistische Lage in Serbien," *Die Neue Zeit*, XIX (2) (1900-1901), 516-522; D. Tutzowitsch, "Der Sozialismus in Serbien," *Die Neue Zeit*, XXVII (2) (August 6, 1909), 648-654; D. Lapschewitsch and Z. Topalovitz, "Die Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Bewegung in Serbien," *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, III (1912), 276-302. A short survey of the Yugoslav socialist movement in the Hapsburg Empire is given in M. Popovitch, "Le mouvement socialiste parmi les Serbes et les Croates de Hongrie," *Mouvement socialiste*, XI (September 1, 1903), 67-69; and in Lapchevich, *op. cit.*, 169-171.

⁸⁷ All of these bodies stood for reform at home and peace and cooperation in foreign affairs, especially with the neighboring Balkan countries. Article II of the constitution of the Socialist Centre of Athens, for example, called for the "Union of the Balkan States into a Democratic Balkan Federation." G. K. Kordates, *Ίστορία του Έλληνικού Έργατικού Κινήματος* [History of the Greek Working Class Movement] (Athens, 1931-1932, II, 50).

⁸⁸ Drakoules himself admitted in a letter of July 7, 1911 to Camille Huysmans, secretary of the Socialist International Bureau, that "... our Socialist Party is still imperfectly organized. There is a number of obstacles to overcome, and the greatest of these comes from those who should be our comrades. Through intrigues, personal jealousy, bad faith and general ineptitude our work is still in an embryonic state although our efforts since 1885 in the direction of the awakening of labouring classes and their organization have been unceasing." *Bulletin périodique du bureau socialiste international*, no. 8 (1912), 69. (Hereafter cited as *B.S.I.*) The standard history on this subject is by the Marxist writer, Kordatos, *Ίστορία του Έλληνικού Έργατικού Κινήματος*. See also P. E. Dracoules, "Le socialisme en Grèce," *Le mouvement socialiste*, XXX (July-August, 1911), 101-104; Ch. D. Vatis, "Grecheskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya" ["Greek Communist Party"], *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 173-176.

The Socialist movement in Roumania was as restricted as that in Greece. Its leadership, with the outstanding exception of Dr. C. Rakovski and a few others, was incompetent and untrustworthy, and the class electoral system made it extremely difficult to make political headway. After 1878 a feeble social revolutionary movement with anarchist tendencies was noticeable in Roumania but it was confined to intellectuals, had no contact with the masses and exerted little influence. In 1892 a Socialist Party was organized and the weekly, *Munca* [Work], was founded in Bucharest. Internal dissension, especially over the status of the numerous Jewish members, together with the wholesale desertion of the leaders who joined the Liberals, led to the virtual disappearance of the party within a few years. In 1905 Dr. Rakovski and the well-known economist and literary critic C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, established a new weekly journal and toured the country in an organizational campaign. A number of scattered "circles" were formed, but the outbreak of the Peasant Revolt in 1907 led to such savage persecution that the Party was virtually annihilated and the International Socialist Bureau was moved to pass a resolution against the "invidious arbitrary action" and "criminal violence" of the Roumanian government. In February 1910 a Socialist Party was once more organized and the *Romania Muncitoare* [Laboring Roumania] was issued thrice weekly. Considerable progress had been made by 1912, especially because numerous governmental employees, prohibited by law from joining labor unions, circumvented the law by joining instead the Socialist Party.⁸⁹

In Turkey there was very little working class activity until the Young Turk revolution of 1908. The general awakening accompanying this event led to the organization of several unions and socialist groups, and in 1909 important railway strikes occurred in which all races participated. In Asiatic Turkey the most active group was the Armenian, and in European Turkey the Jewish and Bulgarian. In Salonica, especially, much progress was made. Under the Jewish

⁸⁹ For the protest of the International Socialist Bureau, see *B.S.I.*, no. 2 (1910), 38; and VII^e Congrès socialiste international tenu à Stuttgart du 16 au 24 août 1907. *Compte rendu analytique publié par le secrétariat du bureau socialiste international* (Brussels, 1908), 432, 433. The periodical literature on the history of the Roumanian working class movement at various periods is especially rich. Among the most significant articles are: P. Axelrod, "Die soziale Bewegung in Rumänien," *Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft*, II (1881), 319-327; C. Millé, "Le mouvement socialiste en Roumanie," *La revue socialiste*, IV (1886), 493-496; B. Malon, "Le socialisme en Roumanie," *La revue socialiste*, X (July, 1889), 76-81; P. Argyriades, *Almanach de la question sociale et du centenaire de la république pour 1892, revue annuelle du socialisme international* (Paris, N.D.) 162-164; Gh. Marculescu, "Le socialisme en Roumanie," *L'humanité nouvelle*, I (July, 1897), 192-206; I (August-September, 1897), 353-365; C. Rakovsky, "Die Arbeiterbewegung in Rumänien," *Die Neue Zeit*, XXV (1) (December 1, 1906), 313-317; G. L. Jaray, "Le socialisme en Roumanie," *Le mouvement socialiste*, XXI (May, 1907), 421-437; W. E. Walling, *et al.*, *The Socialism of Today* (New York, 1916), 181-183.

leader, A. Benaroya, the "Socialist Federation" was established in the hope that it would ultimately include the various races of at least European Turkey. Actually the Bulgarians, Greeks, and Turks refused to affiliate and the "Federation" remained almost exclusively Jewish. Nevertheless it published journals, conducted strikes, obtained affiliation with the Second International, and in general provided leadership for the militant working-class movement of Macedonia. In January 1911 a Macedonian Socialist Congress was held at Salonica and representatives of all the races were sent from the various cities. In spite of increasing persecution by the alarmed Turkish government, the movement persisted and the months preceding the Balkan Wars were marked by increasing cooperation between the races in several strikes and demonstrations.⁹⁰

Such was the state of socialism in the Balkan countries at the beginning of the twentieth century. Before considering the stand taken by the Balkan Socialist parties with regard to inter-Balkan affairs, it should be noted that the international Socialist movement as a whole was also concerned with the Balkan question because of its importance in general European diplomacy. Thus on February 7, 1904 the International Socialist Bureau passed a resolution protesting against the massacres in Macedonia and urging that this region be granted complete autonomy and that its various national groups be given full opportunity for development.⁹¹ Three years later, during the International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart (August 18-24, 1907), a meeting of the Balkan delegates was arranged. In view of the increasing tension in the Near East it was agreed that common action on the part of the Balkan Socialists was necessary in order to combat the war danger. Accordingly it was decided that the Serbian Socialist Party should convene a general Balkan Socialist Conference at Belgrade.

This important conference, the first of its kind, was held on January 7-9, 1910. Representatives were sent by the Socialist parties and groups of Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, Turkey, Montenegro, Macedonia, and the Slavic areas of Austria-Hungary—that is Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia and Ruthenia.⁹² The result of the three days' discussion was the unanimous adoption of a series of resolutions

⁹⁰ For the movement in Constantinople and Asiatic Turkey, see P. Kitaigorodsky, "The Labour Movement in Turkey," *Communist International*, no. 17 (November, 1925), 83-96; *B.S.I.*, no. 8 (1912), 68, 69. For the movement in Macedonia, see *Fédération balkanique*, no. 146 (December, 1931), 31-33; *B.S.I.*, no. 1 (1910), 13; no. 2 (1910), 43; Kordatos, *Ιστορία του 'Ελληνικού 'Εργατικού Κινήματος*, II, 65-143. On the persecution by the Young Turk government, see *B.S.I.*, no. 1 (1910), 10, 11; no. 8 (1912), 69.

⁹¹ *Propositions et projets de résolutions avec rapports-explicatifs présentés au congrès socialiste international du Stuttgart (18-24 août 1907)* . . . (Brussels, n.d.), 395.

⁹² The Greek socialists sent no representative but they did telegraph their greetings to the conference.

against the predatory, imperialist Great Powers and against the reactionary Balkan monarchies which were accused of upholding the Powers in "their policy of interference, guardianship, conquest and reaction." Because of these forces, it was stated, the Balkan peoples remained isolated from each other by artificial frontiers at a time when "the triumphal march of capitalism" called for economic and political cooperation amongst the nationalities. Only one way out remained.

Social-democracy, acting as representative of the working class, which is not divided by the antagonism dividing the governing classes, has undertaken the important mission of constituting itself the most conscious, energetic and consistent champion of the idea of the solidarity of the nations of South-Eastern Europe, and, by the struggle of the proletarian class, of strengthening the force of resistance of the people against the policy of conquest of European capitalism.

Finally the secretaries of all the parties were instructed to keep in close touch with each other and a second conference was scheduled to be held in Sofia in 1911.⁹³

Somewhat similar was the "Resolution on the Situation in Turkey" adopted by the International Socialist Congress at Copenhagen on August 30, 1910. After denouncing the imperialist policies of the Great Powers in Turkey and the violation of the rights of union and of strike by the Turkish government, it was stated that only the socialist program of radical democratic reforms within the Balkan states (including Turkey) and a peaceful entente of the Balkan peoples, could effectively check foreign aggression and establish peace and prosperity.⁹⁴

The events of the next few years fully proved that these resolutions were taken seriously by their framers. On September 26, 1911 the Tripolitan War began. The International Socialist Bureau was at the time in session at Zurich and it immediately issued a manifesto calling on the workingmen of all countries to oppose the war. "Our comrades of Italy are agreed with our Ottoman comrades to protest under the name of the common interests of the proletariat, against an undertaking as criminal as it is mad. . . ." The manifesto also urged the Turkish government to take to heart the lesson of current events and to satisfy the aspirations of its national groups and of the working classes. This, it was argued,

. . . will contribute efficaciously to the reconciliation of the Balkan

⁹³ Text of the resolutions adopted given in Appendix E.

⁹⁴ Slightly varying texts of this resolution are to be found in *Huitième congrès socialiste international tenu à Copenhague du 28 août au 3 septembre 1910. Compte rendu analytique publié par le secrétariat du bureau socialiste international* (Copenhagen, 1911), 237-240; and in *B.S.I.*, no. 5 (1910), 177.

nations while waiting for their closer union in a federative organism. The nations of South-Eastern Europe possess all the cultural conditions for autonomous development. They are related economically. They should be related politically. Socialism will therefore uphold with all its influence, the idea of the solidarity of the Balkan nations and will develop the force of resistance of these nations against the intrigues and aggressions of European capitalism.⁹⁶

In addition to this manifesto, a preliminary Balkan Socialist Conference met at Belgrade on October 18, 1911. Delegates were sent by the parties of Serbia, Roumania, Croatia, Bosnia and Turkey. One of the purposes of this meeting was to organize common action against the war.⁹⁶ It was decided that the Balkan Socialist parties should hold anti-war mass meetings throughout the peninsula on October 23. The purpose of these meetings would be to bring pressure to bear upon the various governments and to gain popular support for the Socialist program—that is, for the formation of a Balkan federative republic (including Turkey) and for the democratization of the Balkan states. These plans were fulfilled to the letter. In Salonica a crowd of eight thousand heard local and foreign orators speak in Turkish, Bulgarian, Spanish and French. One of the resolutions passed at this meeting proclaimed that, "... the Ottoman proletariat is united in agreement with the universal proletariat to fight against war in general . . .," and that, "... only a Balkan federation will enable the nations of the Balkans to ensure their total development of culture and political independence."⁹⁷ In Athens the meeting was addressed by Drakoules and, in addition to the usual resolutions, the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party was instructed "to convey fraternal greetings to the Socialists of Italy and Turkey."⁹⁸ In Bulgaria and Serbia meetings were held not only in the capitals but also in most of the towns. Even the party of Bosnia-Herzegovina planned a meeting, but it was forbidden by the authorities, and instead strong anti-war articles were published in the party paper.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Text of the manifesto in *B.S.I.*, no. 8 (1912), 112, 113.

⁹⁶ The other purpose was to smooth the way for the calling of a second regular conference. At the insistence of the Bulgarian "narrow" socialists, the "broad" Bulgarian socialists had been excluded from the first conference at Belgrade. When a second conference had been proposed, the "narrow" had refused to participate because the "broads" were to be admitted. This preliminary conference now considered the problem and decided that all socialist parties and groups in the Balkans, adhering to the International Socialist Bureau, should be invited to the second regular conference. Since this meant the inclusion of the "broads," the "narrow" refused once more to take part. Further efforts were made to solve this problem but the Balkan Wars broke out before a compromise could be reached, and the proposed conference had to be postponed. See *Ibid.*, no. 11 (1913), 76, 77; no. 2 (1910), 66.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 8 (1912), 46.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 8 (1912), 45.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 8 (1912), 24, 47-49.

All this activity on the part of the Balkan socialists did not appreciably influence the course of events but it does demonstrate their readiness to act on behalf of peace and of Balkan federation. This was more strikingly shown in the next two years during the course of the Balkan Wars. The first Balkan War began on October 18, 1912. On October 29 the International Socialist Bureau issued a resolution expressing horror at the massacres that were taking place and declaring that the solution of the Balkan problem lay not in war but, "... in progressive democratization and in close union of all the Balkan states, including Turkey. . . ."¹⁰⁰ In order to strengthen and unify the struggle against the war the Bureau decided to call an extraordinary International Congress at Basel. The Congress was held on November 24 and 25, 1912, and specific instructions were issued to the Socialist parties of the various European countries regarding anti-war action. The parties of Austria-Hungary and Russia were especially warned to guard against the intervention of their governments in Balkan affairs, while the Balkan parties were instructed to combat the war, oppose the renewal of old rivalries between the allies, prevent the oppression of Turkish and Albanian minorities and strive for the fraternity of all the Balkan races, including the Albanians and Turks.¹⁰¹

The Balkan Socialists, however, had no need for such guidance. Several weeks before the actual outbreak of the war they had foreseen the danger and begun an anti-war campaign. The one exception was in Greece. In that country the Socialists were relatively uninfluential because of internal dissensions and because of the great popularity of Venizelos who had won the support of the working class by passing various social reform bills. Thus no delegates were sent to the 1910 and 1911 Balkan Socialist Conferences and similarly during the Balkan Wars the Greek Socialists remained quiet.¹⁰² In Salonica the powerful Socialist Federation was quickly rendered ineffective by the economic dislocation and unemployment caused by the war, and by the severe persecution of the Greek army of occupation.¹⁰³ In Roumania the Socialist Party early in September began a press campaign against the imminent war, and on September 30 thousands of copies of an anti-war leaflet were distributed and mass meetings were organized in various cities. As soon as hostilities began,

¹⁰⁰ For text, see *ibid.*, no. 9 (1912), 3; and *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, VI (1916), 391, 392.

¹⁰¹ Text in appendix F.

¹⁰² Kordatos, *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἐργατικοῦ Κινήματος*, II, 62-64; *B.S.I.*, no. 8 (1912), 72, 73.

¹⁰³ *B.S.I.*, no. 11 (1913), 63-66. This report issued by the Socialist Federation of Salonica on August 3, 1913, contains interesting information on conditions in the city during the course of the Balkan Wars.

a manifesto was issued describing Roumania's relations with the belligerents and calling on the workers to oppose intervention. "To the present war between the Balkan nations and the Turks we oppose our ideal: *A federal republic among all the states and all the nations including Turkey and Roumania.*"¹⁰⁴

Most spectacular and effective were the campaigns conducted by the Bulgarian and Serbian parties. In Bulgaria the "narrow" faction held a congress at Ruschuk on August 28, 1912, which passed resolutions against the threatening war and in favor of Balkan federation. On September 20 the Central Committee of the same group issued an anti-war manifesto and two days later protest meetings were held throughout the country. After mobilization was ordered the ranks of the party were decimated. An attempt was made however, to continue the publication of the party paper but it was at once suspended by the government. One more means for opposition remained. On October 8, when war was expected momentarily and the excitement was at its height, Sakūzov, the sole Socialist ["broad"] deputy, delivered a defiant anti-war speech before the Sobranje. He denounced the government for leading the country towards a war which could solve no problems, and added:

We do not want a Balkan Confederation instituted in view of the war. What we want, what we are preparing is a Confederation uniting in fact all the Balkan nations, including Turkey, for a work of peace, of labor, of production and exchange, a work of liberty and of progress. . . . Will you who are allied today, not turn against each other to-morrow as is already stated of you in the press and diplomatic circles?¹⁰⁵

During the course of his speech Sakūzov was continually interrupted and even threatened by the other deputies. Many taunts were hurled at him, such as "Shame on you! If you had a drop of Christian blood, such thoughts would not enter your head." "He ought to wear an osmen head dress, a Tschalma." On leaving the Sobranje Sakūzov was attacked by a group of students armed with revolvers and clubs and he escaped only with difficulty.

The Serbian Socialists carried on a similar anti-war campaign. Demonstrations were organized, leaflets distributed and the party press utilized to the full. Outstanding in view of later developments, was the speech delivered in the Skupshtina on October 7, 1912 by

¹⁰⁴ The manifesto continued as follows: "Brothers, we have here in the interior of Roumania more than 6 million peasants who, exploited by landowners and the tyranny of the administration, have returned to a state of slavery. We must conquer liberty as well as universal suffrage at home, for the fate of 7,000,000 Roumanians is decided by the votes of 45,000 electors." *B.S.I.*, no. 9 (1912), 22-25; no. 11 (1913), 77, 78.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 9, 2nd supplement (1912), 7-11; no. 10 (1913), 49.

Lapchevich, one of the two Socialist deputies. This speech is worth considering in detail, not only because of its remarkably prophetic character, but also because it contains a clear and specific exposition of the nature and principles of the contemporary Balkan socialist movement. Lapchevich first emphasized that the Socialists of all the Balkan countries had been consistent champions of Balkan unity. The recently created Balkan League, he added, did not represent a true union of the Balkan nations but rather a temporary combination formed under Russian auspices with aggressive designs. The outcome, therefore, would be war, but such a war he denounced as wholly unjustified in view of the fact " . . . that the most dangerous enemy is the imperialism of the great powers." There still remained, he admitted, the problem of the decadent and oppressive Ottoman Empire. Yet the fundamental basis of this problem was not the inherent incapacity of the Turkish people but rather their antiquated feudal regime together with the imperialist exploitation of their Empire by the European powers.

The population of Turkey bears on its shoulders a living and a dead man: capitalism [i.e. European] which crushes it with the burden of its claims, and feudalism which gives it no possibility of developing its productive forces. . . . War in the Balkans cannot put an end to this situation.

If war did break out, he continued, and the Turks were driven from the Balkans, then new wars would inevitably ensue because of boundary disputes which would arise as a result of the intermixture of races. "The Serbians will try to free their compatriots from Bulgarian domination, and *vice-versa*, and thus new conflicts will arise. . . ." This in turn, he warned, would lead to " . . . the intervention of the great capitalist states . . . and such intervention might signify a general conflagration of Europe . . ." In conclusion he urged the Socialist program as the only feasible solution:

Instead of war between the Balkan nations which would paralyse our forces and would open the way to capitalist conquerors, we ask:

The development at home of all nationalities and of all the countries in the Balkans;

The building up of the economic and cultural forces;

The union of the Balkan nations in a fraternal community in the form of federated and democratic republics for the welfare of all the nationalities in the Balkans and for the resistance of the oppressive powers of European capitalism.¹⁰⁶

Steps were also taken to convene a second Balkan Socialist Conference with the purpose of strengthening and coordinating the

¹⁰⁶ Text in *B.S.I.*, no. 9 (1912), 25-27.

anti-war movement, but this proved to be impossible because of the differences amongst the Bulgarian socialists and because of the lack of time. The various parties did succeed, however, in issuing, a few days before the outbreak of the war, the joint "Manifesto of the Socialists of Turkey and the Balkans." The Young Turk government was denounced for denying liberty, equality and justice, and for perpetuating the vices of the old regime. The Balkan Allies were also attacked for plotting war with the alleged purpose of overthrowing Turkish rule and attaining national unity. How, it was asked, could national unity be attained in Macedonia with its Bulgars, Serbs, Greeks and Albanians, or in the Adrianople vilayet with its Turks, Bulgars and Greeks? The unity argument was thus rejected as "merely a pretext for the Balkan governments" whose true aim was "economic and territorial expansion."

To the outrageous ideal of . . . disposing of the lives of . . . people by war, of haggling for their rights and their territories, we reply by the declaration of the imperative necessity, already proclaimed at the inter-Balkan and Socialist Conference of Belgrade in 1909,¹⁰⁷ closely to unite all the people of the Balkans and the Near East in the most democratic form, without distinction of race or of religion. Without such a Federation of the people of Eastern Europe, national unity is neither possible nor durable for them.¹⁰⁸

On May 30, 1913 the Treaty of London ended the first Balkan War. A month later, on June 29, the second Balkan War had broken out over the question of the division of the spoils. This war was opposed, no less than the first, by the Balkan Socialists. In Roumania a series of mass meetings were held in June and early July in an effort to prevent intervention, and on July 13, the day of mobilization, a manifesto was issued denouncing the preparations for war. The prevailing argument of "the peril of a greater Bulgaria" was rejected as mere camouflage for a war of conquest. Instead of war, the manifesto called for peace and for the building up of a truly free and democratic Roumania.¹⁰⁹

In Serbia a very active campaign was conducted against the outbreak of a second war. Meetings and demonstrations were organized, thousands of leaflets were distributed, and in the Skupshtina the two Socialists continually reiterated a three-point program: peace, unconditional demobilization, and Balkan federation.

Without much consideration for the Agenda, whether it was a question of minting, or of railway workers, or of new communications

¹⁰⁷ The date of this conference was December 25-27, 1909/January 7-9, 1910.

¹⁰⁸ Text in appendix G. The precise date of this manifesto is not available. The International Socialist Bureau published it on October 12 with the statement that it had just been received. ¹⁰⁹ *B.S.I.*, no. 11 (1913), 77-79.

by rail, the budget, credits etc., our deputies always addressed the house and commenced and terminated their subjects by the three demands above mentioned.¹¹⁰

Nor did the Serbian successes in the second Balkan War affect the stand of the party.

If peace is signed at Bucharest, in our opinion this peace will be only nominal. If class relations are not created, i.e., if the Federation of the Balkan Republics is not realised, we shall see further struggles, for all the dynasties and all the bureaucratic capitalist and militarist cliques desire hegemony. . . .¹¹¹

Although this agitation did not succeed in preventing war, it did lead to increasing popular support for the socialist position. On May Day 1913 the Socialist Party received messages of congratulation bearing thousands of signatures from all the divisions of the army. In May 1914 the Party congress was held in Belgrade and the Bulgarian Socialist, Sakúzov, who was present, was given a great ovation. The usual resolutions were passed in favor of internal reform and Balkan federation. After the Congress was ended an imposing demonstration took place in the streets of Belgrade in favor of union between Bulgaria and Serbia. In the same year elections were held and the Socialist Party, despite its republicanism and extreme anti-war stand, received twenty per cent more votes than in the 1912 elections—that is, an increase from 25,000 to 30,000.¹¹²

In Bulgaria, also, the renewal of war had been actively opposed. On May Day 1913 the "narrows" issued a proclamation attacking the Balkan League as

. . . a pact concluded, to the detriment of the people, between the rulers and the bourgeoisie of the four states. . . . We were told that the war would realise the formula: "The Balkans for the Balkan nations," but instead the prospects are for inter-allied war. . . . The consequences of the Balkan war clearly show us that the enfranchisement, the independence, and the unity of nations as well as their economic development could not and cannot be realised by a war. . . . Social progress, national independence and unity can only be realised by a federation of Balkan nations.¹¹³

With the outbreak of the second Balkan War and the disastrous defeat of Bulgaria, public opinion turned sharply to the support of the Socialist program. When the Balkan Wars began the Socialists had only one seat in the Sobranje, but in the elections of December 1913 they gained 37 seats (21 "broad" and 16 "narrow"). Whereas in the 1911 elections they received about 25,000 votes, in 1913 the figure

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, no. 11 (1913), 69, 70.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, no. 11 (1913), 71.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, no. 11 (1913), 71-76.

¹¹³ Walling, *The Socialists and the War*, 106, 107; *B.S.I.*, no. 11 (1913), 69-71.

jumped to 107,000. Moreover the Socialist program had not been altered in the slightest, so that the 107,000 voters had, in effect, cast their ballots in favor of a republican Bulgaria and a Balkan federation. Moreover other opposition parties were ready to support a bill for the abolition of the monarchy unless their demands for radical reforms were met. The position of the crown was precarious, so much so that Sazonov asked Pashich whether in the event of the abdication of Ferdinand, Serbia would be willing to intervene to uphold the monarchical principle. Fearing the spread of republicanism in Serbia, Pashich replied in the affirmative. Ferdinand, however, met the danger by refusing to call the Sobranje and by ordering new elections for March 8, 1914. In the face of extreme governmental pressure the Socialist vote fell from 107,000 to 85,000 that is a decline of about 20%. No further electoral contests were held until the post-war period when Ferdinand, after the second great national defeat, was finally forced to abdicate.¹¹⁴

This survey reveals that during the course of the Balkan Wars, despite war hysteria and governmental persecution, the Balkan Socialist Parties, excepting that of Greece, stuck resolutely to their principles. Again and again they reiterated that war provided no solution for the Balkan problem—that instead it would lead to further wars between the Balkan states and probably to the intervention of the Great Powers and to a general European conflagration. A lasting settlement could be obtained, they insisted, only by the establishment of democratic, republican Balkan regimes and by their unification into a Balkan federation. There now arises the problem of ascertaining the effectiveness of the Socialist propaganda. This is extremely difficult to do because of the almost complete lack of data. There is little doubt, however, that the Socialists had very little influence at the outset. The Balkan people naturally looked forward to the liberation of their brothers under Turkish rule and they hailed the Balkan League as a means of attaining this end. Thus there could have been very little response to the Socialist thesis that a war by the Balkan allies against Turkey would bring disaster rather than freedom. An indication of this is the reaction to Sakuzov's speech in the Sobranje on October 8, 1912. But by the middle of 1913 the situation had changed. The Socialists had now been proven correct—at least in one respect. War had not brought peace and liberty, but rather more war and mutual distrust and hate. The re-

¹¹⁴ *British Documents*, X (1), nos. 331, 349; Khr. Kabakchiyev, "Bolgarskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya," *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 73-75; Walling, *The Socialists and the War*, 108-110; C. G. Logio, *Bulgaria, Problems and Politics* (London, 1919), 98-105.

sult was a considerable increase in Socialist influence in Serbia and a spectacular increase in Bulgaria. Undoubtedly the two costly wars led many of the voters to select the Socialist ticket because of their war-weariness rather than any enthusiasm for a Balkan federation. Nevertheless by 1914 when the Balkan states were hopelessly divided and feverishly preparing for still more war, the Socialist parties had become the most powerful and consistent force in the Balkan federation movement.

CHAPTER VIII

BALKAN FEDERATION AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION, 1914-1929¹

In the Balkan Peninsula the World War was essentially a continuation of the Balkan Wars. The second Balkan War and the Treaty of Bucharest had ended the short-lived unity of the Balkan states. Thus during the course of the World War they were unable to pursue any common policy and instead, one after another, they intervened in the war on whichever side seemed the strongest and promised the most. Serbia, of course, was involved from the outset. On August 7 Montenegro joined Serbia. In the meantime Turkey was passing under German control. On August 2 Germany and Turkey had signed a secret treaty to become effective in the event of Russian intervention in the war—a condition which already existed when the treaty was signed. Turkey was not ready to enter the conflict, however, and for several weeks the Turkish authorities amused themselves by carrying on negotiations with the Allies who were ignorant of the true state of affairs. This situation was ended when on October 29 a Turco-German squadron commanded by the German Admiral Wilhelm Souchon bombarded several Russian Black Sea ports. On November 3 Russia declared war on Turkey and two days later Britain and France did likewise. Bulgaria was the next Balkan state to intervene in the war. For over a year Ferdinand received bids from both sides and carefully watched the course of military events. Finally on September 6, 1915 he concluded an alliance with the Central Powers and on October 14 declared war against Serbia. The failure of the Gallipoli campaign, the defeat of the Russians in Galicia and Poland, and the desire for revenge against Serbia all contributed to his decision to throw in his lot with the Central Powers.

In the case of Roumania, her King was in favor of joining Austria-Hungary and Germany, but the cabinet preferred neutrality and public sentiment was generally pro-Ally. During the first two years of the war the Roumanians hesitated to take sides, but the Allied successes in 1916 on the French, Italian, Russian, and Near Eastern fronts convinced the Roumanian government that the time had come to enter on the winning side. By the secret treaty of August 17, 1916,

¹ Some of the material in this chapter has been published in L. S. Stavrianos, "The Balkan Federation Movement: A Neglected Aspect," *American Historical Review*, XLVIII (October, 1942), 30-51.

Roumania agreed to join the Allies and in return was promised Transylvania, Bukovina, and the Banat of Temesvar. Ten days later Roumania was involved in the war.

Greece now remained the only neutral in the Balkans. King Constantine, related to William II and fearful of a Bulgarian attack, favored neutrality, if not actual alliance with Germany. But Venizelos, prime minister since 1910, believed that Greece could at last complete her unification by joining the Allies. The result was a bitter Venizelist-royalist feud which was destined to plague Greek political life for two decades. The deadlock was ended forcefully by the Allies in 1917. They blockaded the Greek ports, recognized the Venizelos government at Salonica and compelled Constantine to abdicate, on June 12, 1917, in favor of his second son, Alexander. Venizelos was then called to head a new government, and on July 2 Greece officially became one of the Allied Powers.²

Thus the Balkan states became involved in the World War and once more fought one another for the fulfillment of their respective national ambitions. The Greeks dreamt of a new Great Hellas which would include the coast of Asia Minor and possibly Constantinople; the Serbs and Roumanians sought to liberate their brothers under Hapsburg rule; and the Bulgarians were determined to smash the Bucharest settlement and to gain the whole of Macedonia. The results of this war were no more satisfactory or permanent than those of the Balkan Wars. The Austro-Hungarian minorities were freed and the Greco-Turkish exchange of populations ended a centuries-long dispute but Bulgaria remained more discontented than ever. The harsh terms of the Treaty of Neuilly left Bulgaria a revisionist state and made impossible any permanent rapprochement between the Balkan governments during the post-war period. Thus it was not the governments but rather the agrarian parties of the peasants and the socialist and communist parties of the workers that were by far the strongest forces for Balkan unity in the years immediately following the peace settlement. Furthermore, these parties enjoyed the support of a large percentage of the Balkan people and for brief periods were in power.

During the war years, 1914-1918, the socialist movement was disrupted in the Balkans as in the rest of Europe. Anti-war resolutions had been passed at the various pre-war congresses of the Second International, but when war did come, the socialists split into three main groups, causing the disruption of the International. The "right"

² The involvement of the Balkan states in the World War is described in B. E. Schmitt, *The Coming of the War, 1914* (New York, 1930), I, 418-459, and the works cited therein.

socialists, who were in the majority at the beginning of the war, supported their respective governments in their war efforts. The "centre" socialists denounced the war and refused to support it actively, but they preserved their party connections with the "right" and refused to embark on class war. The "left" socialists, who were numerically the weakest at the outset, accused the "right" and "centre" of betraying the workers and demanded that the war should be immediately transformed into a class war. The Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences of 1915 and 1916 represented attempts on the part of the "centre" and "left" socialists to revive the international socialist movement, but no permanent organization was established because the "centre" wished to reestablish the old International while the "left" under Lenin insisted upon the creation of a new Third International dedicated to class war and world revolution. The situation remained chaotic until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 precipitated the issue and led to a definite division between the adherents of the Socialist Second International and those of the Communist Third International.³

In the Balkans the Socialist Parties were divided by this factionalism and in addition they were fiercely persecuted by their governments, and in some cases, obliged to flee before foreign armies of occupation. They did succeed, however, in convening a second Balkan Socialist Conference at Bucharest in July 1915. Representatives of the Greek, Bulgarian, Roumanian and Serbian parties were present, and after much discussion, anti-war resolutions were passed and a manifesto was issued attacking the Great Powers and the existing Balkan regimes and calling for a Balkan republican federation.

The conquest and the partition of the Balkan Peninsula and Turkey are, together with the struggle for world trade, the most important aims in the present imperialist war. Never before has the peril of the policy of conquest of the Great Powers appeared so imminent and so clear. . . . The ruling classes and the Balkan dynasties rule, under a regime of persecution and oppression, the subjugated peoples of Macedonia, Dobrudja and Thrace, and this regime provides overwhelming proof that their aim had never been the liberation of the peoples and the integrity of the Balkan countries, but rather the conquest of new territories. . . . The Balkan proletariat sound the alarm for the working class and popular masses of the Balkan countries to take upon themselves the defence of the independence of the Balkan Peninsula. It is their duty and to their interest to fight for the realization of the Balkan republican federation. The Balkan Wars as well as the World War prove that only an independent union of

³ M. Fainsod, *International Socialism and the World War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935); A. Van Der Slice, *International Labor, Diplomacy, and Peace, 1914-1919* (Philadelphia, 1941).

the Balkan peoples, freed from the tutelage of any Great Power whatsoever, will be able to assure their liberty and their integrity.⁴

This strong anti-war position by no means reflected the sentiments of all the Balkan socialists. They were all agreed that the ultimate solution lay in reform and federation as proposed in the manifesto, but like their comrades in the rest of Europe, they disagreed sharply on the war issue. In Bulgaria the "broad" socialists were generally nationalistic and backed the government. They rejected the anti-war manifesto of the Bucharest Conference and several of them accepted important official positions. In fact the Premier himself stated that the support of the "broad" was of the utmost importance for his government.⁵ In contrast, Blagoev, the leader of the "narrow," took a stand very similar to that of Lenin. As early as August 1914 he was writing in his journal, *Novo Vreme* [*New Times*] that a general European revolution would follow the war and that such a revolution was "the only salvation for mankind." He did not hesitate to attack such outstanding Socialists as the German Parvus and the Russian Plekhanov, when they urged Bulgarian intervention in the war.⁶

On November 24, 1914 the "narrow" deputies introduced two motions before the Sobranje. One provided that the Bulgarian Government should come to an understanding with the governments of the neutral countries with the view to common action for the termination of the war. The other required that the Sobranje should call upon the parliaments of the other Balkan countries to arrange for a common defense against foreign invasion and to take steps towards a Balkan federation. Only the eleven members of the "narrow" group voted for these motions. In the next year the "narrow" endorsed the anti-war manifesto of the Bucharest conference, and a few days before Bulgaria's intervention in the war they issued a proclamation warning the people of the government's intrigues and demanding the preservation of neutrality. Immediately after the declaration of war the parliamentary group of the "narrow" Socialist Party published a manifesto denouncing the "treachery" of the "Bulgarian bourgeoisie and monarchy" and calling for "uncompromising class war" and a "Balkan federative republic" as the only means of escaping the horrors of war. "Across the frontiers we stretch fraternal hands

⁴ Kordatos, *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἐργατικοῦ Κινήματος*, II, 154-157; *La fédération balkanique*, March 1, 1927.

⁵ *American Labor Year Book*, 1916, 169, 170; 1917-1918, 235, 236; Fainsod, *op. cit.*, 37.

⁶ The charge that Blagoev was unduly influenced by Parvus and became imbued with "extreme Russophobia" is unjustified, for Blagoev attacked Parvus as violently as he did Plekhanov. Kabakhiyev, "Bolgarskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya," *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 78-85; Logio, *Bulgaria's Problems and Politics*, 77.

to the workers of Greece, Serbia, Roumania and Turkey." Finally on December 15, 1915, when war credits were being voted in the Sobranje, Blagoev stated in the name of his party:

We remain uncompromising opponents of a war which was forced on the Bulgarian people . . . we demand the immediate cessation of bloodshed and the conclusion of peace. Social Democracy, acknowledging the right of all nations to self-determination and self-government, energetically protests against annexation of foreign lands and . . . against the annihilation and enslavement of Serbia. The Party has believed that the unification of the Bulgarian nation was possible only through a Balkan federative republic consisting of all the Balkan countries as autonomous members. . . . In consequence of the above we vote against the war credit of five hundred million levas.⁷

In Greece the situation was essentially the same although much more confused because of the tendency to emphasize personalities rather than issues. In spite of various unification efforts innumerable factions continued to exist consisting of followers of Drakoules, Yannis, Benaroya, Theodoropoulos and other labor leaders. Most of them supported Venizelos in his pro-Entente policy and took a position very similar to that of the "right" socialists in the Allied countries. Most extreme in this respect was Drakoules who favored intervention in the war against the Central Powers and the creation of a greater Greece. In an article in the *Asiatic Review*, for example, he claimed for Greece the Aegean Islands, Macedonia, Epirus, Smyrna, and even Constantinople. To these nationalist aspirations he added a proposal for a Balkan federation of "the democratic type, based upon the solidarity of the productive masses of all the Balkan countries."⁸ Such a position was bound to lead to conflict with the Bulgarian "broad" socialists who were supporting the war aims of their government. In fact one of them, A. Schopov, immediately published in the same journal a reply in which he stated that the Bulgarian socialists were equally in favor of a federation, but only after "a just division of land conquered in the war, a division on the basis of the principle of nationalities." He then quoted statistics designed to prove that Macedonia was predominantly Bulgarian and should therefore be turned over to Bulgaria.⁹ In other words, these "right" socialists, in favoring federation but at the same time backing the war aims of their respective governments, found themselves in the

⁷ Cited in Kabakchiev, *op. cit.*, 77, 78.

⁸ P. E. Drakoules, "Greece, the Balkans and the Federal Principle," *Asiatic Review*, VI (February 15, 1915), 113-133. Drakoules was so strongly interventionist that in July 1915 he was expelled from his party. See *New York Call*, August 11, 1915.

⁹ A. Schopov, "The Balkan States and the Federal Principle," *Asiatic Review*, VII (July, 1915), 16-30.

same mutually antagonistic position as the "right" socialists of the Western European countries.

In contrast the more leftist Labor Federation of Salonica adopted a strong anti-war stand and denounced the nationalist ambitions of all the Balkan governments. It was represented at the Balkan Socialist Conference of Bucharest, and in August 1915 it sent a communication to the convention of the Bulgarian "narrowers" in which it censured all the Great Powers alike for their imperialist plans in the Balkans. Once Greece entered the war the Labour Federation opposed exaggerated national claims and strove to prevent a peace settlement based on military conquest. At the inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference held in London in February 1918, the representatives of the Federation insisted on the following points: the evacuation of the occupied territories and the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*; customs union of the Balkan states; and the collective guarantee by the Balkan states of the right of the minorities to develop freely. "It is by this means, and only by this means that we will be able to march forward towards that democratic federation of the Balkans which the workers and the Balkan peoples so ardently desire and which is so essential for peace."¹⁰

In Roumania and Serbia the Socialist Parties denounced the war as imperialist and demanded a federation of free Balkan peoples, but in both countries the socialist agitation was cut short by foreign invasion and occupation. A few months after the outbreak of the war the Executive Committee of the Roumanian Party issued a manifesto warning against Russian propaganda designed to involve the country in war, and demanding a federated Balkan republic as the only way out of the dilemma. Resolutions to the same effect were passed at the party convention in November 1915 and at hundreds of mass meetings organized in all the cities. When the Roumanian government intervened in the war in August 1916, it at once arrested Dr. Rakovski, the outstanding Socialist leader, and hundreds of his followers. These arrests, together with the occupation of Roumania by foreign armies, effectively silenced the Socialist Party until the Armistice.¹¹

The Serbian Socialists were not as divided as those of Greece and Bulgaria. Their position was to the left of the centrists but not as

¹⁰ The text of their memorandum to the conference is available in pamphlet form in A. D. Sideris, A. Couriel, and P. Dimitratos, *La question d'Orient* (Paris, 1918). See also A. D. Sideris, "The Macedonian Question," *New Europe*, VI (April 11, 1918), 396-401; *American Labor Year Book*, 1916, 193.

¹¹ *American Labor Year Book*, 1916, 207, 208; Walling, *The Socialists and the War*, 400, 401, 210, 211. For a war statement by Dr. Rakovski regarding Macedonia and Balkan federation, see "Transylvania and Macedonia," *New Europe*, VI (March 7, 1918), 254-256.

far left as Lenin and his followers. This position they held consistently throughout the war period. In the sitting of the Skupshtina of August 1, 1914, the two socialist deputies, Katzlerovich and Lapchevich, both refused to support the government. While agreeing that the Austrian ultimatum was an outrage, they argued that Serbia was partly responsible in having allowed herself to be a pawn in the hands of Russia and France, and in having tolerated the activities of the national secret society, *Narodna Odbrana*. Thus they maintained that the government did not merit socialist support. In the next year the Serbian Socialist Party participated in the Bucharest Socialist Conference and supported its pro-federation and anti-war resolutions. A few months later, on August 10, 1915, the two Socialist deputies issued a statement in the Skupshtina in which they urged the formation of a Balkan federative republic as "... the sole means for the cessation of slaughter, for liberation from the imperialist Great Powers, and for the cultural and political progress of all the Balkans." The occupation of the country by enemy troops did not lead the Serbian Socialists to change their views. Delegates were sent to the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences, but within Serbia Socialist activity became impossible and was not renewed until the disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire in the autumn of 1918.¹²

With the cessation of hostilities at the end of 1918 the Socialist movement quickly revived and within a few months experienced a tremendous growth. Equally spectacular was the increase in the strength of the Agrarian Parties representing the peasant masses. The disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire, the triumph of the Bolsheviks in Russia, the establishment of a Soviet regime in Hungary, and the destruction and suffering resulting from the war, all combined to produce this great revolutionary upsurge. At the outset the Labor and Agrarian Parties appeared to be of equal strength but within a few years the latter had gained the upper hand. This was due to a number of reasons. The most obvious was the numerical superiority of the peasants over the city proletariat, although this factor can be over-emphasized, as the Communist Parties attracted considerable support amongst the poor peasantry. Another reason is to be found in the fact that the Balkan governments persecuted with particular severity the labor movement, and especially the revolutionary Communist Parties.¹³ The latter were also handicapped by

¹² C. Grünberg, *Die Internationale und der Weltkrieg* (Leipzig, 1916), 210-213; B. Boshkovich, "Yugoslavskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya," *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 136-139; *American Labor Year Book, 1919-1920*, 386. For the attitude of the Yugoslav socialists in the Hapsburg Empire, see "A Southern Slav Socialist Manifesto," *New Europe*, V (December 13, 1917), 281-284.

¹³ The nature of the White Terror in the Balkans has been eloquently described by Henri Barbusse who made a tour of the Balkans in 1925 and summarized his findings in *Les Bourreaux* (Paris, 1926).

their tendency to emphasize class war to the extent of almost ignoring the all-important nationality problem. Thus in a country such as Yugoslavia, where the pan-Serb policies of the centralist Belgrade government were so hated, the Agrarian leader, Stefan Radich, was able to win the allegiance of the great majority of the Croats by demanding autonomy as well as social reform.¹⁴ Finally the labor movement in general was seriously weakened by the bitter feud between the Communist and Socialist Parties in all the Balkan countries.

This schism in the labor ranks was precipitated by the formation of the Third International. When the first Congress of the Third International convened in March 1919, representatives were present from Roumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and these were grouped together as the Balkan Revolutionary Socialist Federation and granted three votes out of a total of fifty-five. A new communist manifesto was drawn up which denounced the Second International as bankrupt and called for world revolution based on Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Soviets.¹⁵ The result was a split in the working class movement throughout the world.

In Greece the Socialist Labor Party was formed on November 3, 1918 and at its congress of January 1920 it voted to affiliate with the Third International. In opposition, the right wing elements left in the Socialist Party maintained their tie with the Second International.¹⁶ In Roumania there was much friction within the Socialist Party over the question of joining the new International. There existed apparently a difference of opinion between the party sections and the executive committee over this issue. Thus, although the Party had left the Socialist International in 1915, it was not until the congress of May 1921 that a resolution was passed for unqualified adherence to the Third International.¹⁷

In Yugoslavia the Socialist Party called for a congress at Belgrade on April 20-25, 1919, of all parties willing "to profess anti-militarism i.e., to repudiate all participation in a bourgeois ministry." Representatives were sent from all the provinces of the newly organized

¹⁴ The Communist leaders realised this flaw in their tactics and admitted that their failure "... indicates that the Communist Party failed to estimate at its true worth the national factor in the struggle of the toiling masses." Accordingly they have studied and discussed at great length the problem of nationalities in the Balkans. See V. Kolarov, "The National Question in the Balkans," *Communist International*, no. 4 (July-August, 1924), 78-85; "Resolution on the Question of Nationalities," *Communist International*, no. 4 (July-August, 1924), 86-98.

¹⁵ Fainsod, *op. cit.*, 201-211.

¹⁶ Vatis, "Grecheskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya," *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 176, 177; Kordatos, *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἐργατικοῦ Κινήματος*, II, 178-185; *American Labor Year Book, 1921-1922*, 277, 278.

¹⁷ Ch. Rakovski, "The Communist Movement in Roumania," *Communist International*, no. 13 (August, 1920), 2551-2554; *American Labor Year Book, 1921-1922*, 302, 303.

state and a resolution was passed unanimously in favor of affiliation with the Third International. At the second congress held in June 1920 the Party adopted the name Communist Party of Yugoslavia. As in the case of Roumania and Greece, the more conservative Socialists remained within the Second International.¹⁸

A similar split took place in Turkey where apparently two distinct Communist Parties were organized in 1920, one in Constantinople and the other in Ankara. The Socialist Party under Hylmi Bey adhered to the Second International and based its program on Wilson's Fourteen Points.¹⁹ Finally in Bulgaria the "broad" Socialists, who had cooperated with the government during the course of the war, now retained their affiliation with the Second International while the "narrow" Socialists at their June 1919 Congress voted unanimously in favor of joining the Communist International.²⁰

This rift in the Balkan labor movement did not involve simply adherence to rival international organizations. It meant, in addition, the adoption of fundamentally different programs. It has already been noted that before and during the first World War all the Balkan Socialist Parties had consistently demanded a federation of democratic Balkan republics as the only feasible solution of the Eastern Question. They also professed to be working for the establishment of socialism but that part of their program was usually phrased in vague terms and obviously concerned the more distant future. Their immediate aim was the overthrow of the existing monarchical regimes, the establishment of democratic republics and their unification into a Balkan federation. In the post-war period the Socialist Parties affiliated with the Second International retained, generally speaking, this program, although they never worked out their policies and tactics in the same detailed fashion as did the Communist Parties. For example, the Second International at its Lucerne Congress in August 1-9, 1919, passed a resolution, "... in favor of a rapprochement among the Balkan peoples and their union in a federation of independent States." It recommended in addition the holding of plebiscites under neutral control in order to determine the frontiers of the federated states. Finally it expressed the hope that, "... these countries may live in concord and liberty and devote their strength in the future to Socialism."²¹

¹⁸ For references and details, see *infra*, 213.

¹⁹ P. Kitaigorodsky, "The Labour Movement in Turkey," *Communist International*, no. 17 (November, 1925), 83-96; *American Labor Year Book, 1921-1922*, 317, 318.

²⁰ For references and details, see *infra*, 207, 208.

²¹ Text of this resolution given in appendix H. Similarly the 1927 May Day manifesto of the Second International included a demand for "The Balkans to the Balkan Peoples! For the Balkan Federation of Free Balkan Peoples!" *International Information*, IV, no. 20 (April 12, 1927), 142.

The program of the Balkan Communist Parties, on the other hand, was entirely different. In January 1920 a conference was held in Sofia which was attended by the Communist Party of Bulgaria, the Socialist Labor Party of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Labor Party of Greece and the Socialist Party of Roumania. This conference was viewed as one of the regular meetings of the Balkan Socialist Federation but the latter was now renamed the Balkan Communist Federation and was affiliated to the Third International. The views and program of this Balkan Communist Federation were revealed in the following resolution:

... nothing but the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat with its organization of the Workers', Peasants' and Red Army deputies, will liberate the Balkan nations from all oppression and will afford them a possibility of self-determination uniting them all into one Balkan Socialist Soviet Republic.²²

A comparison of these two programs reveals the fundamental difference between the Socialist and Communist positions. Both parties call for a Balkan federation, but the one speaks vaguely of "rapprochement among the Balkan peoples and their union in a federation of independent States" while the other specifies a "Balkan Socialist Soviet Republic" established by means of "proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat." It might be noted further that the two differed also in organization. The Socialist Parties in the Balkan countries had few contacts with each other and met on only a few occasions when some special problem presented itself. In contrast, the Communist Parties were closely associated in the Balkan Communist Federation which met comparatively frequently and formulated policies and tactics to be followed throughout

²² The text of the resolutions passed at this conference is given in appendix I. The Balkan Communist Federation held conferences fairly regularly. By 1925, a total of seven had been called. For details regarding these conferences see *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 8-27; 205-222; and the authoritative articles by G. Dimitrov, former head of the Communist International, in *International Press Correspondence*, August 7, 1924, and in the *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* [*Grand Soviet Encyclopedia*] under the heading "Balkan Communist Federation." The Communist explanation for the adoption of a new revolutionary program runs as follows: before the Balkan Wars, when the Balkan people were struggling for national liberation, there existed "... the historical possibility of a bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and monarchism, and the establishment of a democratic federated republic in the Balkans." But this possibility was eliminated when the Balkan monarchs and bourgeoisie followed an aggressive expansionist policy during the Balkan and World Wars and thereby became the pawns of European imperialism. Thus a bourgeois-democratic revolution was no longer feasible. Only a "revolution of the proletariat, in conjunction with the poor peasantry" could now end the domination of the ruling classes and dynasties, and liberate and unify the Balkan peoples into a federated Socialist Soviet Republic. See *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 215; and "Events in the Balkans and Prospects of a Workers' and Peasants' Revolution," *Communist International*, no. 10 (April, 1925), 69-86.

the peninsula.²³ As might be expected, in view of these differences and in view of the fact that both sought to gain the support of the same general class, the two parties remained bitter rivals throughout the post-war period.²⁴

Such was the general background of the great revolutionary upheaval which convulsed the Balkan Peninsula in the immediate post-war years. As in the pre-war period, so now the revolutionary movement was much stronger and better organized in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia than in Greece or Roumania. In fact in Bulgaria the Agrarians were in power from October 1919 to June 1923 while in Yugoslavia during these years the Agrarian, Communist and Socialist Parties undoubtedly had the support of the great majority of the population and seriously threatened the existence of the Belgrade regime. For a while it seemed that, in the South Slav lands at least, the radical Agrarian and labor parties might at long last have an opportunity to apply their programs for social reform and for federation. This was actually done to a slight extent until counter-revolutions from the right smashed the radical parties and drove them underground. Nevertheless their efforts are of great significance in the history of the Balkan federation movement and require detailed examination.

In Bulgaria the Agrarian Party had from its inception fought against the expansionist policies of King Ferdinand before it finally rose to power in 1919. It was in 1900 that the Agrarian Union or Party was founded by Dimităr Dragiev as a protest against the oppressive rule and excessive taxation of the Liberal Radoslavov government. Its platform called for curtailment of the growing powers of the Crown, economy and retrenchment in administration, the disbanding of the regular army in favor of a militia, and the cessation of the imperialistic foreign policy followed by Ferdinand. Accordingly the Party strongly opposed the Balkan Wars and numerous articles were published in its organ, *Zemledelsko Zname* [Agrarian Banner], criticizing Ferdinand's regime. One of the four Agrarian deputies

²³ A list of the various conferences of the Communist Federation is given in the article by G. Dimitrov in the *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*. The headquarters of this federation were in Sofia until 1924, when they were moved to Moscow "owing to the prevalence of martial law in the Balkans." *International Press Correspondence*, August 14, 1924. For two conferences of the Balkan Socialist Parties, held in March 1924 and June 1925 to discuss the situation in Bulgaria and the relations of the Bulgarian Socialist Party with the Tsankov government, see *International Information*, II, no. 26, June 25, 1925; "The Balkans," *Labour Monthly*, VI (May, 1924), 310, 311; "Bulgaria" *Labour Monthly*, VIII (September, 1925), 570-572.

²⁴ A typical socialist denunciation of Communism is to be found in the article by Z. Topalovič, "Ten Years' Communism in the Balkans," *Living Age*, 334 (January 1, 1928), 28-32. On the other side the *Fédération balkanique* regularly attacked socialist policies in the Balkans. For example, see the issues of July 1, 1925, and August 1, 1925.

then holding seats in the Sobranje supported the government's war policy and was thereupon promptly expelled from the Party. Especially prominent in this anti-war campaign was Aleksandăr Stamboliški who had joined the party in 1902 and by this date was one of its prominent leaders. When the World War broke out the Agrarians strenuously opposed intervention. On August 30, 1915 a manifesto signed by Stamboliški and Yanko Sakūzov, on behalf of the Agrarian and "broad" Socialist Parties, was issued calling on the people to combat the drift to war and to demand continued Bulgarian neutrality.²⁵ A few weeks later the Agrarian parliamentary group elected Stamboliški to represent it in the group of party chiefs who were to seek an audience with Ferdinand. Their request was granted and the audience was set for September 4. It was at this meeting that Stamboliški, with characteristic courage and impetuosity, bluntly warned the King that intervention in the war would cost him his throne. For his rashness Stamboliški was arrested, tried by court-martial and condemned to penal servitude for life. Nevertheless his speech, which was published and distributed throughout the country, established him as the outstanding opponent of the dynasty.²⁶

Within three years Stamboliški was vindicated. By September 15, 1918 the Bulgarian lines had been broken. Premier Malinov, who had replaced the pro-German Radoslavov in June, asked for an armistice which he was compelled to sign unconditionally on September 29. Four days earlier Stamboliški had been released and sent to the front in the hope that he could calm the mutinous troops. Instead he proclaimed a republic and advanced on Sofia. Although Stamboliški was defeated by combined loyalist and German forces, the position of King Ferdinand had become untenable and on October 3 he abdicated in favor of his son Boris. The new ruler was acceptable to Stamboliški, who thereupon entered the cabinet in January 1919 and became Prime Minister in October. As head of the government he signed the Treaty of Neuilly in the same year.

In the meantime the Communist and Socialist Parties, particularly the former, had been gaining rapidly in strength. In the 1919 elections, out of a total of 236 seats, the Communists won 47 and the Socialists 39. The trial of strength came in December of the same year when a strike of railway employees paralyzed transportation and threatened to lead to revolution. With the aid of Allied troops

²⁵ *Galeriya Ubili Durzhavni Muzhe* [Gallery of Assassinated Statesmen] (Pleven, 1927), no. 4, 5, 58-65; D. Strashimirov, *Zemledelskiya Sŭyuz* [The Agrarian Union] (Sofia, 1914), 59, 125, 131, 132.

²⁶ A. Stamboliški, *Dvete mi Sreshti s Tzar Ferdinand* [My Two Meetings with Tzar Ferdinand] (Sofia, 1915); K. Todorov, *Balkan Firebrand, The Autobiography of a Rebel, Soldier and Statesman* (Chicago, 1943), 92, 93.

Stamboliŭski broke the strike after much violence, and then proceeded to arrest the Communist leaders and to call for a new election in March 1920 with the aim of overwhelming the Communists and gaining a clear majority. Despite Government terrorism 48 Communists were returned to the Sobranje, but the Agrarians were able to gain 113 seats at the expense of the Socialists who retained only 9 seats. With this victory Stamboliŭski became complete master, and with the aid of considerable force and sundry shady practices he was able to curb both the radical and reactionary forces and to remain in power until 1923.²⁷

The significance of this situation lies in the fact that two parties favoring Balkan federation now had the support of a large majority of the Bulgarian people. In the March 1920 elections the Agrarians and Communists won 68 per cent of the seats (161 out of 236),²⁸ and in the municipal elections of October 1920 these two parties polled over 80 per cent of the total votes cast (82,089 out of 100,811).²⁹ Furthermore it should be noted that for the Agrarians and Communists, Balkan unity was not a pleasant sentiment to be voiced on state occasions. It was an integral part of their program and they had consistently advocated it for decades and continued to do so now. The Communist Party at its June 1919 Congress drew up a program which called for the establishment of a socialist, soviet Bulgaria, and for the conclusion of

... a friendly alliance with the neighboring peoples in order to create a Balkan Socialist Federated Soviet republic which will be a part of the European and World Socialist Federated Soviet Republic which will realise a union between all the nations and a lasting peace.³⁰

Even more important at this time was the pro-federation stand of the

²⁷ Kabakchiŭev, "Bolgarskaya Kommunisticheskaia Partiya," *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 89-95; P. Kiranov, *Bulgarskoto Zemledelsko Dvizhenie* [The Bulgarian Agrarian Movement] (Sofia, 1927); Logio, *Bulgaria, Past and Present*, 439-448; Todorov, *Balkan Firebrand*, ch. 11, 12, 15; J. D. Bourchier, "Alexander Stambolisky," *Contemporary Review*, 118 (November, 1920), 784-789; "Alexander Stambolisky," *Slavonic Review*, II (December, 1923), 407-411; P. Gentizon, "Stamboulisky et le peuple bulgare," *Revue de France*, V (October 1, 1923), 593-608; A. L. Kennedy, "A Peasant Statesman; Alexander Stambolisky," *Fortnightly Review*, 114 (August, 1923), 177-186; "Bulgaria's Future; An Interview with Premier Stambolisky," *Living Age*, CCCVI (July 24, 1920) 274-276. An excellent short study of Stamboliŭski, with bibliographical references, is given by Victor N. Sharenkoff in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

²⁸ *New York Times*, May 2, 1920. The figures for the various parties were: Agrarians 113; Communists 48; Democrats 34; Nationalists 15; Socialists 7; Progressives 7; Radicals 6; Liberals 3; Ghenadievis 3.

²⁹ *New York Times*, November 28, 1920. The figures given out by the Minister of Interior are: Agrarians 52,097; Communists 29,992; Democrats 7,321; People's Party 4,156; Liberals 3,195; Socialists 2,711; Tsankov party 1,339.

³⁰ *Communist International*, no. 4 (August 1, 1919), 67-70; *ibid.*, no. 5 (September, 1919), 54-57. Similarly the Socialist Party at its conference held in Sofia on September 1-2, 1918, demanded Balkan rapprochement. See Logio, *Bulgaria, Problems and Politics*, 7, 8.

Agrarian government in power. In innumerable speeches Stamboliŭski repeatedly urged rapprochement with Serbia and the unification of all the South Slavs into one, great, federated state. He also proposed, less frequently and as a more distant goal, a federation of all the Balkan countries. In addition, as the peasant leader of a peasant party, Stamboliŭski hoped to unite all the European agrarian parties into a "Green International" which could cope with both communism on the left and reaction on the right.³¹

Throughout his career Stamboliŭski took advantage of every opportunity to further inter-Balkan unity. At the time of the Austrian attack on Serbia in 1914 he stated in the Sobranje: "I hope that our brothers, the Serbs, will be victorious over the Austrians." With memories of recent wars still fresh, the majority shouted, "Traitor! You are a Serb!" "No, I am neither a Serb nor a Bulgarian," replied Stamboliŭski, "I am a Yugoslav."³² In the next year he was jailed for his opposition to Ferdinand's plans to intervene in the war and to attack Serbia. While in prison Stamboliŭski formulated the *Principles of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union* [i.e., of the Agrarian Party], and the seventh article of these Principles reads as follows: "The Agrarian Union favors durable and peaceful relations between Bulgaria and her neighbors. . . . It seeks to strengthen these good relations by uniting Bulgaria with the other Balkan states on a federative basis."³³

When he was at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, Stamboliŭski stated on a number of occasions that he had always worked for closer inter-Balkan relations, that he had been persecuted for his efforts, but, he added, "I am conscious that it is my imperative duty to raise my voice in favor of rapprochement among the Balkan states."³⁴ According to some sources, the Bulgarian delegates had

³¹ Early in 1921 Stamboliŭski visited Prague, Warsaw and Bucharest, and these capitals, fearful of the Communist danger, pledged support to his "Green International" scheme. On his return to Sofia, a great Congress of the Agricultural League was held on February 15, and Stamboliŭski elaborated on the "Green International." With the support of the Polish, Czechoslovak and Roumanian governments, this was to be an international union of the peasants of Central and Southeastern Europe, to offset the White International of the reactionaries who wished to restore the monarchs and landlords, and also the Red International of the Bolsheviks who were attempting to destroy all government and individual initiative. "I have no doubt," he added, "that our 'Green Internationale' will ultimately free Russia from the Soviets. At least, it is destined to free farmers elsewhere from the unjust restrictions placed upon them by the manufacturers and capitalists, who know nothing about farming, and make both realize that the farmer is just as necessary to the life of a country as the workers on the roads, in the factories, or employed in transportation." *New York Times*, April 10, 1921. A survey of the agrarian movement throughout Central and Eastern Europe is given in M. Hodža, *Federation in Central Europe: Reflections and Reminiscences* (London, 1942), 112-125.

³² Stragnakovich, *Oeuvre du rapprochement*, 26.

³³ Petkov, *Aleksandŭr Stamboliŭski, lichnost i idei*, 183, 184.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 66-69.

actually been authorized to propose the establishment of a Yugoslav federation in which Macedonia would be included as an independent state.³⁵ It is known that the chief of the Bulgarian delegation, T. Theodorov, urged privately in a letter of September 2, 1919 that, in place of the mutilation of Bulgaria, a plebiscite be held "embracing all the populations delivered from the Turkish yoke since 1912." If that were not feasible, he proposed the creation of an independent Macedonian state.

Let all the nations, big and small, freely use the ports of the new state thus constituted—Salonica, Cavalla, and Dedeagatch—and let this new state serve as a pledge for the future Balkan Confederation . . . it will eliminate all the pretexts of rivalries and strife between the Balkan states and will facilitate the establishing of the future confederation.³⁶

Although the Bulgarian offers at the Peace Conference were rejected, Stamboliški persisted in his efforts for cooperation and unity. The day after he signed the Treaty of Neuilly, he sent letters to the premiers of Greece, Roumania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes proposing that the past be forgotten and that all Balkan governments collaborate for the common security and economic welfare of the Balkans. While passing through Ljubljana a few years later he told the editor of the *Slovenski Glas* that: "The great majority of the Bulgarian people are for union with Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, and for the formation of a great Yugoslav State."³⁷ In the *Sobranje* on a number of occasions he stated that Bulgaria was ready to join a Yugoslav federation. All this naturally aroused apprehension in Italy where the prospect of a powerful, united Yugoslav state was viewed with distaste. Accordingly in April 1920 the Italian minister to Sofia, Baron Aliotti, in a private interview with Stamboliški, proposed an Italo-Bulgarian alliance directed against Yugoslavia. Stamboliški flatly rejected both this proposal and a similar one a short while later by Baron Aliotti's

³⁵ H. G. Alsberg, "Union in the Balkans," *Nation*, CIX (October 4, 1919), 463–464. The author states that since a Yugoslav federation was favored in practically all circles he suggested at a meeting of Agrarian leaders in Sofia that the Bulgarian delegation in Paris be instructed to make such a proposal. "To my astonishment I was told that Stamboliški already had instructions in Paris to make such a proposal. The offer included a demand that Macedonia, which is neither Greek, Serbian, nor Bulgarian, be erected into a little state within the union. Thus the whole endless Macedonian question would be finally settled. Also the Thrace question would be solved. For unanimously I was assured that if Thrace and the Aegean coast were taken away from Bulgaria, and there were no federation, then another Balkan war was inevitable." See also C. Stephanove, "Drifting Toward a Yugoslav Federation," *Current History*, XV (1922), 936, 937.

³⁶ "Peace in the Balkans: A Bulgarian Solution," *Nation*, CIX (November 29, 1919), 699–702.

³⁷ Stephanove, *loc. cit.*, 937. For the role of Stamboliški at Neuilly, see Todorov, *Balkan Firebrand*, 123.

successor, Count Aldrovandi. The offer was repeated once more during the Genoa Conference in 1922, but the same answer was received.³⁸

In addition to refusing the Italian proposal, Stamboliški took concrete measures to effect a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The great obstacle was the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. This body, which at the turn of the century reflected the aspirations of the Macedonian people and fought with their complete support against Turkish misrule, had now degenerated into a band of unprincipled adventurers. After the first Balkan War it ceased to be a truly Macedonian organization and became, in effect, an instrument of the Bulgarian government. During the World War it fought with the Bulgarian army and was given the administration of Serbian Macedonia, at which task it distinguished itself by its irresponsible violence and terrorism. The debacle of 1918 seemed to put an end to the Organization because the great majority of the Macedonians and Bulgarians by this time had been alienated, and the Stamboliški government was strongly hostile.

The harsh terms of the Treaty of Neuilly, however, gave the Organization an opportunity to pose as the champion of national rights and justice. In addition it received money and other aid from Italy who was anxious to keep Bulgaria and Yugoslavia apart. Thus in 1920 the Organization recommenced its raids against Yugoslavia. In an effort to check this activity, the Bulgarian government on May 19, 1922 proposed to Belgrade the establishment of a joint frontier guard, to be composed of Bulgars and Serbs who should act in common against the comitadji bands. Although nothing was done at the time, this suggestion did lead to discussions which culminated in the Treaty of Nish (April 1923) providing for better supervision of the frontier. Henceforth the Bulgarian government took military measures to control the bands and the number of raids declined considerably. Bulgar-Yugoslav relations improved correspondingly. The first step had been taken in the direction of the long-desired rapprochement with Yugoslavia. In fact, arrangements were made for the conclusion of a secret Bulgarian-Yugoslav military alliance but this never materialized because of the assassination of Stamboliški and the overthrow of his government in June 1923.³⁹

Not only were the Bulgarian people and government in favor of

³⁸ An account of these negotiations is given by Kosta Todorov, at that time Bulgarian minister to Belgrade, in his article, "The Macedonian Organization Yesterday and Today," *Foreign Affairs*, VI (April, 1928), 478–482, and in his autobiography, *Balkan Firebrand*, 137, 138.

³⁹ Swire, *Bulgarian Conspiracy*, 145–156; Todorov, *Balkan Firebrand*, 184–186, 191–196. See also Todorov's article in the *New York Times*, August 12, 1928.

close relations with their neighbors and especially with the Yugoslavs, but very much the same sentiment prevailed at this time in Yugoslavia. The powerful Agrarian and Communist Parties in Yugoslavia had precisely the same views on foreign policy as their counterparts in Bulgaria. In spite of the fact that Yugoslavia had emerged triumphant from the World War, mass unrest and political instability were practically as great as in Bulgaria. The chief reasons were the terrible destruction and suffering resulting from the war, the influence of the social upheavals in Russia, Hungary, Bavaria and Italy, and the unpopularity of the centralization policies of the Belgrade government. The latter factor was especially important, for it led to a political feud which lasted for two decades.

As soon as the Austro-Hungarian Empire crashed in the autumn of 1918, there met in Zagreb a revolutionary assembly known as the National Majority and composed of party leaders from the various Yugoslav areas of the Empire. Most of the representatives were conservative men. They were alarmed by the advancing Italian troops on the Dalmatian coast and by the revolutionary temper of the peasants who were sacking the castles of landlords. They felt that the protection of the Serbian army was needed immediately and they disregarded the protests of a minority who wished to ensure the adoption of the federal principle before uniting with Serbia. On November 23 the Majority proclaimed the union of the territories under its control with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, and invited the Prince Regent of Serbia to assume the regency of the new state. This decision took effect on December 1 when Prince Alexander, at the formal request of twenty four delegates from Zagreb, proclaimed the union. But rule by Belgrade proved unpopular. Revolts broke out against the Serbian administration in a number of provinces and it was not until two years had elapsed that the Provisional Government agreed to hold elections on November 28, 1920 for a constituent assembly.⁴⁰

One of the strongest of the federalist groups opposed to the centralization policies of Nicholas Pashich was the Communist Party. In accordance with the program of the Balkan Communist Federation, the Yugoslav Communists took the stand that the economic problems as well as the oppression of national minorities could be

⁴⁰ C. A. Beard, and G. Radin, *The Balkan Pivot: Yugoslavia* (New York, 1929), 33-39; Tomitch, *La formation d'état yougoslave*, 147-157; Stephanove, *loc. cit.*, 930-934; C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919-1937* (Oxford University Press, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1937), 362ff.; D. Tomašić, "Croatia in European Politics," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, II (April, 1942), 63-70; L. Adamic, *My Native Land* (New York, 1943), 304-329.

solved not simply by federalization, but by class war and revolution which would lead to the establishment of a soviet state and of a communist Balkan federation. This program was adopted when the more radical Socialists held a conference in Belgrade in April 1919 and voted to join the Third International.⁴¹ A few days after the conference had been held the entire, newly-elected Central Committee and two hundred other members were imprisoned. But the Communists were now at the height of their power. In the Croatian municipal elections they gained the largest number of votes and in such cities as Belgrade, Nish and Zagreb they had a majority of the seats. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly on November 28, 1921 they polled 200,000 votes and gained 58 seats out of a total of 419. Soon afterwards, however, the government passed a drastic law "for the defence of the state" which severely curtailed civil liberties, annulled the mandates of the Communist deputies and outlawed the Communist Party. Thus the Communists were driven underground and were unable to run any candidates in the succeeding elections held in March 1923.⁴²

⁴¹ Representatives from all the provinces attended this conference. The Serbian and Bosnian Socialists were almost unanimously for affiliation with the Third International and were opposed to cooperation with the Belgrade government. The Croatian and Slovenian socialists were mostly in favor of working with the Ministry until the emergency was passed, and hence were known as "Ministerialists." The majority amongst them remained affiliated with the Second International while a minority joined the new Communist Party of Yugoslavia. See Boshkovich, "Yugoslavskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya," *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 137-140; P. Jugowitsch, "Sozialismus und Kommunismus in Jugoslawien," *Die Neue Zeit*, XXXVIII (2) (September 17, 1920), 559-566; H. Wendel, "Sozialistische Entwicklung in Südslawien," *Die Neue Zeit*, XXXVII (2) (August 29, 1919), 507-511.

⁴² Boshkovich, "Situation in Yugo-Slavia," *Communist International*, no. 8 (February, 1925), 95-101; "The White Terror in Yugo-Slavia," *Labour Monthly*, I (September, 1921), 270-275; "Repression in the Yugoslav State," *Nation*, 113 (October 12, 1921), 403, 404. In view of their great strength during these years it seems strange that the Communists offered little opposition to this persecution. The reasons seem to be internal dissension regarding policies and tactics, and a tendency to place too much emphasis on class struggle and not enough on minority rights. Thus the national parties, like that of Radich, increased in strength at the expense of the Communists. See Kolarov, "The National Question in the Balkans," *Communist International*, no. 4 (July-August, 1924), 78-85; Boshkovich, "Yugoslavskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya," *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 142ff. The Socialists during this post-war period, were comparatively weak, as they themselves freely admitted. See Z. Topalović, "Ten Years Communism in the Balkans," *Living Age* 334 (January 1, 1928), 28-32. The Socialists retained their pre-war program in favor of a Balkan federation. For example, at their convention at Belgrade on April 15, 16, 1928, they denounced the Balkan governments for "striving and fighting against one another" and for "blind submission to the lead of the great imperialist powers. . . . The Yugoslav Socialist Party remains true to the old watchword of the Socialist International: 'The Balkans to the Balkan people! A free Federation of the free and equal peoples of the Balkan Peninsula!'" They further demanded an agreement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia regarding the Macedonian question, and concluded as follows: "Nothing but a consistently democratic policy in the home and foreign policy of the Balkan States can lead us toward reconciliation, understanding and the Balkan Federation, and thereby to exterior security and to economic and cultural progress." *New York Times*, May 20, 1928; *International Information*, V, no. 16, April 28, 1928.

An even more serious obstacle for the Belgrade centralists was the Croatian Agrarian Party founded by Stefan Radich in 1905. Before the World War Radich was not concerned with Yugoslav or Balkan unity. He was interested mainly in economic and social reforms which would lighten the burden of the peasants, and in establishing a triune system which would give Croatia a position of autonomy akin to that enjoyed by Austria and Hungary under the Hapsburg monarchy.⁴³ With the collapse of the Empire in 1918 a new program was adopted to meet the needs of the changed situation. This program was practically identical to that of Stamboliški's Agrarian Party. It demanded distribution of land. It was opposed to the maintenance of a large army and to militarism in general. It was equally opposed to direct rule from Belgrade. Instead it demanded the creation of a federated Yugoslav state which would include as autonomous units not only Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro and the other newly acquired provinces, but also Bulgaria. After this federation had been realized the Agrarian leaders envisaged a federation of all the Balkan peoples, and even of all the races between the Baltic and Aegean Seas.⁴⁴

Stefan Radich was one of the party leaders who participated in the meeting of the National Majority at Zagreb on November 24, 1918. Radich insisted on a guarantee of the federal principle before union with Belgrade, but the real strength of his party was unknown at the time and he had little influence on the deliberations. On the next day a meeting was held of three thousand Croatian Peasant Party delegates who unanimously rejected the decision of the National Majority for immediate union with Serbia. There now began the long struggle between the Croatian Agrarians and the Belgrade authorities. On March 1, 1919 the Croatian Peasant Party adopted a program providing for an independent Croatia (with Slovenia) which would have no more than an irreducible minimum of "common affairs"

⁴³ In 1902 Radich proposed a plan by which a Danubian federation was to be substituted for the dual system of the Hapsburg monarchy. The federation was to consist of Bohemia, Galicia, Hungary, Croatia, and German Austria. Bosnia and Herzegovina were to receive full autonomy and to decide by vote whether or not they should unite with Croatia. The Slavs of the federation were to enjoy full cultural and spiritual relations with Russia, and Radich expressed the hope that the Czech language would be used by the three Slav states so that it might compete with the German and Magyar languages. The capital of the federation was to be Vienna. Fischel, *Der Panlawismus bis zum Weltkrieg*, 452, 453.

⁴⁴ L. Kezman, ed., *Constitution of the Neutral Peasant Republic of Croatia* (Pittsburgh, 1923); R. Herceg, *Die Ideologie der Kroatischen Bauernbewegung* (Zagreb, 1923), 48-59. The author is indebted to Dr. Louis Kezman for an explanation of the views of the leaders of the Agrarian Party regarding Balkan federation. Dr. Kezman was secretary general of the Agrarian Party from 1919 to 1927, and deputy to the Skupshtina from 1920 to 1928. An interesting account of the early years of Radich is given in "Autobiography of Stephen Radich," *Current History*, XXIX (October, 1928), 82-102.

with any other state. At the same time Radich organized a monster petition to the Peace Conference for a "neutral Croatian Peasants' Republic" with a Croatian Constituent Assembly of its own. The reply of the Belgrade authorities was simply to imprison Radich until the eve of the constituent elections of November 28, 1920. Fifty of the eighty Croatian seats were won by Peasant Party candidates, but their refusal to participate in the work of the assembly enabled Pashich to secure the adoption of a constitution of an extremely centralized character. Despite open terrorism the Agrarian Party continued to increase in strength and in the elections of March 1923 its representation in the Skupshtina jumped to seventy. Radich was now the acknowledged leader of the great majority of the Croatian people.⁴⁵

In October 1924 the Agrarian Party held a great mass meeting at Verpolie in Eastern Croatia near Djakovo, and the speakers included Radich, Dr. Lupu of the Roumanian Peasant Party, the Serbian Democrat George Popovich, and Ferhad beg Ali Draga, the President of the Djemiet, the party of the non-Slavic (chiefly Albanian) branch of the Yugoslav Moslem minority. The keynote of the meeting was the need for federation. Radich expressed his views as follows:

The Balkan federation can be only peasant and republican. It cannot have any trace of Roumanian or Hungarian feudalism any more than it can be a copy of Russian bolshevism. At the outset and probably for a long time it will not include Roumania or Greece because it is really and formally limited to the four principal Yugoslav peoples, the Slovenes, the Croats, the Serbs and the Bulgarians, and to Macedonia and Montenegro, and finally to Albania, all this, naturally, with their complete consent.⁴⁶

This marks the high point of the post-war mass movement for a Yugoslav federation and general Balkan cooperation. In Bulgaria the Stamboliški government was actively seeking a rapprochement and, if possible, a federation with Yugoslavia. With the other Balkan states it was anxious to establish close relations in the hope that at a more distant future a general Balkan federation might be established. The most powerful opposition party in Bulgaria, the Communist, stood unequivocally for a Balkan Communist Federation, as did also the Yugoslav Communist Party. In Croatia the dominant Agrarian Party held precisely the same views as the Bulgarian government. This was true also of the Montenegrin Federalist Party which was

⁴⁵ A Pavelich, *Aus dem Kampfe um den selbständigen Staat Kroatien* (Vienna, 1931), 40-53; Herceg, *Die Ideologie der Kroatischen Bauernbewegung*, 60-68; "Autobiography of Stephen Radich," *Current History*, XXIX (October, 1928), 103-106; Stephanove, *loc. cit.*, 934-936.

⁴⁶ The description of the meeting is based on an account kindly furnished by Dr. Kezman. The text of the Radich speech is in *La fédération balkanique*, October 1, 1924.

supreme in Montenegro and maintained close relations with the Radich Party. Similarly the dominant Slovenian People's Party led by Dr. Koroshetz favored a Yugoslav federation. An editorial of the Ljubljana *Novi Chas*, organ of Dr. Koroshetz, described the situation in the following prophetic words:

The most salient question facing our State is that of our relations with Bulgaria, because the Bulgarians belong to the national unity of the Southern Slav States. Without Bulgaria we shall pursue only a great Chauvinistic policy, which sooner or later will lead us to isolation and catastrophe. That policy, espoused by the supporters of great Serbian dreams, is the real obstacle to the creation of a strong and united Yugoslavia. All Yugoslav people independent of the Belgrade politicians are thoroughly convinced that the security of our future existence as a State demands union with Bulgaria, all the more as the Bulgarian Nation today is fully prepared and qualified for it. We know that this question, left for solution to the Belgrade race alone, will never bring about our consolidation with the brave Bulgarian people. On that account the entire Slovene and Croatian people should inscribe this demand in its program, and should never rest until it has been realized. The future Yugoslavia of Serbs, Bulgarians, Croats and Slovenes will be the strongest State in Southern Europe. It will prove a great guarantee for the cultural development of Southern Yugoslavdom, and one of the strong citadels for the world's peace.⁴⁷

The accounts left by contemporary observers uniformly emphasize the popular and widespread demand for Yugoslav and, to a lesser extent, Balkan federation. An American journalist who in the autumn of 1919 interviewed Bulgarian and Yugoslav leaders of various parties, commented as follows after a conversation with the editor of the Sofia Communist daily:

His most significant statement referred to the insistence by his party that a Balkan federation be formed to avoid future wars. The statement proved significant and startling because it was repeated by practically all the leaders of the other parties. The union with Yugoslavia seems to be the one thing that all political factions are agreed upon. In Serbia, in a less insistent degree, I heard the same thing.⁴⁸

Similarly the English Balkan expert, Noel Buxton, reported in the autumn of 1921 that,

The party led by Radich—republican, Croatian and federalist—is rapidly growing in influence. Radich has proclaimed his desire to unite all the peasants of the Balkans in one state, and he especially invites the kindred branch of the Southern Slavs—"our Bulgarian brothers." The Bulgarian Agrarian Party, he added, "is in sympathy

⁴⁷ Cited by Stephanove, *loc. cit.*, 937.

⁴⁸ Alsberg, *loc. cit.*, 463, 464.

with the Peasant Party in Croatia, which, if it comes into power, will bring Jugo-Slavia and Bulgaria into close relationship.⁴⁹

Finally in 1922 Professor Stephanove of Sofia University summarized the situation with the sentence, "Raditch-Stambolisky versus Paschitch-Davidovitch . . . united Yugoslavia versus Greater Serbia—these are the issues in the Balkan Slaydom of today."⁵⁰

These issues were destined to be settled by assassination and suppression—by the assassination of Radich and Stamboliški and by the suppression of the federalist parties. In Bulgaria Stamboliški's rapprochement with Yugoslavia, his drastic reforms on behalf of the peasants, and his ruthless persecution of all opposition, whether from the right or left, led to the formation of a strong coalition against him. The Crown, the Macedonian Organization, the bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, army officers—all combined in a successful coup against the government on June 9, 1923. Five days later Stamboliški was assassinated. The Communists, alienated by Agrarian oppression during the previous three years and believing themselves strong enough to profit later from this turmoil, remained neutral. But so ferocious did the bourgeois reaction become that Agrarians and Communists cooperated in September 1923 in a widespread revolt which was barely quelled after days of bloody fighting. The terror dragged on reaching its bloody climax with the Sofia Cathedral bombing of April 14, 1925 and the subsequent mass executions.⁵¹

In the meantime a split had occurred in the ranks of the Macedonian Organization, and some of its members joined forces with the Communists with the expressed purpose of working for a Balkan Confederation. The Macedonian Organization had taken part in the coup against Stamboliški because of the latter's willingness to recognize the *status quo* in Macedonia. Within a year, however, certain of the Macedonian leaders had come to the conclusion that the Organization was being exploited for purely Bulgarian interests and that an entirely new policy was necessary. Accordingly it was decided to strive henceforth for Macedonian autonomy rather than for annexation to Bulgaria, and to seek an alliance with the Communists

⁴⁹ Noel Buxton, "The Balkans Today," *Nineteenth Century*, 90 (August, 1921), 333-335. ⁵⁰ Stephanove, *loc. cit.*, 937.

⁵¹ A detailed account of these gruesome events is given in Swire, *Bulgarian Conspiracy*, 157-180. The tactics of the Bulgarian Communists during this period, and especially their failure to support the Agrarians, were severely criticized by the leaders of the Communist International. See *Communist International*, nos. 26, 27 (September, October, 1923), 70-109; no. 28 (November, 1923), 65-117; V. Kolarov "The Social Basis of the Tsankoff Government," *Communist International*, no. 14 (August, 1925), 13-30; Kabakchiyev, "Bolgarskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya," *Kommunisticheskiye Partii*, 96-109. An anti-Communist account of these events is given by the present Agrarian leader, K. Todorov, in *Balkan Firebrand*, ch. 26.

who likewise stood for autonomy. In the spring of 1924 negotiations were carried on in Vienna with representatives of the Third International. Who took part in these negotiations and what agreements were concluded is the subject of bitter dispute to the present day. The outcome, at any rate, was the publication on July 15 of the first issue of *La fédération balkanique*, a fortnightly periodical published in Vienna in all the Balkan languages as well as in German and French. In a spirited editorial the program of this publication was defined as follows:

The principal task of our publication as its title has already shown, is to propagate the idea of the liberation and the right of self-determination of the Balkan people as well as that of federalization. . . . We wish that they may cease to be the common prey of European imperialism and Balkan chauvinism; that they may cease to be the arena where the latter settle their disastrous internal quarrels. We wish to make it understood to all the citizens of the Balkan states that only the union of our countries and our peoples in a federation will permit them to liberate themselves once and for all from political and economic servitude. [But, it added, these aims could not be gained by cooperation with the European or Balkan governments] . . . which already in their foreign and domestic policies have sufficiently demonstrated that they are against the liberty and self-determination of the peoples. . . .

The liberty and peace of the Balkans, through the Balkan federation, will only be attained by movements for national liberation which will break, as soon as possible, the bonds which attach them to the European and Balkan governments; which will hasten to unite under their flag, the working masses of their nation into a united national front; which will have aided and drawn upon their power for the social struggles of these same masses in neighboring countries; which finally will be eager to unite its forces into a single Balkan front directed against Chauvinism and conquering imperialism from whatever quarter it may come.

We want liberty and peace for our countries and our peoples!

We know also that this liberty and this peace are not graciously granted but must be conquered by a desperate struggle!

And we are beginning this struggle!

This first issue of *La fédération balkanique* also contained a declaration of policy signed on behalf of the Central Committee of the Macedonian Organization by T. Aleksandrov, A. Protogerov and P. Chaulev. This statement was essentially the same as the previous one except that it naturally was concerned more specifically with the Macedonian question. It called for the liberation and unification of partitioned Macedonia. It favored the democratization of the Balkan states on the ground that the nature of their governments would determine the fate of Macedonia. In addition it urged a Balkan federation,

. . . which alone can guarantee the political existence of an independent Macedonia and the independence of the rest of the Balkan peoples: satisfy the economic and cultural interests of the Balkan states united on the principle of free access to the three Balkan seas; paralyze the annexationist aspirations of the Balkan states and the imperialist tendencies of the European states as well as guarantee a just solution for all the national differences, favoring the cultural development of all the ethnic minorities.

Finally it was stated that the committee realized that

. . . it can depend only upon the progressive and extreme revolutionary movements of Europe struggling against the imperialist policy of their governments, against the existing peace treaties, for the self-determination of their peoples and of foreign peoples.

The significance of this document lies in the fact that it represents an alliance between the Macedonian Organization and the Communist International. Communist policies were adopted insofar as a radical mass movement was to be organized to overthrow the existing regimes and to establish a Balkan federation. But no mention was made of soviet socialist republics. In fact Chaulev specifically stated in an interview at this time that the movement was not communistic—that it stood for “peasant proprietorship and democracy in the bourgeois sense.”⁵²

The publication of these documents naturally created a sensation and led to a series of extremely confusing charges, counter-charges and assassinations. First Aleksandrov and Protogerov denied that the Central Committee had issued the above statement and branded it as a forgery perpetrated by the Communists in an attempt to exploit the prestige of the Macedonian Organization. This was indignantly denied by Chaulev and others who claimed to have been present when the Central Committee discussed the problem and agreed on the new policy. Then on August 31, 1924 Aleksandrov was assassinated and immediately thereafter the assassins were themselves murdered. At the same time a wave of murders were committed, the victims being mostly Federalists, as the supporters of the new policy were called to distinguish them from the pro-Bulgarian Macedonians known as Supremists. The responsibility for this mass butchery has not been ascertained to the present day. As might be expected the Bulgarian government and the Supremists on the one hand, and the Communists and the Federalists on the other, immediately accused each other of responsibility for the crimes. The semi-official Sofia journal, *La Bulgarie*, stated that the Communists attempted to gain control of the Macedonian Organization in order to

⁵² *New York Times*, August 15, 1924.

throw "the entire peninsula into the chaos of revolution," and that Aleksandrov was murdered because of his refusal to cooperate with them. The communists and Federalists replied that the Bulgarian government and Mihailov, the Supremist Macedonian leader, were alarmed by the new federation movement and doubted the sincerity of Aleksandrov's public repudiation of it. For that reason Aleksandrov and his followers were massacred and then the assassins in turn were killed to make sure that they would not reveal who had given the orders.⁵³

On whichever side the guilt may rest, the fact remains that *La fédération balkanique* had been launched and for eight stormy years, between 1924 and 1931, it carried on a campaign along the lines indicated in its first issue. It denounced the Italian domination of Albania and Italian intrigue throughout the peninsula. It ceaselessly opposed the White Terror in Bulgaria, King Alexander's dictatorship in Yugoslavia, the reactionary regimes in the other Balkan countries and the general oppression of national minorities. It strove to attract the attention of Western Europe to the state of affairs existing in the Balkans, and organized or stimulated various international organizations to furnish relief and to bring pressure to bear on the governments concerned. Finally it constantly reiterated that the only solution for the sorry mess which it described to its readers lay in radical mass movements which would overthrow the prevailing regimes, establish "truly democratic" governments, and thus make possible the creation of a Balkan federation. In order to emphasize and publicize the federation idea, the editors drew up a questionnaire which read as follows:

1. Do you consider the present solution of the Macedonian question as conforming to the principles of justice and liberty, as well as to the interests of peace?
2. Do you believe that, under the present Balkan reaction, the rights of ethnic minorities are sufficiently respected and guaranteed?
3. What is, in your opinion, the means which will put an end to the oppression of ethnic minorities, on the one hand, and to the rivalries which set the Balkan states against each other on the other hand?
4. Do you believe in the possibility of realizing a Balkan Federation through the present governments?
5. What do you think, in general, of a Federation of the Balkan

⁵³ A bibliography on this subject is given in Swire, *Bulgarian Conspiracy*, 9, 10, 332-336. The most detailed and most convincing pro-Stamboliiski and pro-federalist accounts are given in Swire, *op. cit.*, 181-192; and G. C. Logio, *Bulgaria, Past and Present* (Manchester, 1936). Todorov, *Balkan Firebrand*, ch. 25, is anti-Communist, and Christowe, *Heroes and Assassins*, 169-202, is strongly anti-Stamboliiski and on the whole pro-Mihailovist.

peoples and what are, in your opinion, the conditions under which it could be realized?⁵⁴

Between 1926 and 1930 this questionnaire was sent to a large number of prominent individuals and their replies were published in the paper. Over one hundred and fifty persons responded, among them being statesmen such as Francesco Nitti, Stefan Radich and Fan Noli; labor leaders such as James Maxton, George Lansbury, Edward Bernstein, Arthur Ponsonby and G. Dumoulin; and scientists, writers and academic people such as Albert Einstein, Auguste Forel, Henri Barbusse, Thomas Mann, Joseph Redlich, Jean-Richard Bloch, M. A. Aulard and Charles Baudouin. All of them condemned the existing state of affairs in the Balkans and practically all of them favored the creation of a federation and considered it possible of realization. There was a wide difference of opinion, however, as to how federation was to be attained. In general the Communists and left-wing Socialists stressed the need for preliminary revolution and fundamental social changes, while the moderate Socialists and the liberals depended more on peaceful means such as educational campaigns, use of the ballot and cooperation with the League of Nations. Little can be deduced from the data available on this questionnaire, but it does indicate the existence of a widespread feeling amongst European liberals and radicals in favor of a Balkan federation.

La fédération balkanique continued to be published until April 1931. It is difficult to estimate the extent of its influence during the seven years of its existence because no circulation figures are available. It can be said, however, that it did serve to bring to the attention of certain circles in western Europe the existence of pressing minority and social problems in the Balkans and the possibility of their solution by means of Balkan federation. As for the peninsula itself, the effect of the journal and of the movement it represented seems to have been one of radicalizing the Macedonian revolutionaries. When the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization failed to ally itself as a body with the Communists, certain Macedonian leaders such as Vlahov and Chaulev formed a rival organization, the Imro United. This body adhered to the principles of the Declaration published on July 15, 1924 and cooperated closely with the Communists in the publication of *La fédération balkanique* and in the carrying on of revolutionary activities within the peninsula. With the expiration of the journal, these Macedonian leaders continued to oppose actively the existing Balkan regimes and to strive

⁵⁴ *La fédération balkanique*, February 1, 1926.

for the creation of an autonomous Macedonia within a general Balkan Socialist Federation.

In the meantime in Yugoslavia the federalist parties had been suppressed and a royal dictatorship established, thus ending the possibility of a Yugoslav federation. Although the Croatian Party had gained seventy seats in the 1923 elections, Radich found it necessary to seek refuge abroad during the next year. The Croatian deputies again refused to sit in the Skupshtina, but Radich now came to the conclusion that the only result of his party's abstention was to perpetuate Pashich in power. Accordingly the Agrarians took their seats in 1924 and by March of that year Pashich was compelled to resign. During the following months government in Yugoslavia practically came to a standstill as ministry followed ministry. Finally King Alexander in 1925 dissolved the Skupshtina, imprisoned Radich on charges of high treason and conspiracy, and during the succeeding electoral campaign used strong-arm tactics in an attempt to crush the opposition. Despite these measures the Croatian Peasant Party elected practically the same number of deputies as before. The Communists now offered to form a united front with Radich along the same lines as their alliance with the Macedonian Organization in Bulgaria. Radich refused the proposal, and instead, although still in prison himself, he announced that the Croatian Peasant Party was ready to recognize the monarchy, the dynasty, and even the Constitution of 1921. He apparently hoped by this sudden reversal of policy to gain concessions by parliamentary action. Radich was now released from prison, members of his party were given portfolios in the government, and in November 1925 he entered the cabinet as minister of education.

The reconciliation, however, was of brief duration. Radich was unable to work with his colleagues and by April 1926 the coalition was ended. During the next two years political turmoil again prevailed and reached a crisis when on June 20, 1928, during a bitter debate in the Skupshtina, a government supporter fired upon leaders and members of the Croatian Peasant Party, killing two and wounding several others. Among the latter was Radich himself who died from the effects of his wound on August 8. The Croatian deputies thereupon withdrew from the Skupshtina and set up a rival body at Zagreb where they passed resolutions refusing to recognize laws enacted by the "Rump" Skupshtina at Belgrade. Faced with this situation King Alexander on January 5, 1929 abrogated the Constitution of 1921, dissolved all political parties and established a personal dictatorship in an effort to restore national unity. A so-called "constitution" was issued three years later, but actually the dictatorship

remained in force to a greater or less degree, until the eve of the German invasion twelve years later.⁵⁵

In conclusion, the significance of these developments in the immediate post-war years is that for the first time the Balkan federation movement had secured a mass basis. Hitherto Balkan cooperation and federation had been the dream of isolated idealists and of powerless revolutionists, or the slogan of diplomats and statesmen who almost invariably were interested primarily in national aggrandisement. For the Communists and Socialists and Agrarians, however, federation constituted a fundamental and integral part of their program and philosophy. This was inevitably so for the Communists and Socialists who were traditionally anti-war, who thought in terms of international classes rather than national states, and who foresaw an ultimate world socialist or communist federation. Similarly the Agrarians were equally anti-war and internationally minded and envisaged some sort of an international peasant organization which would rid them of dynasties, bureaucracies, trusts and the other symbols of age-long exploitation. Thus, for these groups federation was all important, for it was essential for the realization of their aims.

The desire for a federation was, however, the only tie between them. In practically every other respect these groups were mutually antagonistic. The peasants with their highly developed sense of property rights mistrusted and feared the urban workers and the radical movements associated with them. The workers in turn were weakened by lack of unity. The Socialists denounced the Communists as dangerous and irresponsible extremists while the Communists scorned the Socialists as compromisers and betrayers of the working class. It was this dissension which, more than any other factor, contributed to the defeat of the labor and agrarian mass movements and to the triumph of the forces of reaction in the Balkan Peninsula. Thus the possibility of federation from below was eliminated. This did not mean, however, the end of all federation attempts. In fact, Balkan federation was very much in the air in the nineteen thirties but the advocates were then primarily liberal intellectuals who hoped to attain their ends by persuasion and education rather than by radical social change.

⁵⁵ See Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors*, 368-375, and the works therein cited, and D. Tomašić, "Constitutional Changes in Yugoslavia," *Political Science Quarterly*, LV (December, 1940), 582-593.

CHAPTER IX

THE THIRD BALKAN ALLIANCE SYSTEM, 1930-1941

During the decade following the peace settlement the most important and consistent champions of Balkan federation were the Agrarians, the Communists and the Socialists. With the suppression of these elements the character of the federation movement changed. Individuals and organizations with liberal tendencies now assumed the leadership. Their primary concern was not social reform but rather the maintenance of peace, and they hoped to attain this end by the formation of a Balkan federation. Unlike their radical predecessors they did not organize mass revolutionary parties for the overthrow of existing governments. Instead they sought by various propaganda methods to win the support of public opinion and thereby to induce the Balkan governments to settle their differences, to establish closer relations, and eventually to unite within a federal framework.

These liberal advocates of federation did not suddenly come to life in the nineteen thirties. In the previous decade they made a few attempts to win popular support but with very little success. On July 28, 1915, for example, there appeared in Sofia the first number of a daily journal entitled *Balkanski Zgovor* [*Balkan Entente*]. The aim of its editor, D. Mishev, was to promote a rapprochement among the Balkan states, and various articles in support of this end were contributed by such figures as the English journalist James Bouchier, General Savov, and the political leaders A. Malinov and I. E. Geshov. Within a few months, however, Bulgaria was involved in the war and the continued publication of the journal became impossible.¹ Somewhat similar was the newspaper campaign begun in 1926 by C. Georgevich in favor of a Balkan customs union. In spite of the refusal of most journals to publish his articles, Georgevich organized in 1928 the "Inter-Balkan Association for Peace and Prosperity." In June 1929 this group sent to the principal journals and statesmen of the Balkan and Western European countries a statement urging the creation of a Balkan customs union which, it was claimed, would lead to political rapprochement and would be economically advantageous for both the Balkans and the rest of Europe. Neither the governments nor the general public showed any appreciable interest in this scheme.²

¹ Stragnakovitch, *Oeuvre du rapprochement*, 29-32.

² Tchéd, Diourdievitch, "Vers l'union balkanique. Un contribution yougoslave à l'histoire du mouvement," *Les Balkans*, V (March-April, 1934), 218-224.

In the meantime, as a result of the influence of Radich and Stamboliiski, a number of societies for the furtherance of Yugoslav unity were organized in Belgrade, Prague, Vienna, Berlin, Munich, Paris, Geneva, Toulouse, Leipzig and other centres. In January 1930 these various groups, in order to coordinate their activities, combined to form the "League for the Rapprochement of the Serbs and Bulgars and for the Union of all the South Slavs." In the same year, under the auspices of this League, an excellent study was published which described Serbo-Bulgarian relations in the past, denounced Italian intrigues amongst the Macedonians, and called for the formation of a united Yugoslav state. No material is available concerning the later activities, if any, of this League.³

Liberals in the western European countries were also interested in Balkan federation, as was apparent in the replies to the questionnaire of *La fédération balkanique*.⁴ In this respect there should be noted the work of the Balkan Committee which in the pre-war period had wielded its influence on behalf of reform in Macedonia.⁵ With the outbreak of the World War, Noel Buxton, James Bouchier and other leaders of the Committee sought to bring Bulgaria over to the side of the Entente Powers. In fact in the autumn of 1914 Noel Buxton and his brother, Charles Roden Buxton, were sent on a semi-official mission to Bulgaria with the following instructions from Winston Churchill:

The creation of a Balkan Confederation comprising Bulgaria, Serbia, Roumania, Montenegro and Greece, strong enough to play an effective part in the destinies of Europe, must be the common dream of all their peoples. . . . I want you to make your friends in Greece and Bulgaria realize the brilliant but fleeting opportunity which now presents itself, and to assure them that England's might and perseverance will not be withheld from any righteous effort to secure the strength and union of the Balkan peoples.⁶

The question may well be raised whether the British government was not more interested in obtaining the aid of the Balkan states than in securing their federation. In the case of the Buxtons, however, these instructions coincided perfectly with views which they had held and expressed for decades. In the spring of 1915, for example, after their return from Bulgaria, they published a book entitled *The War and the Balkans* in which they foresaw the fulfillment of the territorial aspirations of the Balkan states at the expense of the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires, and then,

³ D. Michev and B. P. Petkov, *La fédération balkanique* (Sofia, 1931), 37-45.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, 220, 221. ⁵ Cf. *supra*, 178-182.

⁶ N. Buxton and C. L. Leese, *Balkan Problems and European Peace* (London, 1919), 71, 72.

There will be nothing to prevent harmonious co-operation, and as a result the Balkan States will present a united front towards any empire which might endeavor to bring pressure upon them from without. It is not likely for some time that this harmony will take the form of a federation. It will be a defensive alliance, having the maximum of liberty to each individual member. It is highly probable that such an alliance would lead in a very few years to some form of commercial union, which would promote the material prosperity of all the States. For the first time in history we are permitted to contemplate a state of affairs in which the gaunt spectre of Balkan hatred and of Balkan war will be finally laid to rest.⁷

Due to various political and military factors the Bulgarian government cast in its lot with the Central Powers. At the end of the war the main preoccupation of the Balkan Committee was to prevent the mutilation of Bulgaria. Instead it urged a peace settlement based on the self-determination of peoples, in which case,

... a Balkan Federation becomes possible. If this conception took shape, a new Great Power would come into being and 'the Balkans for the Balkan peoples' would be achieved at last. The case for the permanent representation of the Balkan Federation upon the Council of the League of Nations would be irrefutable.⁸

After the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly the Committee devoted itself to the task of securing some revision of the frontiers in the hope that this would lead to a rapprochement among the Balkan states. Specifically it advocated that Bulgaria be given Southern Dobrudja, a section of Macedonia and a suitable freehold port on the Aegean; that Italian penetration in Albania be checked; and that Greece receive Cyprus and the Dodekanese Islands. Although the Committee members made frequent representations to the British government and published numerous articles, they were unsuccessful in securing the adoption of any of their recommendations.⁹

The failure of these various liberal organizations to make any progress during the nineteen twenties is due to several reasons. In the first place each of the Balkan governments was too concerned with pressing internal problems, such as unemployment, social unrest, and minority claims, to pay much attention to plans for closer inter-Balkan ties. Moreover the relations between the Balkan states were

⁷ N. and C. R. Buxton, *The War and the Balkans* (London, 1915), 112.

⁸ Buxton and Leese, *op. cit.*, 121. See also J. D. Bouchier, "The Scramble for the Balkans," *Nineteenth Century and After*, LXXXVI (October, 1919), 640-653.

⁹ Stavrianos, "The Balkan Committee," *Queen's Quarterly*, XLVIII (Autumn, 1941), 258-267. See also the following articles by the chairman of the Balkan Committee, Sir Edward Boyle: "Serbia and the Macedonians," *Contemporary Review*, 131 (June, 1927), 733-740; "Towards Balkan Unity," *Contemporary Review*, 151 (April, 1937), 404-409; "Bulgaria, 1939," *Contemporary Review*, 155 (April, 1939), 409-415.

far too unsettled. The Treaty of Neuilly had left Bulgaria a revisionist power and she was unwilling to conclude agreements involving recognition of the territorial *status quo*. Consequently the succession states combined to form the Little Entente as a precaution against Bulgarian and especially Hungarian revisionism. This preponderance of the satiated powers did not lead to political stability in southeastern Europe because of the intervention of the Great Powers. France sought allies in the Balkans to buttress her military hegemony in Europe. Italy strove to safeguard her exposed geographical position by gaining paramount influence in Albania, securing control of the Straits of Otranto and preventing the establishment of a strong power in the Balkans and especially on the Dalmatian coast. Britain remained more in the background but dislike of French domination of the continent led her to maintain cordial relations with Italy during these years.

These conflicting interests of the Great Powers inevitably had their effect upon inter-Balkan relations. After signing treaties of alliance with Czechoslovakia (January 15, 1924 and October 16, 1925), France concluded treaties of friendship with Roumania (June 10, 1926) and with Yugoslavia (initialled March 1926 and signed November 11, 1927). Thereby France became the patron and defender of the *status quo* in southeastern Europe. This left Italy no choice but to support the revisionist states if she were to retain a foothold in the Balkans. In this way Franco-Italian rivalry sharpened and made much more dangerous the differences between the Balkan states. In 1920, for example, when there existed widespread public opinion in favor of the creation of a Yugoslav federation, the Italian government hurriedly proposed an anti-Yugoslav alliance to Stamboliiski with the aim of eliminating the possibility of such a federation. The offer was rejected but Italy continued to sabotage efforts to effect a rapprochement between Bulgaria and her neighbors by aiding the Macedonian bands in their raids into Greece and Yugoslavia.¹⁰ Italy also strengthened her position in the eastern Mediterranean by signing a series of friendship treaties with Greece and Roumania in 1926, Hungary in 1927 and Turkey in 1928. Italy's greatest gain, however, was made in Albania where a virtual protectorate was established by the Treaty of Tirana in 1926 and the treaty of alliance in the following year. These rival alliance systems naturally aroused suspicions and mutual distrust amongst both the Balkan states and the Great Powers. The Yugoslavs accused Italy of seeking to encircle them with her satellites—Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania—while the Italians

¹⁰ Todoroff, "The Macedonian Organization Yesterday and Today," *Foreign Affairs*, VI (April, 1928), 478-482.

accused the French and Yugoslavs of the same motives in concluding their agreement.

About 1929 inter-Balkan relations improved considerably with the conclusion of a series of agreements settling long-standing disputes. The first was the Greek-Yugoslav pact concerning Salonica. For almost a decade the difficulty of establishing a smoothly working system for the transit of Yugoslav goods through Salonica was the chief obstacle in the way of a complete understanding between Yugoslavia and Greece. The Yugoslavs were dissatisfied with the management of the Greek section of the Belgrade-Salonica Railroad and claimed that freight charges were too high and that the port facilities at Salonica were inadequate. In March 1929, however, a convention was signed which met these difficulties, and ten days later the two countries concluded a treaty of friendship, conciliation and judicial settlement. The re-establishment of friendly relations between Greece and Yugoslavia was followed almost immediately by a decided relaxation in the tension between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. A mixed Bulgaro-Yugoslav Commission began negotiations at Pirot in February 1929 and by February 1930 it succeeded in achieving a settlement of the vexed question of properties which were divided by the frontier and in concluding an agreement for the maintenance of order and security along the border.

At the same time Greece and Turkey were settling their differences. Relations between the two countries had been strained, sometimes almost to the point of war, by various issues, including property settlement following the exchange of minorities and the status and treatment of Moslems in Western Thrace and of Greeks in Constantinople. In 1930 negotiations were recommenced and were aided by the encouragement of Mussolini who had hopes of a tripartite treaty of friendship and arbitration among Italy, Greece and Turkey. Thus in June 10, 1930 a convention was signed at Angora in which a final settlement was reached on all outstanding problems. Four months later the rapprochement was completed by the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, neutrality, conciliation, and arbitration, a protocol for naval limitation, and a treaty of commerce and navigation.¹¹

Despite this series of agreements the situation was as yet by no means completely settled. Bulgaria and Greece had still to come to terms regarding a Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean, reparation payments and the liquidation of the property of the exchanged minorities.

¹¹ A brief analysis of Balkan diplomacy during this period is given in E. P. MacCallum, "Recent Balkan Alignments," *Foreign Policy Reports*, VII (March 18, 1931), 5-17; and a more detailed account in A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1930* (Oxford, 1931), 143ff. [Hereafter referred to as *Survey of International Affairs*.]

Bulgaria and Roumania were also at odds over the treatment of Bulgarians in the Dobrudja and various property issues. Moreover Yugoslavia still regarded Albania suspiciously and Franco-Italian rivalry and intrigue in the peninsula was by no means ended. Nevertheless the Balkan situation was more settled at the end of 1929 than at any other time in the post-war period. This improvement of relations was one of the factors which induced certain individuals to call a Balkan Conference in the hope of furthering Balkan unity.

Another factor was the world-wide economic depression. The Balkan countries being predominantly agricultural,¹² were particularly hard hit by the disproportionate drop in agricultural prices during the depression. In Bulgaria between 1930 and 1931 cereals fell an average of 47% in price while tobacco fell 16% and eggs 25%. In Roumania 40 to 45% of the total national income was derived from the cultivation of cereals and during the same period they dropped in value by 50%. In that same year the two most important cereals produced in Yugoslavia, wheat and maize, decreased in price by 18% and 53% respectively. Mediterranean products experienced a similar decline in price. In Greece, where most of them were grown, the value of the principal export commodities dropped as follows between 1929 and 1930: currants—17.5%, dried figs—12.3%, leaf-tobacco—12.8%, olive oil—32.9%, olives—13.6%.¹³

In addition to this catastrophic drop in prices there was a very considerable decline in the quantity of exports. This was due partly to lack of purchasing power and partly to economic nationalism. For example, wheat production in France, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Britain together increased by some 15% between 1925-29 and 1930-34, while that of southeastern Europe declined considerably.¹⁴ This situation forced the statesmen of all these countries to the conclusion that purely national measures were no longer adequate and that concerted international action was necessary.¹⁵ Accordingly eight east European agrarian states—including Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and

¹² According to the latest figures 81% of the total occupied population of Bulgaria is engaged in agriculture, 54% in Greece, 78% in Roumania and 79% in Yugoslavia. *Europe's Trade. A Study of the Trade of European Countries with Each Other and with the Rest of the World* (League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service, Geneva, 1941), 50.

¹³ *League of Nations. Economic Committee. The Agricultural Crisis* (Geneva, 1931), I, 117ff. The best work on post-war economic developments in Central Europe and the Balkans is A. Basch, *The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere* (New York, 1943). On the effects of the depression, see ch. 3.

¹⁴ *South-Eastern Europe. A Brief Survey. (Information Department Papers, no. 26, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford, 1940), 103, 104.*

¹⁵ Thus Professor Jon Raducanu, Roumanian Minister of Agriculture, wrote in 1931: "Solutions no longer depend on individual Governments. They must be sought and applied by means of a general agreement between all consuming and producing countries." *The Agricultural Crisis*, I, 261.

Roumania—held two conferences in August and October 1930 in Warsaw and Bucharest. The aim of this agrarian bloc was to form a customs union which could bargain on equal terms with the industrialized states of Western Europe. A few more conferences were held but the bloc soon became a mere appendage of the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry for European Union. Nevertheless the mere holding of these conferences pointed the way to similar action in the political field, and the profound social repercussions of the economic crash served as a spur to action.¹⁶

These favorable circumstances led Alexander Papanastassios, formerly premier of Greece, to request several international organizations to sponsor the calling of a Balkan conference.¹⁷ After a number of fruitless proposals he gained the support of the Universal Peace Congress.¹⁸ At the 1929 meeting of the Congress in Athens, Papanastassios suggested that a semi-official conference be called to consider the possibilities of a federation of the Balkan states. The proposal was enthusiastically received and on May 12, 1930 the International Bureau of Peace at Geneva sent to the six Balkan foreign ministers a circular invitation to attend a Balkan Conference in Athens in October. The Greek government offered the hall of the Greek Chamber of Deputies for the use of the meeting. By the end of June all of the Balkan states had signified their approval of the conference and made appropriate arrangements for the sending of delegates.

At the opening of the plenary assembly of the first Balkan Conference on October 5, an illustrious assemblage was on hand. The delegates included such personages as the President of the Roumanian Chamber of Deputies, the Vice-President of the Grand National Assembly at Angora, a former Prime Minister of Greece, and numerous senators and deputies. Among the observers were the diplomatic corps at Athens and representatives of the League of Nations Secretariat, the International Labor Office, the International Peace Bureau, the Interparliamentary Union and various other international organizations. After the preliminary series of welcoming addresses, the work of the conference was entrusted to six commissions which had been appointed to study the various problems of federation.

The Commission on Organization was successful in securing the adoption of its proposed statute. A permanent organization was established, to be known as the Balkan Conference. Its function was to

¹⁶ A brief survey of these agrarian conferences is given in Geshkoff, *Balkan Union*, 144–147. For details, see Basch, *op. cit.*, ch. 4, 5.

¹⁷ A. P. Papanastassiou, *Vers l'union balkanique* (Paris, 1934), 11.

¹⁸ For the earlier activities of this organization in behalf of Balkan federation, see *supra*, 150, 151.

promote Balkan cooperation in economic, social, intellectual and political intercourse, in the hope of making a Balkan union ultimately practicable. The Conference was to meet annually in each of the Balkan countries in turn and the president of the conference was to be the leader of the delegation in whose country the conference met in any given year. The organs of the Conference were to be the General Assembly, Council, Secretariat and National Groups. Each country was to be represented by thirty voting members plus experts, secretaries, and observers. The Council, consisting of the chiefs and two members of each delegation, was to serve as the executive body of the Conference. Its tasks were to meet between sessions, fix the agenda, approve the budget, and take any other action deemed necessary. The Secretariat was assigned the customary duties and was financially supported by annual pro-rata contributions. The National Groups, finally, consisted of the members of past and present delegations. Their duty was to win the support of all peace and political groups and of the general public; to help select delegates for future conferences; to work for the application of the Conference resolutions in their country; and to submit an annual report of their activities. The best description of the character of this Balkan Conference is that by M. Papanastassios:

Though based on the national groups, composed of politicians, representatives of peace organizations, universities, and professional organizations, and though its decisions do not obligate the governments, this organization has nevertheless an official character, not only because the governments of the six countries support the activities of the national groups, but also because the delegations of each country to the Conferences are chosen after consultation with the government, and these governments are represented at each Conference by their diplomatic officials (who follow the deliberations in the capacity of observers) in the country in which the Conference meets.¹⁹

In accordance with the provisions of this statute, annual conferences were held between the years 1930 and 1933.²⁰ The results of these conferences were very similar to those of the League of Nations

¹⁹ Papanastassiou, *op. cit.*, 46, 47.

²⁰ The locations and dates of the four conferences were: I, Athens, October 5–13, 1930; II, Istanbul, October 20–26, 1931; III, Bucharest, October 22–29, 1932; IV, Salonica, November 5–11, 1933. The following account of these conferences is intended to summarize and interpret the proceedings and results, rather than to present a detailed factual account. Several excellent, full-length studies of the conferences are available, outstanding being T. I. Geshkoff, *Balkan Union. A Road to Peace in South-eastern Europe* (New York, 1940); R. J. Kerner and H. N. Howard, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1930–1935* (Berkeley, 1936); N. J. Padelford, *Peace in the Balkans. The Movement towards International Organization in the Balkans* (New York, 1935); S. Petrovich, *L'union et la conférence balkanique* (Paris, 1934); and Papanastassiou, *Vers l'union balkanique*.

at Geneva. The commissions concerned with non-political problems were able to make slow but appreciable progress at each conference. The Commission on Intellectual Cooperation pointed out to the first conference that the prevailing intellectual isolation fostered misunderstanding and prejudice. To remedy the situation an elaborate program was submitted and adopted, calling for exchanges of students and professors; creation of libraries and professorships to emphasize Balkanism; athletic and scholastic competitions; modification of teaching so as to serve the cause of peace; translation of Balkan folklore into the various Balkan languages; and the celebration of a Balkan Week in each country at a fixed date. Some progress had been made along these lines by the time of the second conference. A Balkan Association had been formed and national press associations created, university students and professors had exchanged visits and some efforts had been made to organize education along Balkan rather than national lines. Other plans which were considered at later conferences were the unification of Balkan law and the establishment of a common institute of historical research. This led to the formation of the Permanent Commission of Balkan Jurists and of the Balkan Historical Institute, although the latter never actually functioned.²¹

The Commission on Social and Health Problems made a thorough study of social legislation in the various countries, and urged at the first conference that serious attention be given to the precarious plight of the agricultural and industrial workers, pointing out that their support was a prerequisite for success. Resolutions were adopted in favor of the improvement and collaboration of sanitary services, abolition of child labor and prostitution, equal treatment of foreign workers, and ratification of the conventions and recommendations adopted by the International Labor Office at Geneva. At the 1932 Bucharest Conference there was adopted a draft convention on the status of aliens, providing for equal rights and privileges. The final article of the convention stipulated that it should be part of a general Balkan pact.²² The conference further called on the governments to eliminate the traffic in women and children by adopting the League of Nation's Children Charter, appointing women police officers and providing for more careful inspection at frontiers. At the last conference a draft statute of a Balkan Labor Office was adopted. This organization was to be related to and perform the same functions as

²¹ See Geshkoff, *op. cit.*, 166-180, and Petrovich, *op. cit.*, 247-251, and the works there cited.

²² Text in *III^e Conférence balkanique, Bucarest 22-29 octobre 1932* (Bucharest, 1933), 363-370, [Hereafter referred to as *III CB*], and translated and reprinted in Geshkoff, *op. cit.*, 277-283, and Kerner and Howard, *op. cit.*, 209-216.

the International Labor Office, namely, collect and publish labor information, prepare conventions, and study all questions concerning labor.²³

The Commission on Communications found that a great deal of improvement was necessary in the transportation and communication facilities in the Balkan countries. Direct telegraphic connections existed between most of the leading cities but telephonic communication was still relatively undeveloped. Railroads were few and their usefulness was decreased by the existence of some narrow gauge lines. Not a single bridge spanned the Danube in the whole Balkan area while Albania was inaccessible by rail or by highway from any Balkan state. At its plenary session of October 10 the first conference adopted resolutions calling for the construction of direct rail, air, road, and telegraphic lines between all the capitals; the construction of two main trunk lines (rail and road) from the Black Sea to the Adriatic and from the Danube to the Aegean; and the establishment of a Balkan Tourists' Federation to study and encourage tourist traffic.²⁴ The conference further approved a draft convention for a Balkan Postal Union which would permit reduction of postal rates between Balkan countries and would extend, speed up, and regularize postal service in the peninsula. This convention was later accepted by the Greek, Turkish, and Yugoslav governments and was thus at least partially applied. At succeeding conferences the Commission devoted itself largely to the consideration of ways and means of securing the application of proposals which had been previously adopted but which remained unfulfilled.²⁵

The Commission on Economic Affairs studied in detail the economic position of every Balkan country and of the peninsula as a whole. Its findings were very similar to those of the East European agricultural conferences. It was generally agreed that a large percentage of Balkan produce could be consumed within the peninsula, and yet inter-Balkan commerce amounted to only nine per cent of the total foreign commerce of the states. The result was cut-throat competition for foreign markets, which in turn were steadily contracting because of the general economic crisis. Moreover each of the Balkan countries was threatened with a credit crisis due to over-borrowing, and each was subordinating economic welfare to military policies. The Commission accordingly urged "economic collaboration" as the prelude to ultimate economic union. More specifically,

²³ Text in *IV CB*, 528-531, and translated and reprinted in Geshkoff, *op. cit.*, 272-276. ²⁴ *ICB*, 292-301.

²⁵ Text of Balkan Postal Union in *Les Balkans*, II, nos. 13-14 (October-November, 1931), 139-140. Translated and reprinted in Geshkoff, *op. cit.*, 288, 289, and in Kerner and Howard, *op. cit.*, 186, 187.

the first Balkan conference on October 10 adopted resolutions advocating the organization in each Balkan state of an office for the study of commercial questions, and of a Central Balkan Commercial Institute, composed of representatives of the national offices. Economic cooperation was to be furthered also by the removal of obstacles to the transit of goods, unification of tariff nomenclature, the adoption of a common policy of protection for Balkan products (especially tobacco), collaboration between banks, and investigation of the possibility of a monetary union.

Having examined the general economic situation at the first conference, the Commission then devoted itself to the development of specific projects. The second conference adopted a resolution establishing the Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This organization was patterned after the International Chamber of Commerce and was intended to improve economic relations. It was officially opened at Istanbul during the celebration of Balkan Week in May 1932, and a maritime section was added to it in 1933. Other resolutions called for the creation of a Balkan Chamber of Agriculture modeled after the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a Central Cereal Office to coordinate production, distribution, and sales, an Inter-Balkan Grain Exchange, a Central Tobacco Office, and a Central Union of Cooperative Societies.

These projects were further discussed at Bucharest in 1932 and finally at the Salonica Conference in 1933 there was adopted the important "Draft Convention on Regional Economic Entente." Its expressed aim was to develop inter-Balkan trade and to secure effective protection for Balkan goods in foreign markets. To attain these ends the contracting parties were to grant mutual most-favored-nation treatment in their tariff arrangements, and to make special arrangements for products not included in the preferential system. A common commercial policy was to be adopted in order to stimulate the exportation of Balkan products to foreign markets, and before concluding a commercial treaty with an extra-Balkan state the signatories were to exchange views. A Compensation Chamber was to be established to facilitate transactions in credits, exchange and transfer. More important was the Permanent Commerce Commission, designed to encourage commerce, co-ordinate policies, advise methods of eliminating duplication and conflict, and propose new commercial agreements. Unlike the Chamber of Commerce and Industry set up in Constantinople, this Permanent Commission was to be a state-controlled organ. The significance of this Convention is apparent, for it was designed to furnish an economic basis for political union.²⁶

²⁶ A convenient summary of the work of the Commission on Economic Affairs is given in Geshkoff, *op. cit.*, 147-162. The text of the Convention on Regional Economic

From this survey it is apparent that in the technical and comparatively non-political fields of intellectual cooperation, social and health problems, communications, and economic relations, a very considerable number of constructive and valuable projects were presented and adopted, and a substantial proportion of them were put into operation.²⁷ As regards political questions, however, the situation was quite different. From the outset the Commission on Political Relations was faced with the task of reconciling sharply conflicting interests and viewpoints. Thus a week before the first conference was to open, the Bulgarian delegation announced its decision not to attend on the grounds that the problem of minorities was not on the agenda. Meetings and negotiations for Balkan unity were predestined to failure, it was argued, unless preceded by a just settlement of the minorities question. The Commission on Organization explained that no questions of detail were to be discussed but only the broadest of general principles, while M. Papanastassios conceded that the question of minorities might be discussed "in principle." The Bulgarians were persuaded in this manner to attend the conference, and a general discussion on minorities took place in the Political Commission. Since the fundamental questions at issue had already been ruled out, the debate on this question was limited and inconclusive.

The Commission did succeed, however, in securing the adoption of a resolution recommending that the Balkan foreign ministers meet annually to discuss outstanding questions; that the Council appoint a committee to undertake the study of a Balkan pact involving outlawry of war, amicable settlement of all disputes, and mutual assistance; and that this committee report at the next conference.²⁸ A pact was accordingly drafted by Professor Spiropoulos of the University of Salonica and considered by the Political Commission at the 1931 conference. The proposed pact was modelled after the Little Entente's General Act of Conciliation, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement and provided for an agreement of non-aggression, pacific solution of differences by a Balkan Conciliation Commission or the World Court, and mutual assistance for any Balkan state attacked by any other Balkan state. No progress was made, however, for the Bulgarian delegation, supported by the Albanian, suggested adjournment of the discussion until the problem of the non-fulfillment of minorities treaties had been solved. The conference broke this impasse by referring the proposed pact, with all the amendments and

Entente was published in *Les Balkans*, IV, nos. 14-15 (November-December, 1933), 1088-1091, and translated and reprinted in Geshkoff, *op. cit.*, 284-287, and in Kerner and Howard, *op. cit.*, 217-221.

²⁷ A summary of the accomplishments of the four conferences is given in Kerner and Howard, *op. cit.*, 156-161.

²⁸ *I CB*, 364, 365, 221-224; Papanastassiou, *op. cit.*, 62.

proposals resulting from the Political Commission's discussions, to a special committee which was to submit a report three months before the next conference. The conference further recommended that pending this elaboration of the pact, an attempt should be made to dispose of the contentious minorities question by direct, bilateral negotiations between the national groups.²⁹

The Bulgarians and Albanians promptly acted upon this proposal by concluding an agreement providing for reciprocal recognition of the juridical existence of minorities for whom educational facilities were to be provided. The other Balkan countries, however, refused to act on this hint and no further bilateral discussions on minorities took place. Consequently the Bulgarian delegation to the third conference at Bucharest refused to discuss the draft of a Balkan Pact and proposed adjournment of the debate until the next conference in order to arrange bilateral negotiations on the minority question. With the rejection of this proposal the Bulgarian delegates left the conference.

In their absence the delegates of the other five countries approved, with certain reservations, a revised draft of a pact of non-aggression, peaceful settlement and mutual assistance. In addition, this draft included proposals for dealing with the minorities problem. These proposals, which had been introduced by the Greek national group in the hope of satisfying the Bulgarian demands, provided that a permanent Minorities Bureau should be established, and in addition that a Minorities Commission representing the six Balkan countries should meet once a year to examine complaints from minorities. Any question on which the members of the Commission failed to agree would be referred to the League of Nations.³⁰ This pact represents the most important achievement of the conferences in the political field. The fourth conference at Salonica contented itself with expressing the hope that the governments would adopt the draft Balkan Pact and arrange for annual meetings between their foreign ministers to smooth out difficulties. The Bulgarian delegation in reply issued a declaration accepting the pact on the condition that the equality of Bulgaria be recognized and the minorities provisions be loyally enforced.³¹

This survey reveals that despite all the meetings, negotiations and resolutions, Bulgaria still remained an unsatisfied power. She

²⁹ *Les Balkans*, II, nos. 13-14 (October-November, 1931), 134; Papanastassiou, *op. cit.*, 102.

³⁰ Text of the Bucharest Draft Balkan Pact in *III CB*, 347-356, and translated and reprinted in Geshkoff, *op. cit.*, 290-299 and Kerner and Howard, *op. cit.*, 200-208. A good analysis of the work of the Commission on Political Relations is given in Geshkoff, *op. cit.*, 181-202.

³¹ *IV CB*, 440, 441, 477, 478.

still refused to accept the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly as final and she persistently rejected any pact which involved recognition of the *status quo*. This attitude was a cause for worry for Bulgaria's neighbors. An isolated Bulgaria was obviously no threat, but so long as she refused to enter a non-aggression pact, so long she would continue to offer a foothold to any Great Power desirous of intervening in the Balkans. By 1933 this was no longer an hypothetical danger. Italy still manifested a special interest in Bulgaria. The twenty-fifth anniversary of Bulgarian independence, which was celebrated at the beginning of October 1933, was made the occasion for a renewal of the assurance of Italy's friendship for Bulgaria, and after Bulgaria's refusal to adhere to the 1934 Balkan Pact, the Italian press declared that Bulgaria could count on continued Italian support. Moreover the rise of Hitler to power and his bellicose statements regarding the Versailles settlement and the need for German expansion stimulated the revisionist movement throughout Europe and aroused the apprehension of Bulgaria's neighbors. Accordingly they sought to counter the increased danger by settling as far as possible their differences with Bulgaria and by strengthening the ties amongst themselves.

Yugoslavia was the most successful in improving her relations with Bulgaria. One reason was that in June 1931 a Government of National Union had been formed in Sofia which included several members of the Agrarian Party that had been traditionally in favor of close relations with Yugoslavia. Moreover the Four Power Pact between France, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany which was initiated on June 7, 1933 aroused anxiety in Bulgaria because this apparent rapprochement between France and Italy removed one motive for Italy's support of Bulgaria. In addition the series of non-aggression pacts which had been concluded on Russian initiative during the summer and which included Turkey, Yugoslavia and Roumania, were of direct concern to Bulgaria. The definition of the aggressor which they contained covered the case of a state that gave support to armed bands which invaded the territory of another state, or which refused the request of the invaded state that it should take all the measures in its power to deprive such armed bands of assistance or protection. The failure of successive Bulgarian governments to curb the activities of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization clearly brought Bulgaria within the scope of this definition.

For these reasons the Bulgarian government was uncertain of its diplomatic position and was therefore ready to take steps to improve its relations with Yugoslavia. In June 1933 a protocol was signed by the two countries providing for more effective measures against the

Macedonian bands. On June 25 of the same year the Bulgarian authorities carried on a house to house search in Sofia in an attempt to crush the Macedonian Organization, and although none of its prominent leaders were apprehended, yet this move did encourage the popular movement in favor of a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Between September and December of 1933 the Bulgarian and Yugoslav royal families exchanged several visits and were most enthusiastically welcomed by the populace of the two capitals. The significance of these visits was increased by the fact that they represented a renewal of personal relations between the two monarchs after a lapse of nineteen years.

These signs of growing friendliness between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were not altogether welcomed by the other Balkan countries. Greece and Turkey, for example, were apprehensive of a Yugoslav bloc which would be in a position to dominate the Balkans. Therefore they attempted first to improve their own relations with Bulgaria. In May 1933 they suggested that the Bulgarian government should become a party to an agreement guaranteeing the inviolability of their frontiers which the Greek and Turkish governments intended to conclude between themselves. This Bulgaria refused to do. She was willing to improve her relations with her neighbors but not to the extent of surrendering her claims to a modification of the territorial *status quo*. This refusal did not cause Greece and Turkey to abandon their project for tightening the bonds between themselves. On September 14 they signed a treaty by which they mutually guaranteed the inviolability of their common frontiers, and undertook to consult each other on all international questions which were of interest to them "... in order to secure a common line of action in conformity with their policy of friendship, understanding and collaboration in protection of their respective and common interests."

In the meantime Roumania was concerned by the increasing demand for revision and by the Bulgaro-Yugoslav rapprochement and Greco-Turkish alliance which left her isolated. Her first step was to come to terms with the Soviet Union. This was achieved when the two countries signed a pact of non-aggression on July 3, 1933. Roumania next sought to protect her southern frontier by promoting a general Balkan pact which would supplant the existing bilateral agreements from which she was excluded. Accordingly the rulers and ministers of all the Balkan countries exchanged visits in the fall of 1933 and on October 12, 13, the Roumanian foreign minister Nicholas Titulescu, visited Sofia. The conversations were cordial but the Bulgarian government made it clear that it was unwilling to bind itself by any

pact which would render impossible any future modification of the Treaty of Neuilly.

A pact which would include all the Balkan states was obviously out of the question. Bulgaria's neighbors therefore decided to come to an agreement amongst themselves in the hope that Bulgaria would either change her mind during the course of their negotiations or would be induced to join them at a later date. Accordingly after negotiations carried on in Geneva and Belgrade, a four-power Balkan Pact was initialed at Belgrade on February 4 and signed at Athens five days later. The signatories bound themselves to guarantee mutually the security of the existing Balkan frontiers and "... to consult with each other on the measures to be taken in the face of eventualities capable of affecting their interests as defined by the present agreement." They also undertook not to embark upon any political action in relation to any other Balkan state without the consent of the other signatories. The agreement was to come into force on the date of its signature, and it was to be open to any other Balkan countries whose adherence would be "... the object of favorable examination by the contracting parties."

An additional protocol, the terms of which were not made public for some weeks after signature, defined in more precise terms the nature of these engagements. The pact was declared not to be directed against any Power. Its object was to guarantee Balkan frontiers against aggression by a Balkan state, but it would also come into operation against a Balkan state which joined another Power in committing an act of aggression upon a signatory. An aggressor was defined in accordance with Article II of the London Conventions of July 3-5, 1933. The signatories agreed to begin negotiations within six months for conventions in conformity with the objects of the pact. They recognized that existing treaties remained binding upon them, and declared that the pact was "not in contradiction with previous obligations." The pact was defined as a "defensive instrument" and accordingly if any signatory state committed an act of aggression against any other country, the relations of that state with the other signatories would cease to be governed by the terms of the pact. The maintenance of the existing territorial situation in the Balkans was declared binding upon the signatories. The pact could be denounced after two years, and if not so denounced, and in the absence of agreement to the contrary, it would remain in force for another five years. Thereafter, failing denunciation, it would automatically continue in force for seven more years.

At the end of October 1931 the foreign ministers of the four states

met at Angora where they drew up and adopted the Statutes of the Balkan Entente. They provided for regular meetings of the Permanent Council of the Entente, consisting of the foreign ministers of the four member states, and for the establishment of an Economic Council which was to examine the possibilities of closer economic collaboration and to report within six months. In addition the establishment of a Balkan Bank was agreed upon in principle and a commission was appointed to go into the question of the unification of legislation. The organization thus established obviously would carry on much the same type of work as the Balkan Conferences had in the past, with the important difference that the Permanent Council would be able to make decisions and take action where the Balkan Conferences had only been able to make recommendations. Thus, despite the opposition of Papanastassios and others, the fifth Balkan Conference which was to have been held at Istanbul was adjourned *sine die*. The Balkan Entente had replaced the Balkan Conference.³²

The two, however, were not similar. In fact, the differences between them were fundamental. The Balkan Conference had striven to bring all the Balkan states together on some program, limited though it might be, in the hope that it would gradually be expanded as outstanding issues were settled. The Balkan Entente, on the other hand, had been organized for the purpose of maintaining the *status quo* and thereby was automatically directed against revisionist Balkan states. This was emphasized by Papanastassios, the President of the Council of the Balkan Conference, at the time when the Balkan Pact was being negotiated. The proposed pact, he pointed out, was concerned only with the maintenance of the existing Balkan frontiers while the Bucharest Draft Balkan Pact of the Balkan Conference contained the principles of non-aggression, mutual assistance, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and protection of minorities. He urged, therefore, that there be concluded a multilateral pact of non-aggression and pacific settlement of disputes, to which Albania and Bulgaria would readily adhere. The other principles included in the Draft Balkan Pact could then be reserved for later negotiations. Otherwise the hasty conclusion of a pact designed only to guarantee the Balkan frontiers would serve to make Balkan understanding more

³² The details of the diplomacy culminating in the formation of the Balkan Entente are given in Geshkoff, *op. cit.*, 203-222; Kerner and Howard, *op. cit.*, 116-138; Padel-ford, *op. cit.*, 90ff.; *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, 508ff.; and the works there cited. According to Kosta Todorov, the Bulgarian Peasant leader, who apparently was on close personal terms with King Alexander, the latter much preferred a Bulgarian alliance to the Balkan Pact, and even proposed unofficially to cede Tsaribrod and Bosilgrad in the event of an alliance. Why this offer was rejected is not made clear. Todorov, *Balkan Firebrand*, 250-257.

difficult.³³ The plea was ignored, and the resulting Balkan Entente became, like the Little Entente in Central Europe, simply an anti-revisionist bloc. Whereas the Balkan Conference looked toward a fundamental and comprehensive union of all the Balkan peoples, politically, economically, socially and intellectually, the Entente was, for all intents and purposes, purely political.

Even in this respect it was limited. While the pact was being negotiated the Soviet Ambassador in Angora drew attention to the possibility that in the event of hostilities between the Soviet Union and Roumania, Bulgaria might be drawn in on the Russian side, in which case Turkey, by the terms of the pact, would be obliged to support Roumania against Bulgaria and therefore against Russia. Such action on Turkey's part would contravene the Turco-Russian treaty of neutrality of 1925. In order to avoid this difficulty the Roumanian government issued a written declaration to the effect that it would expect no aid from Turkey in the event of a conflict with the U.S.S.R. When the terms of the pact were made public, the opposition in Greece led by Venizelos, attacked the government on the ground that it should have taken similar precautions to ensure that Greece would not become involved in war with Italy as a result of the obligations which she had undertaken in regard to the protection of Yugoslavia's frontiers. In these circumstances the Greek government asked for and received assurances from the other three governments that under no condition would the application of the pact involve Greece in hostilities with a Great Power. The significance of these reservations lies in the fact that they narrowed the pact to a purely anti-Bulgarian instrument. So long as Bulgaria remained isolated and the Great Powers refrained from military or diplomatic intervention in the Balkans, the Entente could operate effectively. To state these conditions is to reveal the futility of the Pact.³⁴

³³ A. Papanastassiou, "Les conférences balkaniques et le pacte balkanique," *XXX^e congrès universel de la paix tenu à Locarno du 1^{er} au 6 septembre 1934. Documents officiels*, 68-74; A. Papanastassiou, "Le pacte d'entente balkanique," *Les Balkans*, V (January-February, 1934), 1-7.

³⁴ Regarding the reservations, see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, 526-528; W. Miller, "The Balkan Pact," *Contemporary Review*, 145 (May, 1934), 533, 534. The Bulgarian attitude to the Pact was set forth in a note to Secretary of State, Cordell Hull:

In spite of the pressure which has been brought to bear on her, Bulgaria has been unable to see her way to signing a pact which would crystallize for all time the actual *status-quo* in the Balkans which has been established mainly at her expense. Bulgaria could see no reason to accord voluntary endorsement to penalties imposed upon her by a dictated peace treaty, and further to aggravate her position by renouncing, without even a hint of compensation, the hope deeply imbedded in the nation's heart for a revision of the Treaty, though by peaceful means.

Cited by H. N. Howard, "Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, I (January, 1942), 447, 448.

Hardly had the Entente been formed when it began to show signs of cracking under the pressure of a resurgent Germany. Hitler's success in carrying out rearmament, first clandestinely and later in open defiance of the treaties, and even in securing British agreement to the expansion of the Versailles fleet into a navy, was the first shock. More startling was the re-occupation and refortification of the Rhineland. Heretofore the members of the Balkan and Little Ententes had calculated that if the Reichswehr struck to the southeast, its right flank would be exposed to a French counter-attack across Bavaria. Now, however, the German armies could operate with little restraint behind the protecting Siegfried Line.

Another important factor was the growing economic dependence of southeastern Europe upon Germany. In the case of Hungary, Yugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria and Greece, the percentage of their imports coming from Germany rose from 19½ in 1933 to 35 in 1937, while the percentage of their exports going to Germany increased during the same period from 16 to 27. Turkey's dependence was even greater. Between 1933 and 1936 the percentage of Turkish exports going to Germany rose from 19 to 51. Moreover the exports of these countries to Germany were considerably greater than their imports, so that they found themselves tied by a double bond to Germany—as the principal market for their products and as a debtor who was unwilling or unable to liquidate his debt except by exports. Thus the Balkan countries found themselves hopelessly dependent on the German market, especially since both Britain and France were relatively uninterested in Balkan products, with the exception of Roumanian oil. It was not till 1938–39 that the western Powers realized the political danger implicit in Nazi economic domination and then they made frantic efforts to provide the Balkan countries with alternate markets. But in the meantime German economic hegemony had been established in southeastern Europe, with inevitable diplomatic repercussions. For, regardless how much the Balkan states might resent the methods of Dr. Schacht or fear complete Nazi control, they could not afford to antagonize their principal customer.³⁵

The danger from Germany was increased by the social and political conditions prevailing in the Balkans at this time. The existence of a large peasant class with a miserable standard of living has been a standard feature of Balkan society. After a brief spell of political power during the first decade after the World War, this class was gradually excluded from government by the ruling classes which had

³⁵ For details, see "Dr. Schacht in the Balkans: The Economic Background," *Bulletin of International News*, XIII (July 4, 1936), 3–9; and *South-Eastern Europe. A Political and Economic Survey* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939), 122, 135, 149, 165, 175, 183, 193–203; Todorov, *Balkan Firebrand*, 271. The best and most detailed account is in Basch, *op. cit.*, ch. 10–13.

taken alarm at the radical peasant and labor programs. Dictatorial governments were established which ruthlessly suppressed any radical manifestations amongst the peasantry or the workers. Such authoritarian regimes did not automatically adopt a pro-Axis foreign policy but they naturally felt a certain sense of kinship with the great Fascist powers of Europe, especially since the opposition elements were almost invariably pro-British, pro-French and violently anti-Axis.

Moreover native fascist parties arose with programs basically similar to that of the National Socialists and generally favoring closer relations with the Reich. These movements were largely indigenous—a logical product of the existing economic and social conditions—and in the case of Roumania, the Iron Guard enjoyed considerable support amongst the peasantry. Nevertheless these parties were certainly under Nazi influence, direct or indirect. Some were secretly subsidized from Berlin, and all gained in prestige and power after each German victory in Europe. In addition the Reich did not hesitate to extend its influence by means of cultural missions, numerous scholarships for Balkan students for study in Germany, the organization and unscrupulous use of German minorities in Roumania and Yugoslavia, and the encouragement of dissident elements such as the Croats in Yugoslavia. The importance of these internal developments cannot be stated in absolute terms, but it can be assumed safely that they did create a favorable atmosphere for the consideration of a pro-Axis shift in the foreign policies of these states.³⁶

This combination of military, economic and political factors altered fundamentally the balance of forces in southeastern Europe and thereby undermined the foundations of both the Balkan and Little Ententes. The new situation has been described aptly as follows:

... the five South-East European anti-revisionist states, in their relations with one another, were now faced with the question whether a pair of ententes which had originally been made mainly with an eye to Hungary and Bulgaria should be built into a larger structure of alliances covering Europe as a whole and involving the risk of a collision not only with Hungary and Bulgaria but also with Italy and Germany, or whether the original arrangements would cease to be operative, even within their narrow regional limits, now that the two local vortices of post-war political disturbances round Hungary and round Bulgaria were being caught up into a maelstrom of European dimensions.³⁷

It was the latter course which was adopted, particularly when it

³⁶ P. E. Mosely, "Hitler and Southeastern Europe," *Yale Review*, XXVIII (December, 1938), 249–272; P. F. Drucker, "Can Germany Win the Balkans?" *Harper's Magazine*, CLXXVIII (January, 1939) 148–159; H. Seton-Watson, "The Social Background in Balkan Politics," *Politica*, IV (June, 1939), 139–154.

³⁷ *Survey of International Affairs*, 1936, 506.

became apparent that the Western Powers were unwilling or unable to oppose effectively German and Italian aggression. As each crisis arose, one after another of the Balkan states hastened to loosen their ties with the threatened country, and thereby, as events were to prove, ensured their own ultimate destruction.

The Balkan Entente Conference held on May 4-6, 1936 in Belgrade was overshadowed by the triumph of Mussolini in Ethiopia and the failure of the League of Nations to check the flagrant Italian aggression. The lesson was not lost on the Entente members, and they hastened to make certain that their obligations would not involve them also in a war with a Great Power. General Metaxas was particularly insistent on this point because the problem of obligations under the pact had become a partisan matter in Greece. The issue had been reopened in the spring of 1936 by charges from the Opposition that the foreign minister, M. Maximos, had signed a secret minute in Geneva in 1934 nullifying the statement of reservation made at the time by the Greek Chamber. The effect of such a move, according to the charges, would have been to commit Greece to action in case of an Italian attack on Yugoslavia, a contingency which at the time did not seem at all improbable. Accordingly the Greek objective at the Conference was to eliminate all danger of involvement in war with Italy by excluding the Albanian frontiers from the guarantees of the Pact.³⁸

Greece was strongly supported by Turkey, who was engrossed in negotiations for the summoning of the Montreux Straits Conference and had no desire to become involved in Adriatic quarrels. Despite strong opposition from Yugoslavia and Roumania, the Greek point of view won out and it was agreed that the liability for mutual defence should be limited to purely Balkan exigencies and that in all other cases the obligations of the Entente members should be restricted to the aid required under the League Covenant. In order to allay Greek apprehensions it was specifically added that "... the obligations of Greece, clearly and unequivocally defined, are only concerned with the Balkan frontiers."³⁹

At the same time that they were limiting their external obligations, the Entente members attempted to consolidate their internal position. The difficulties over Turkey's request to fortify the Straits were adjusted with ease, and in an attempt to conciliate Bulgaria, a cordial invitation was extended to join the Entente, coupled with a

³⁸ N. S. Kaltchas, "Post-War Politics in Greece," *Foreign Policy Association Reports*, XII (September, 1936), 159; *New York Times*, May 7, 1936.
³⁹ *New York Times*, May 6, 7, 8, 1936.

promise to consider any demands for revision which were made in a legal manner.⁴⁰ These steps, however, could not repair the damage already done by limiting the Pact. This is evident in the following news despatch from Belgrade after the conclusion of the Conference: "Yugoslavia's interest in the pact in the future will be small, for the reservations now made abandon her to Italian aggression. As the pact stands, it is little more than an alliance against Bulgaria. The movement for a rapprochement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia is constantly growing in this country."⁴¹ Equally revealing is General Metaxas' statement to the Greek correspondents, that "the Entente has now become more diplomatic than military."⁴²

A similar loosening of ties was evident in the case of the Little Entente at this time. The first indication was the downfall of the veteran Roumanian foreign minister, Nicholas Titulescu. Long known as an ardent Francophile, a supporter of the League and of the two Ententes, his dismissal foreshadowed a fundamental shift in Roumanian foreign policy. Roumania at this time was torn between two possible courses of action. The first, dictated by the needs of the Little Entente and the German threats to Czechoslovakia, involved an alliance with Russia, the powerful ally of the French and the Czechs. This was the policy advocated and begun by Titulescu. The alternative course was to draw closer to Poland, the leading proponent of isolationism, and to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward Germany and Italy. Arguments for this policy included the fear of Russian intentions on Bessarabia, and the danger, both foreign and domestic, of becoming a corridor for Russian armies bringing support to Czechoslovakia. The dismissal of Titulescu and the appointment of Victor Antonescu to his position was a clear indication that Roumania had selected the latter course.

Antonescu, it is true, emphasized that Roumanian policy would not be altered, but more significant than his assurances was the marked strengthening of Polish-Roumanian ties. During the autumn of 1936 a number of visits were exchanged between Roumanian and Polish political and military leaders, and agreements were signed for technical and cultural cooperation and for "close military collaboration" between the two countries. In view of the Polish-German non-aggression pact of January 1934, and the well-known hostility between Poland and Czechoslovakia, the rapprochement between Roumania and Poland naturally raised doubts regarding Roumania's position in the Little Entente and her commitments to Czechoslovakia. Cer-

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, May 10, 1936.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, May 7, 1936.

⁴² *Ibid.*, May 8, 1936.

tainly by the end of 1936 Roumania's position had shifted considerably from the days when Titulescu had so actively espoused the principle of the "indivisibility of peace."⁴³

The slackening of the Little Entente ties, first evident in August, was confirmed at the Bratislava Conference of the Entente Council. After mentioning new trade agreements, the communique announced that greater elasticity had been agreed upon in relation to extra-Danubian affairs. Unable to reconcile the different attitudes toward the Great Powers, the Entente had decided that Czechoslovakia's treaty with the U.S.S.R. should involve no obligation upon Roumania or Yugoslavia, and that the latter countries should be free to assume any attitude they saw fit toward Germany and Italy.⁴⁴ The final step in the disintegration of the Little Entente was reached at the Belgrade conference in April 1937. Czechoslovakia, in critical danger from Germany, proposed the enlarging of the military clauses of the pact into a guarantee of full military assistance in case of aggression from any quarter instead of from Hungary and Bulgaria. The proposal was too late to be acceptable. Roumania would not be budged from her new course and the Yugoslav leaders had already ensured themselves, in their opinion, by the signing of two treaties with Bulgaria and Italy which left the Balkan Entente as innocuous and ineffective as the Little Entente.⁴⁵

More than any other Balkan country Yugoslavia feared Italy's ambitions in the Balkans, especially after the Ethiopian affair, and yet the decisions of the Belgrade Conference eliminated any likelihood of aid for Yugoslavia in case of an Italian attack. Accordingly the Yugoslav premier, Milan Stoyadinovich, in the face of strong popular opposition, abandoned the traditional pro-French policy which had been followed by King Alexander, and came to terms with Bulgaria and Italy. On January 24, 1937 he signed the pact with Bulgaria which provided simply that "... there shall be inviolable peace and perpetual friendship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia." Nothing at all was said either about renunciation of territorial demands or about Bulgarian entry into the Balkan Entente. The other states of the Entente were left to draw their own conclusions. Yugoslavia, however, had kept them informed of the negotiations and they

⁴³ Pertinax, "Nicholas Titulescu," *L'Europe nouvelle*, XIX (September, 1936), 917, 918; R. Freund, "Russia and Rumania," *Fortnightly Review*, CVL (June, 1936), 725-730; *Survey of International Affairs*, 1936, 522-526.

⁴⁴ C. F. Melville, "Germany and the Balkans," *Nineteenth Century*, CXX (December, 1936), 736-749.

⁴⁵ *New York Times*, March 27, 1937. For conflicting views of the relation of France to the Czech proposal, see F. A. Ogg, *Events*, I (June, 1937), 455, and P. Brossolette, *L'Europe nouvelle*, XIX (April, 1937), 344.

eventually gave their approval, although not without some misgivings.⁴⁶

Much more disturbing was the Italo-Yugoslav agreement of March 25, 1937. Czechoslovakia and the members of the Balkan Entente had been informed as to the general conditions but under Italian pressure the treaty had been rushed through before its final text could be communicated to Yugoslavia's allies in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Statutes of the Little and Balkan Ententes. Both countries agreed not to attack each other, to remain neutral in case of unprovoked attack by a third power, and to consult on matters affecting their common interests. Italy made substantial commercial concessions, extending to Yugoslavia the tariff preferences hitherto reserved for Austria and Hungary under the Rome protocols, and doubling the Yugoslav export quota. It also promised to ameliorate the lot of the Croat-Slovene minority in Italian Istria and to refrain from encouraging the Croat terrorist *Oustachis*. In return Yugoslavia recognized the Ethiopian empire, made a reciprocal pledge to prevent anti-Italian activities within its borders, agreed to increase imports of Italian goods, and promised to respect the existing frontiers of Albania.

In a superficial sense the terms were highly advantageous for Yugoslavia, but the reception of the treaty outside of Italy, was far from favorable. Yugoslav public opinion was strongly opposed to it. Military circles still regarded Italy as the arch enemy, while the democratic elements interpreted the treaty as a desertion of the liberal forces in Europe and as a short-sighted sacrifice of future security for the sake of immediate, temporary gains.⁴⁷ The attitude of the Ententes was similarly disapproving. Although the initial statements for the press welcomed the Pact as an assurance of peace in the Adriatic,⁴⁸ the true feelings of the Balkan states were expressed at the

⁴⁶ Greece feared that Yugoslavia might support Bulgaria's claims for an Aegean outlet and Roumania and Turkey were similarly apprehensive about renewed claims. *Survey of International Affairs*, 1936, 513-516. For suggestions as to the inspiration of the Pact, see D. Caclamanos, *Greece in Peace and War* (London, 1942), 152, 153; R. Jackson, "German Influence in the Balkans," *Fortnightly Review*, CXLVII (March, 1937), 351-353; *New York Times*, January 1, 1937. At the meeting of the Balkan Council held in Athens on February 14, 1937, it was officially announced that it had been agreed that the Pact was compatible with both the letter and spirit of the Balkan Entente. *New York Times*, February 15, 16, 1937; H. N. Howard, "Les nouvelles perspectives dans les Balkans," *L'Esprit international*, II (August, 1937), 486-505.

⁴⁷ The treaty with Italy together with the proposed Concordat with the Vatican aroused such a political storm in Yugoslavia that the Stoyadinovich cabinet was almost overthrown. L. Markovitch, "L'orientation nouvelle de la Yugoslavie," *L'Esprit international*, II (July, 1937), 291-315; *Survey of International Affairs*, 1937, 479-485.

⁴⁸ *New York Times*, March 29, 1937.

Belgrade Conference of the Little Entente in April 1937. Stoyadinovich was sharply criticized for concluding the pact without previous consultation and more generally for starting a system of bilateral accords which were contrary to the spirit of the two Ententes. The specific fears and grievances of the individual states were apparent. Czechoslovakia was discouraged by the obvious rebuff to France and the desertion from the *status-quo* front. Roumania was fearful of an Italian-Hungarian-Yugoslav alignment that might be achieved at her expense, and the result of the treaty was to incline her even more towards Germany. For Greece and Turkey the pact was less disturbing. Greece welcomed the promise of peace in the Adriatic while Turkey hoped that it might increase the chances of Italian adherence to the Montreux convention.⁴⁹ In the end the Italo-Yugoslav treaty was approved by both Ententes, but with a general feeling that it marked the end of any hope for a coordinated foreign policy on the part of the Balkan states.

The significance of this treaty lies in the fact that it was symptomatic of a general European trend away from collective treaties toward bilateral pacts. This was welcomed in some quarters as a means of removing centers of tension. In the clearer light of retrospect, however, this treaty, together with the other developments in the Balkans since 1936, represented the beginning of the break-up of the Balkan and Little Ententes. In the face of the rising storm the allies were already cutting the ties between them and seeking refuge in a policy of *sauf qui peut*.⁵⁰

During the next two years the Austro-German *Anschluss* and the partition and occupation of Czechoslovakia smashed the one entente and seriously undermined the other. The Axis Powers now represented an immediate threat to the Balkan states. Economically, southeastern Europe was more than ever dependent upon greater Germany with her recently acquired Austrian and Czechoslovak industries. More alarming was the new strategic situation. Germany now bordered on the Balkan Peninsula, and Yugoslavia was particularly endangered, being largely surrounded by the Axis Powers and their satellites. Moreover, Hitler's "peaceful" method of conquest by propaganda, internal disruption and ultimatum was especially threatening for Roumania and Yugoslavia with their large German and

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, March 29, 1937; April 3, 1937.

⁵⁰ N. Mirkovich, "Yugoslavia's Choice," *Foreign Affairs*, XX (October, 1941), 133-135; G. Lubenoff, "La situation internationale dans les Balkans," *L'Esprit international*, XII (1938), 417-419; "Italy, Yugoslavia and the Danube Basin," *Bulletin of International News*, XIII (April 17, 1937), 3-10; "The Italo-Yugoslav Treaty," *Current History*, XLVI (June, 1937), 110.

other minorities.⁵¹ Nor could outside aid be counted on any longer as the Munich agreement was taken to mean, both by Germany and by the Balkan states, that Britain and France had renounced their interests in central and east European affairs.⁵²

The Entente members at this time were not only faced with the overwhelming might of the ever-expanding and apparently insatiable Axis partners, but also with a marked revival of Bulgarian and Hungarian claims for revision. The resounding victories of the Axis from 1936 to 1938 had raised the hopes of the small revisionist states. Hungary's appetite was whetted by the seizure of the Carpatho-Ukraine in September, 1938, and Bulgaria was inspired to seek similar gains in Macedonia and Dobrudja. The states of the Balkan Entente were thus faced with the possibility of a combined attack by Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary. With this terrifying prospect in mind, the Entente attempted to come to terms with Bulgaria. On July 31, 1938 the President of the Entente Council signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with the Bulgarian foreign minister at Salonica, by which the allies recognized Bulgaria's right to rearm and agreed that the clauses of the Convention of Lausanne providing for the demilitarization of the frontiers between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey should lapse. In return Bulgaria agreed not to attempt to change her existing frontiers by force and to submit all disputes with her neighbors to arbitration or judicial settlement.⁵³ Significantly enough, the agreement said nothing about respect for the territorial *status quo* or about Bulgarian membership in the Entente.⁵⁴

The news of the Munich agreement brought increased efforts to stem the tide of revisionism. The Balkan Entente delegates met together in an unprecedented ten day conference in November to consider the situation created by the collapse of the Little Entente and to discuss the possibilities of new defense. The prospects were anything

⁵¹ G. F. Eliot, "The Military Consequences of Munich," *Foreign Policy Reports*, XIV (December 15, 1938), 222-228; E. Jackh, "The German Drive in the Balkans," *International Affairs*, XVIII (November-December, 1939), 763-783.

⁵² E. J. Knapton, "The Duel for Central Europe: Some Aspects of French Diplomacy, 1938-1939," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, II (April, 1942), 1-19.

⁵³ *Bulletin of International News*, XV (August, 1938), 12; *New York Times*, August 1, 1938.

⁵⁴ For the reception of the pact at the time, see F. Codresco, "La VII^{ème} reunion du conseil permanent de l'entente balkanique à Bucarest," *Affaires danubiennes*, III (March, 1939), 69-73; S. G. Stoyanoff, "Les intérêts permanents de la Bulgarie," *L'Esprit international*, XIII (May, 1939), 407, 408; *New York Times*, August 2, 1938. Similarly the Little Entente sought to placate Hungary. At the Bled Conference in August 1938, an agreement was signed recognizing Hungary's demand for equality of armaments and providing for pacific settlement of disputes. In the next month, however, Hungary violated the pact by occupying the Carpatho-Ukraine on the occasion of the German attack on Czechoslovakia. *Bulletin of International News*, XV (September, 1938), 762.

but promising, for the Munich successes had increased revisionist agitation in Bulgaria to the point where it threatened the overthrow of the pro-Entente premier, M. Kiossievannoff.⁵⁵ Moreover Hungarian threats against the rump of Czechoslovakia were mingled with ominous remarks about Transylvania. The meeting failed to accomplish anything concrete. There were wild rumours of territorial concessions to induce Bulgaria to join the Entente, but nothing was confirmed.⁵⁶

Three months later the Council met again in Bucharest and the discussion was resumed. As an initial move to appease the Axis, *de jure* recognition of General Franco was approved by the Council, which then proceeded to consider more immediate questions. The first important decision to be reached was the announcement, made early in the conference, that Hungarian claims could not be considered because they did not affect all members of the Entente. By this terse statement, Greece and Turkey let it be known that they would not involve themselves in the Central European problems which did not concern them nor would they undertake any obligation to assist Roumania or Yugoslavia against Hungarian aggression.⁵⁷ The Balkan Entente, therefore, was not to be expanded. The Bulgarian question was also left unsolved, for the Entente merely expressed once more their hope that Bulgaria would join their ranks. They admitted that some further adjustments would have to be made beyond arms equality, and yet at the same time they announced once more their opposition to all territorial revision. With a final declaration of solidarity, but without renewing the Pact which automatically expired the next year, the conference disbanded.⁵⁸

The failure of the Balkan Entente to make any headway with the Bulgarian problem in spite of their realization that something must be done is understandable. King Carol, for example, contended that the cession of Dobrudja to Bulgaria would only encourage her to make further claims, as well as lay Roumania open to similar demands from Russia and Hungary. The truth of the matter, however, is that the all important issue was no longer Bulgaria but rather the struggle between the Great Powers which was rapidly involving the whole continent. It is conceivable, although improbable, that a genuine Balkan agreement of the type envisaged by the Balkan Conference, including all the Balkan states and based on the principle of the Balkans for the Balkan peoples, might have succeeded in keeping the peninsula out of the maelstrom. Certainly this could not be accomplished by the Balkan Entente, constituted as it was in 1939. Thus

⁵⁵ *New York Times*, November 29, 1938.

⁵⁶ E. Boyle, "Bulgaria, 1939," *Contemporary Review*, CLIX (April, 1939), 413, 414.

⁵⁷ *New York Times*, February 22, 1939.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, February 21, 1939.

in the last few months before the outbreak of the war the decisive factor was the battle for influence in the Balkans waged by Germany on the one hand and Britain and France on the other.

First Germany followed up the occupation of Czechoslovakia on March 15 by forcing Roumania on March 23 to sign a commercial accord whereby Roumanian grain and oil were to be exchanged for German arms and machinery, and Roumanian oil and mineral resources and transportation systems were to be developed by German capital.⁵⁹ Six days later France countered with an agreement to double her purchases of Roumanian oil and the next month the British granted a large loan. A similar economic tussle occurred in Yugoslavia and Turkey.⁶⁰ Next Italy on April 7 suddenly attacked Albania, occupied the country in a few days, and thereby gained a jumping-off place for further expansion.⁶¹ Britain and France retaliated on April 13 with unilateral guarantees of the independence of Roumania and Greece.⁶² On May 12 a Joint Declaration was issued in London and Angora that, pending the conclusion of a definite and permanent agreement, the British and Turkish governments, in case of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area, would aid each other to the utmost of their power. A similar Franco-Turkish declaration was issued on June 24. These temporary agreements were replaced by a fifteen year mutual-aid pact signed by Britain, France and Turkey on October 19.⁶³

With the outbreak of the war Turkey was the only country bound to the Allied cause. The other Balkan countries assumed varying attitudes depending on particular conditions. King Carol, who had established a dictatorship the year before, sought a position of neutrality between Germany and Great Britain. Accordingly he did not hesitate to desert Poland when that country seemed destined to be the next Nazi victim, and he hoped that by shrewd bargaining, he could use his valuable oil wells as a means to ward off a German sanctioned attack by Bulgaria or Hungary. The position of Yugoslavia was even more dangerous. Excluded from the British guarantees and cut off from outside aid by an almost complete ring of enemies, she was forced to play the only role left to her, namely strict neutrality and

⁵⁹ Details in *Bulletin of International News*, XVI (April 6, 1939), 308-311.

⁶⁰ *Great Britain and the East*, LII (January-June, 1939), *passim*.

⁶¹ An enlightening picture of the invasion of Albania and the repercussions in the Balkans is given in *Greek White Book 1940. Diplomatic Documents. Italy's Aggression against Greece* (Athens, Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1940), nos. 2-30.

⁶² *Ibid.*, nos. 31-33.

⁶³ As the first definite commitment made by any member of the Balkan Entente, the Turkish treaty was denounced both by the Axis and by Yugoslavia. The latter charged violation of the consultative clause of the Balkan Pact, and declared that Turkey's action had destroyed the neutrality and therefore the very existence of the Entente. *Ibid.*, nos. 41, 45; *Bulletin of International News*, XIV (May, 1939), 589.

cooperation with Italy in the creation of a neutral bloc. To conclude the Entente picture, the policy of Greece was a cautious mixture of friendliness towards Great Britain and the preservation of good relations with Italy.⁶⁴

Such was the sad position of the Balkan Entente in September, 1939. For almost a year after the beginning of the war the Entente was able to continue to function and to prevent the extension of hostilities to the Peninsula. Probably it would be more accurate to state that during that period none of the belligerents was ready to extend the front to include the Balkans. This was particularly true of Italy who announced her non-belligerency at the outbreak of the war and who was anxious to prevent hostilities from occurring in the Mediterranean. The Italian government, after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet treaty, was afraid of Russian penetration in the Balkans,⁶⁵ and suggested, therefore, an agreement for mutual defense among Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Roumania, with the possible inclusion of Bulgaria.⁶⁶ With this favorable diplomatic situation the Balkan countries were able to conclude a series of agreements by which troops were withdrawn from the Greek-Italian, Turkish-Bulgarian, and Hungarian-Roumanian-Yugoslavian frontiers.⁶⁷ The Italian plan for a peace bloc appears to have collapsed in December. With the outbreak of the Russo-Finnish War, the Soviet danger seemed less menacing, and Hungarian demands on Roumania could no longer be held in check. Another difficulty was that no means had been found to overcome the Yugoslav objections to the passage of Italian troops through her territory to protect Roumania.⁶⁸

In addition to this Italian effort, there were several other plans current for the creation of a neutral bloc. During October and Novem-

⁶⁴ *Greek White Book*, nos. 50, 55.

⁶⁵ The Greek Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs reported the following conversation with the Italian minister in Athens on October 10, 1939: "... the Italian minister said to me in strictest confidence that the Italian government had decided to make public at an early date ... their intention of remaining strictly neutral. Thus he added, if the Balkan states also maintained a similar attitude, we should avoid the disasters of war. Signor Grazzi gave me to understand that the Italian government had been led to the above decision in consequence of Russia's latest intervention and of her expansion in Eastern Europe. He said that the hard struggle which Italy had undertaken against Communism in Spain was still fresh. Much Italian blood had been shed then, so that Italy could not see with an indifferent eye the interference of Bolshevik Russia in European affairs. From the entire conversation it was evident that the Italians feared Russian intervention as a potential menace to their own regime and in view of the danger of Slav expansion." *Greek White Book*, no. 53. See also V. M. Dean, "Stalin in Europe," *Current History*, LI (November, 1939), 16.

⁶⁶ *Great Britain and the East*, January 11, 1940, 19; *New York Times*, October 24, 1939.

⁶⁷ *Bulletin of International News*, October 7, 1939, 1083; October 21, 1939, 1156; January 27, 1940, 97, 131; *Great Britain and the East*, October 12, 1939, 322.

⁶⁸ *New York Times*, November 25, 1939; January 11, 1940.

ber, Turkish diplomacy was active in attempting to draw a group together under the auspices of the Allies. Working sometimes with but for the most part counter to the Italians, the Turks wished apparently to include Greece, Bulgaria, and Roumania, and strenuous efforts were made to find a basis of agreement between the two latter countries. The stubbornness of King Carol, who had the argument of an Anglo-French guarantee of Roumania's territorial integrity, together with German opposition, wrecked this plan before the end of the year.⁶⁹ It was also rumored among British circles that in November, 1939, King Carol proposed the transformation of the Balkan Entente into a defensive military alliance to resist all aggression, but the plan was promptly rejected by the other members as far too dangerous.⁷⁰

Shortly after the failure of these last efforts to create a neutral bloc, a meeting of the Balkan Entente was held at Belgrade on February 2-4, 1940. The balance of forces in the Balkans was now clearly revealed. The points agreed upon show that the aim of the allies was to insure peace as far as possible and at the same time to preserve the territorial *status quo* until a general settlement of European questions could be considered. The Yugoslav representative, Cincar-Markovich, put it as follows:

Since the outbreak of the present conflict the governments of the Entente have openly expressed a desire to remain neutral, but on the sole, unique condition that the development of events should not affect their integrity or independence.

Shukru Saraçoglu, who had seen the Bulgarian foreign minister just before the conference, added that, "Bulgaria . . . will work with us on parallel lines for maintenance of peace." It is believed that Saraçoglu further informed his colleagues that Bulgaria had agreed not to press her claims on Southern Dobrudja while the war lasted. Appreciation was also expressed at the conference for Italy's policy of non-belligerency, "... which stands like a beacon before our own aspirations for peace, order, and security."

On the surface, at least, the situation seemed highly satisfactory for the Entente Powers. They had no illusions, however, regarding the future. It was recognized, if not publicly admitted, that the preservation of Balkan neutrality thus far was due to a happy and accidental combination of circumstances, and that the adoption by the Entente of any independent policy was out of the question. Accordingly it was tacitly agreed that it was up to the various members to look individually to the Great Powers to keep them out of the Euro-

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, October 29, 1939; November 4, 1939.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, February 3, 1940.

pean war. Thus the member nations adopted varying policies in their search for shelter from war. Greece and Turkey tightened still more the bonds between them and leaned towards Britain and France; Yugoslavia sought closer cooperation with Hungary and Bulgaria under Italy's leadership; while Roumania drifted towards Germany in the hope of obtaining a Nazi guarantee which might curb Hungarian and Russian aspirations. Thus although the Entente at this conference had been extended for another seven years, in practice, under the pressure of the centrifugal forces of the warring Powers, it had already ceased to be an effective and independent bloc.⁷¹

This was soon demonstrated when the fall of France, the entry of Italy into the war, and the annexationist policy of the Soviet Union plunged the Balkan countries, one by one, into the European conflict. The Balkan Entente now experienced a fate similar to that of the Little Entente. When Czechoslovakia was pressed by Germany, she was left unsupported by her allies. So now with Roumania. On June 26 the Roumanian government was faced with a Soviet ultimatum for the cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The terms of the Balkan Pact precluded assistance from the other Balkan states. Appeal to Germany brought no response and the provinces were accordingly surrendered.

The success of the Soviet Union incited Bulgaria and Hungary to press their claims. The Bulgarian demand for Southern Dobrudja was apparently supported by the Soviet Government, and on August 30 an agreement was reached by which this area up to the former 1912 border was ceded. In the meantime little headway had been made with Hungary. The latter claimed a large slice of Transylvania and rejected the Roumanian counter-proposal for an exchange of populations. The deadlock was broken by the award given by the Axis Powers at Vienna on August 30 by which Roumania was compelled to surrender to Hungary an area of about sixteen thousand square miles with the population of 967,000 Magyars and 1,154,000 Roumanians.

This partitioning of Roumania not only reduced that country almost to its pre-war size, but also, for all practical purposes, put an end to the Balkan Entente. During conversations held in July at Salzburg between Roumanian and German representatives, one of

⁷¹ A summary of the proceedings of the conference is given in *New York Times*, February 3, 4, 1940; and in *Bulletin of International News*, February 10, 1940, 172, 206, 207. Interpretations of the work of the conference are given in R. Pinon, "La conférence de Belgrade," *Revue des deux mondes*, LV (February 15, 1940), 763-766; Pertinax, "La conférence de l'entente balkanique," *L'Europe nouvelle*, XXIII (February 3, 1940), 115, 116; "Conference of the Balkan Entente," *Nation*, CL (February 10, 1940), 147.

the questions raised had been the dissolution of the Balkan Entente in order "to eliminate British influence" in the Balkans and to isolate Turkey. At the time this proposal was supported by most of the Roumanian press. When the Vienna award was issued it was accompanied by an exchange of notes between Italy and Germany agreeing to guarantee the integrity of Roumanian territory, and this guarantee was accepted by the Roumanian government. Against whom this guarantee was directed was made clear when on September 6 General Antonescu defined Roumanian policy as follows:

Roumania, on her own initiative, has entered the political sphere of Germany and Italy. Consequently it is not permissible to attack the Axis Powers in any way. With regard to the Western Powers an attitude of reserve must be maintained, with the limits of objective information.

This entry of Roumania into the "political sphere" of the Axis Powers proved to be but the prelude to actual absorption. German troops began to arrive in strength on October 14 by air, by the Danube, and by railway through Hungary. The Roumanian authorities explained that the state of their army was such that a thorough overhauling by a foreign military power was essential, and that Germany had undertaken the task. With this avowal the independence of Roumania may be said to have ended.⁷²

At the same time the Balkan Entente ceased to exist. The remaining members were interested only in self-preservation, for the Balkan Peninsula was now one of the theatres of war. No sooner had the German troops occupied Roumania than Italy attacked Greece. On October 28 General Metaxas was handed an ultimatum by the Italian minister demanding the right to occupy for the duration of the war an unspecified "number of strategic points in Greek territory." The ultimatum was rejected and the long Greco-Italian war began.⁷³ Contrary to general expectations the Italians were checked after their initial advance, and gradually were pushed back into Albania. In the meantime Turkey had adopted a policy of non-belligerence while Yugoslavia and Bulgaria remained neutral. Hitherto the German armies had remained on the left bank of the Danube

⁷² P. E. Mosely, "Is Bessarabia Next?" *Foreign Affairs*, XVIII (April, 1940), 557-562; P. E. Mosely, "Transylvania Partitioned," *Foreign Affairs*, XIX (October, 1940), 237-244; R. W. Seton-Watson, *Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers* (London, 1934), 41ff.; Transylvanus, "Ordeal in Transylvania," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, I (April, 1941), 18-27; "The Dismemberment of Rumania," *Bulletin of International News*, XVII (September 7, 1940), 1145-1148; C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors, 1919-1937* (Oxford, 1937), 251-255; "End of the Balkan Entente," *Great Britain and the East*, LV (August 1, 1940), 85.

⁷³ For the long series of provocations and negotiations culminating in the ultimatum, see *Greek White Book, 1940*, no. 77ff.

apparently because of the uncertainty of Moscow's reactions to a further advance in southeastern Europe and of the danger of bringing Turkey into the conflict if her control of the Straits were menaced. These considerations, after the Italian disasters in Albania, were outweighed by the necessity of reaching Greece to prevent unchallenged Allied control in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus German troops were massed on the Roumanian side of the Danube, and demands were made upon the Bulgarian government to permit the entry of the German forces into the country. Despite repeated British warnings and a Soviet offer of a pact of mutual military assistance, the Bulgarian government agreed to the German demands. During the first week of February 1941 the first troops began to arrive, and in a few weeks the occupation was completed. The British foreign minister, Anthony Eden, attempted to counter this move by proposing the formation of a Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav bloc, but his efforts failed because of Yugoslav and Turkish reluctance.⁷⁴

The way was now cleared for the advance to the Aegean. First pressure was brought to bear on Yugoslavia to adhere to the Tri-Power Pact of September 27, 1940. This was refused by the Cvetkovich government, which offered instead to sign a pact of non-aggression and mutual friendship. In reply Germany demanded a number of concessions, including the demobilization of the Yugoslav army and the right of transit through Yugoslavia of German munition, hospital and troop trains. Finally, in response to a German ultimatum, Cvetkovich left for Vienna where on March 25 he signed an agreement, the published text of which provided simply for Yugoslav participation in the Tri-Power Pact. Two "letters of guarantee" were added to the protocol, addressed to Cvetkovich and signed by von Ribbentrop. In them the German Government promised to respect the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and not to require the passage of German troops. Despite these assurances, the Yugoslav public, always strongly anti-German, reacted violently against the pact. So profound and general was the reaction that it was a veritable revolution. Under these circumstances the Regency and government were overthrown by a military coup on March 27 and Peter was proclaimed King. The new coalition government under General Dushan Simovich announced that it was ready to do every-

⁷⁴ "Why Bulgaria Went Over?" *New Statesman and Nation*, XXI (March 8, 1941), 231, 232; "The German Threat to Bulgaria," *Bulletin of International News*, XVIII (February 22, 1941), 191-197; "Bulgaria, Turkey and the U.S.S.R.," *American Review on the Soviet Union*, III (February, 1941), 3-32; H. N. Howard, "Turkey's Foreign Policy and Hitler's War," *New Europe*, I (August, 1941), 221-224. An interesting account of the Soviet offer of a pact of mutual assistance and of the reaction within Bulgaria is given in M. Padev, *Escape from the Balkans* (New York, 1943), ch. XII.

thing possible to maintain peace, that it would respect all outstanding "public and open" engagements, but that it was also determined to take a firm stand if the country's independence and territorial integrity was threatened. This, of course, was insufficient, as Germany sought primarily the demobilization of the Yugoslav army and transit rights for German troops. Thus on the morning of April 6 the Nazi divisions invaded both Yugoslavia and Greece. In the case of the latter country the reason given for the attack was the presence of British troops on Greek territory.

Yugoslav resistance was surprisingly weak. Inadequate preparations, sabotage in the rear by Croat terrorists and Macedonian bands, and the rapidity of the Nazi attack spelled the doom of Yugoslavia. On April 17, twelve days after the beginning of the campaign, the German high command announced the end of all organized Yugoslav resistance. The collapse of the southern Yugoslav army exposed the left flank of the Anglo-Greek forces in Macedonia and forced them to retreat. Stands were made at Mt. Olympus and at Thermopylae, but overwhelming superiority in tanks, planes and artillery enabled the Nazis to force their way to Attica. On April 23 German motorcycle troops entered Athens.⁷⁵

Such was the history of the Balkan federation movement between the two World Wars. It began in 1918 as a great, revolutionary, mass movement. Peasants and workers, desperate and disillusioned after seven years of almost continuous warfare, sought to obtain economic security by drastic internal social reform, and to put a final end to the threat of war by uniting as closely as possible the peoples of the Balkans. For a time it seemed that the strong Communist Parties or the even more powerful Agrarian Parties of Radich and Stamboliiski might succeed in carrying through this revolutionary program in at least a part of the Peninsula. But severe and unrelenting persecution coupled with the assassination of the peasant and proletarian leaders checked this radical movement and led to the establishment of authoritarian regimes of various types. During the nineteen thirties another attempt was made to bring the Balkan states together. In place of force and mass action, it was hoped that the same end could be attained by means of educational campaigns to influence public opinion, and of Balkan Conferences to discuss the outstanding issues and to make definite proposals to the governments. The results were by no means negligible. The Conferences gained widespread publicity and considerable popular support, and some progress was made in furthering social, economic and cultural cooperation between the

⁷⁵ Mirkovich, "Yugoslavia's Choice," *Foreign Affairs*, XX (October, 1941), 132-146; F. W. L. Kovacs, *The Untamed Balkans* (New York, 1941), 3-27.

states. But the Balkan Pact of 1934 fell far short of the Conference recommendations, particularly in that it was concerned primarily with the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* and, in effect, was directed against Bulgaria. Thus the Balkan Entente was essentially an anti-revisionist bloc, and during the next several years it experienced the same fate as the other European blocs of that nature.

It cannot be concluded from this, however, that the Balkan peoples are peculiarly incapable of living peacefully side by side. Balkan politics traditionally have been intimately dependant upon and affected by general European politics. Franco-Italian diplomatic rivalry affected inter-Balkan relations in the immediate post-war period as Hapsburg-Romanoff rivalry had in the pre-war. Similarly Anglo-French appeasement policies in the nineteen thirties virtually determined the fate of the Balkan Entente as is evidenced by the fact that the decisive problem which the Entente had to meet in the last few years of its existence was not Bulgarian but rather Italo-German revisionism. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that no fundamental distinction can be made between Balkan and European politics. Thus to inquire why the third Balkan alliance system disintegrated is to ask why the League of Nations proved ineffectual and why the second World War broke out.

CHAPTER X

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

One of the pitfalls which besets the path of the historian who has studied a given movement at length is the natural and understandable tendency to exaggerate its importance. As the mass of data accumulates, it becomes increasingly difficult to retain a proper perspective. This is especially true of the Balkan federation movement because it is very much alive today and because federation in general and Balkan federation in particular are considered worth striving for and highly desirable. Consequently there arises the danger of assuming that the various proposals of the past for more Balkan cooperation necessarily reflected a widespread contemporary enthusiasm for federation. Most of the current studies of the prospects for Balkan federation begin with a few references to Prince Michael and to the Balkan League of 1912 as proof of the long and honorable history of the federation movement. A dispassionate appraisal of the subject, however, does not lead to such an optimistic conclusion.

The general effect of Great Power diplomacy for over a century has been to keep the Balkan states apart rather than to draw them together. Occasionally a Great Power statesman did strive to create a Balkan bloc but the motive in such cases was purely one of meeting his country's diplomatic needs at the given moment. This was true of Russia's sponsorship of the Balkan alliance systems of the eighteen sixties and of 1912. In the early nineteenth century numerous proposals were made by the Great Powers for the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of a number of federated states in the place of European Turkey, but again the primary aim was not the solution of the Balkan problem. For example, Catherine's grandiose plans at the end of the eighteenth century were designed to set up a Russian-dominated Greek Empire in the Balkans, while d'Hauterive's scheme in 1808 aimed at French hegemony in the Near East at the expense of Russia. Similar motives are apparent in the proposals of Polignac, of Hardenburg, of Talleyrand, and the rest.

When the Balkan states gained their autonomy or their independence, their attitude to federation was fundamentally the same. Balkan statesmen occasionally showed some interest in cooperating with their neighbors and even talked of federation, but only for so long as it suited the interests of their particular country. During the eighteen forties and fifties, Roumanian and Hungarian leaders drew up any number of projects for Danubian federation, but these were forgotten as soon as their nationalist aspirations were, for the moment

at least, satisfied by the unification of Moldavia and Wallachia and by the *Ausgleich* of 1867.¹ The primary aim of Prince Michael and of Garashanin was not federation but the establishment of Serbian hegemony in the Balkans, and their alliance system of the eighteen sixties was merely a means to that end. Similarly in 1912, Pashich and Venizelos and King Ferdinand banded together to form the Balkan League, but each was interested above all else in acquiring as large a portion of European Turkey as possible. When their alliances proved an obstacle in the way of that goal, they were automatically broken and the second Balkan War was the result.

It may be concluded, therefore, that in the period prior to 1914, none of the Balkan or Great Power statesmen was interested in federation *per se*. None was convinced that federation in itself might be in accord with the long range interests of the Balkan states, collectively or individually. Certainly they were not convinced of this to the point of adopting it as the basis of their foreign policy. Rather federation was for them a slogan to be adopted when it served as a means to some other end—usually national independence or expansion—and to be discarded when it no longer fulfilled that purpose. The few exceptions to this generalization are to be found in the cases of those Balkan and foreign revolutionaries who were devoted primarily to their revolutionary principles. Outstanding amongst these were Garibaldi, Mazzini, Markovich, Botev, Karavelov, and Rhigas. Their significance, however, can easily be overemphasized. Conditions in the Balkans were such in the pre-1914 period that these revolutionaries exerted no lasting influence as is illustrated by the ineffectiveness, from the immediate point of view, of their proposals and careers.

The policies of the Balkan rulers and statesmen in the post-war years remained fundamentally the same. The Balkan Pact developed into a purely anti-Bulgarian instrument. It was specifically agreed that the signatories were to aid each other only in the case of Balkan contingencies. Inevitably, then, the Entente fell to pieces as soon as the Axis Powers intervened actively in Balkan affairs. During these years, however, a real federation movement with considerable mass following developed under the leadership of two groups, the radical agrarian, socialist and communist parties, and the liberal, middle class intellectual elements.

For the former, like the nineteenth century revolutionaries, federation was an integral and fundamental part of their programs and philosophies, and essential for the fulfillment of their social aspirations. Accordingly they consistently advocated and actively worked for Balkan federation, albeit each group had a different type of fed-

¹ It is true that Kossuth later urged federation, but only after his earlier intolerant nationalism had led to disaster.

eration in mind. With the suppression of these radical parties during the nineteen twenties, individuals and organizations with liberal tendencies assumed the leadership of the federation movement. For this group also, federation was something essential—a prerequisite for the maintenance of peace amongst the Balkan peoples. Federation was the expressed goal of the conferences which they organized and federation they preached in their educational campaigns in the various Balkan countries. Their hope was to arouse public opinion sufficiently to induce the Balkan governments to settle their differences, to establish closer relations, and eventually to unite within a federal framework. The collapse of the League of Nations and of the general European system of collective security automatically put an end to these hopes. By April, 1941, Hitler's "New Order" was the lot of the Balkan peoples, rather than a peaceful, voluntary federation.

Axis domination of the Balkan peninsula has not put an end to the federation movement but rather has precipitated a new phase. In this latest phase it is necessary to distinguish between two distinct aspects of the movement, the one consisting of numerous agreements and plans formulated abroad,² mostly in Britain and the United States, and the other being the still embryonic but potentially highly significant federation trends in the popular resistance movements within the peninsula.

Considering first the plans proposed abroad, it should be noted that a number of official agreements for post-war collaboration have been concluded amongst the governments-in-exile representing various European countries.³ On November 11, 1940, a Polish-Czechoslovak agreement was made public, in which the signatories expressed their conviction that the "German tyranny" will be finally overthrown, and added that:

... the two Governments consider it imperative to declare solemnly even now that Poland and Czechoslovakia, closing once and for all the period of past recriminations and disputes and taking into consideration the community of their fundamental interests, are determined on the conclusion of this war to enter, as independent and sovereign States, into closer political and economic association, which would become the basis of a new order in Central Europe and a guarantee of its stability. Moreover, both Governments express the hope that in this cooperation, based on the respect for the Freedom of Nations, the Principles of Democracy, and the Dignity of Man, they will also be joined by other countries in that part of the European Continent.⁴

² These proposals almost invariably concern the whole of Eastern Europe rather than the Balkan Peninsula alone. It has been necessary, therefore, to deal with the current Balkan federation movement as an integral and inseparable part of the general East European situation.

³ H. Bonnet, *The United Nations on the Way* (Chicago, 1942), 14 ff.; V. M. Dean, "European Agreements for Post-War Reconstruction," *Foreign Policy Reports*, XVIII (May 15, 1942), 1-12.

⁴ Text in appendix J.

A step in the direction of this proposed "closer political and economic association" was taken when the Greek, Yugoslav, Polish and Czechoslovak delegates issued on November 4, 1941 a joint declaration at the conference of the International Labor Organization. The declaration was vaguely worded. It affirmed their "profound devotion to the democratic principle" and their concern for the social and economic standards of the masses of the peasant population. "It is in this spirit . . . of frank and friendly collaboration that we conceive the part to be played by our countries in the reconstruction of a new Europe, enjoying a stable peace with freedom and prosperity."⁵ The speeches delivered at the signing of this declaration were stronger and more definite. In the words of the Yugoslav delegate, Sava N. Kosanovich,

Our states of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, as soon as they regain their freedom, having similar social structures, mentalities, and enemies, will undoubtedly tend to merge into a community of harmony. Other peoples of Eastern Europe, as soon as they free themselves from their Fascist rulers, will be called to join that community. In the Declaration of Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, and Yugoslavia, signed at the Conference of the International Labor Organization, we tried to give expression to these desires for the first time.⁶

In accordance with these aims, the four delegations established on January 7, 1942, the Central and Eastern European Planning Board. This is organized in four national groups, Czechoslovak, Greek, Polish, and Yugoslav. Each group is headed by its own steering committee, and the whole Board by a general steering committee. The purpose of the Board is to carry on research work concerning all problems of reconstruction in the Central and East European region. In May, 1942, it began the publication of the monthly leaflet, *Survey of Central and Eastern Europe*, which presents data on the internal developments of the above mentioned four countries. The Board also has published a number of *Documents and Reports* consisting of the minutes of the Board meetings and of reports on research.⁷

The most detailed and imposing official undertaking is the Greek-Yugoslav Agreement of January 15, 1942. This is based on the principle of "The Balkans for the Balkan Peoples," and provides for the creation of a post-war Balkan Union. The machinery of the Union is to consist of a Political Organ, an Economic and Financial Organ

⁵ Text in *New Europe*, II (December, 1941), 10, 11.

⁶ S. N. Kosanovich, "Common Aspirations of the Nations of Eastern Europe," *New Europe*, II (December, 1941), 6, 7.

⁷ The titles of the first three issues of the *Documents and Reports* are: no. 1, Minutes of the Inaugurative Meeting of Joint Economic Committees of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board, May 28, 1942; no. 2, Plan of Research for Post-War Reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe, Prepared by the Polish National Study Group; no. 3, Research on Industrial Post-War Economy of the System AB, by Professor Stephen de Ropp. The headquarters of the Planning Board are at 26 East 62 Street, New York City.

and a Permanent Military Organ, all of which are to be assisted by a Permanent Bureau. In addition, the presidents of the Councils of Ministers of the member-states will meet when necessary to discuss questions of general interest to the Union, and the governments of the Union will facilitate regular meetings between parliamentary delegations of the various states. The duties of the Political Organ are to coordinate the foreign policies of the member-states; to prepare projects for agreements of conciliation and arbitration between them; and to coordinate efforts for effecting a "rapprochement of public opinion" among member-states. The purpose of the Economic and Financial Organ is to coordinate customs tariffs and foreign trade policies with a view to the conclusion of a customs union; to elaborate a common economic plan and a Balkan monetary union; and to improve inter-Balkan communications of all types. The Military Organ is to prepare a common plan for the defence of the "European frontiers" of the member-states and to coordinate in general their military establishments. Finally the "high contracting parties declare that this agreement presents the general foundations for the organization of a Balkan Union . . . and they envisage with satisfaction the future adherence to this agreement of other Balkan states ruled by governments freely and legally constituted."⁸

In the meantime the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia had been conducting negotiations with a view to supplementing their initial declaration of November 11, 1940, and an agreement was signed on January 24, 1942, regarding the principles of the projected confederation. This agreement is basically similar to that signed by the Greek and Yugoslav governments. Both agreements envisage only a confederation, that is a permanent and close association between two sovereign and independent states rather than a federal state with a common executive power and common assemblies and ministries. The character and organization of the organs of the proposed Polish-Czechoslovak confederation are not so specifically defined, but their tasks are similar, namely the coordination of political, economic, and military policies. Article twelve of the Czechoslovak-Polish Agreement is worth noting as it enumerates the various freedoms and rights to be guaranteed to the citizens of each confederated state by their respective constitutions. These rights are, "freedom of conscience, personal freedom, freedom of learning, freedom of the spoken and written word, freedom of organization and association, equality of all citizens before the law, free admission of all citizens to the performance of all state functions, the independence of the courts of law, and the control of government by the representative national bodies by means of free elections." This is one of the strongest and most important features of the agreement as it estab-

⁸ Text in appendix L.

lishes an indispensable requirement of unity in thought and outlook within the proposed collective organization.⁹

It should be noted, finally, that the signatories of these two agreements foresee close cooperation in the post-war period between the Balkan and Central European confederations. At the time that the Polish and Czechoslovak governments signed their agreement, they expressed their satisfaction with the conclusion of the Greek-Yugoslav pact by the adoption of the following resolution:

The governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia . . . convinced that the confederation of states in Central Europe will be called upon to collaborate with the Balkan union envisaged by the governments of Greece and Yugoslavia, confident that only cooperation of these two regional organizations can assure the security and develop the prosperity of the vast region stretching between the Baltic and Aegean Seas, warmly congratulate the governments of Greece and Yugoslavia on their initiation of a Balkan union by their agreement concluded on January 15, 1942, inspired by the same sentiment of fraternity which animates the relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia.¹⁰

In addition to these official engagements, a surprisingly large number of proposals for a Balkan and general East European federation have been made by various individuals and political leaders of the countries concerned. Representatives of every nationality and of every shade of political opinion have contributed to this veritable flood of books, articles and speeches. In fact it appears that the principle of federalism enjoys at present that vogue possessed at one time by the parliamentary constitutionalism of England and at another by the revolutionary republicanism of France. This is quite understandable. The war-ravaged peoples of Europe are today, more than at any other time, expecting, and even demanding, a peace settlement which will hold out some promise of enduring peace and social security. From all sides federalism is held forth as the means for the fulfillment of these aspirations. Even the Axis propagandists speak vaguely of a post-war continental federation which will be free of what they term the disturbing influence of the British Empire and of Anglo-Saxon domination.

The volume of this mass of plans and suggestions, however, is in itself not very significant. Even a cursory survey of the proposals made reveals that they have little in common apart from the idea of closer collaboration amongst the smaller nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Some of the authors favor a federative union, others a confederative organization while a third group is satisfied with various forms of economic cooperation such as common tariffs and currencies. There are similar differences as to what states should be included in the proposed unions. Some have in mind a great bloc

⁹ Text in appendix K.

¹⁰ *New Europe*, II (February, 1942), 82.

including all the small nations between the Aegean and the Baltic while others favor two or three smaller units, a Northern and a Southern, or a Baltic, a Danubian and a Balkan.¹¹

Another fundamental difference is apparent in the matter of relations with the Soviet Union. A few of the authors obviously are thinking in "Cordon Sanitaire" terms¹² while others insist that any federation, if it is to have any chance of success, must be closely associated with, if not allied to, the Soviet Union.¹³ It is no secret that this issue has seriously affected Polish-Czechoslovak relations, as is apparent when one contrasts the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war collaboration (December 12, 1943) with the severance of Soviet-Polish diplomatic relations. This problem of relations with the Soviet Union is largely responsible for the fact that the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement for post-war confederation is now virtually non-existent.¹⁴ This issue concerns, of course, not only a Central European but also a Balkan federation, as the strong pro-Russian forces in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia would never accept an anti-Soviet Balkan federation.¹⁵

Still another point of conflict amongst the advocates of federation is the volcanic question of the internal regimes of the post-war states.

¹¹ An idea of the number and variety of plans proposed may be gained by examining recent issues of *New Europe*, *Journal of Central European Affairs*, *New World* and similar publications. See also the works listed in H. Aufricht, *War, Peace, and Reconstruction. A Classified Bibliography* (New York, 1943), 22, 24-26.

¹² The Slovak Agrarian leader, Dr. Milan Hodza, has advocated a Central European federation as "a barrier between Nazi ideologists and Russian Bolsheviks." *New York Times*, December 7, 1941.

¹³ President Beneš is in favor of post-war regional federations but insists that, "We must not . . . try to create a confederative bloc of small nations in Central Europe as a barrier between post-war Germany and Russia and hostile to both. Such a conception of the new organization of the smaller European nations would mean preparing for a new European war. . . . Czechoslovakia considers it essential . . . that we should reach a common agreement with the Soviet Union." From address to Council on Foreign Relations in Chicago, May 22, 1943. *News Flashes from Czechoslovakia*, May 31 and June 14, 1943.

¹⁴ The Czechoslovak representative in the United States, Colonel Vladimir S. Hurban, admitted as early as April 12, 1943 that: "Since this declaration [Polish-Czechoslovak declaration of November 11, 1940] was made, several difficulties have arisen; and I must confess, not much progress has been made." *News Flashes from Czechoslovakia*, May 3, 1943.

¹⁵ The Soviet Government with its "Cordon Sanitaire" phobia is extremely suspicious of federation proposals. Its views presumably were expressed in an article in *Izvestia* (November 18, 1943) which included the following passage: "The Soviet Union—and this must be especially emphasized—firmly rejects any attempts to launch a policy of a sanitary cordon regardless of the form in which it may be masked. It must be recognized that several projects for federation that have emanated recently from the West reeked pungently of the long bankrupt anti-Soviet policy." It does not follow, however, that the Soviet Government is opposed to an East European federation for all time and under all circumstances. According to this *Izvestia* article, Molotov explained at the Moscow conference that, in the Soviet view, the emigré governments were too unstable and out of touch with their peoples to undertake far reaching federation commitments, but that after authority and stability definitely had been established, then federation might be discussed in a realistic fashion." *New York Times*, November 19, 1943. A similar view was expressed in a July 1943 issue of the Soviet trade union magazine, *War and the Working Class*. Text in *Information Bulletin*, August 24, 1943. This bulletin is issued three times weekly by the embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Washington, D. C.

Some of the writers insist very properly that if the federation is to be stable, "the internal regimes of the states . . . should be based on the same political and social principles."¹⁶ There is no agreement, however, as to what these principles should be. Whereas many emphasize the need for far reaching political and socio-economic reforms, others evidently prefer a return as far as possible to the pre-1939 *status quo* while a few would go still further back and reconstruct Europe along the lines of the super-national Hapsburg Empire.¹⁷

In conclusion, the practical significance of these numerous unofficial proposals and of the official agreements of the governments-in-exile easily can be exaggerated. The Polish-Czechoslovak agreement already is wrecked over the Soviet issue while the Greek-Yugoslav agreement obviously remains suspended in mid-air so long as the return to power of both of these emigré governments is uncertain.¹⁸ As for the host of unofficial plans, it is difficult to see how they might influence seriously the course of future events in the Balkans. They are of interest as reflecting the currents of thought in certain British, American and emigré circles. Otherwise they are reminiscent strongly of the long list of similar projects which were brought forth during the course of the nineteenth century and which, as has been noted, exercised no appreciable influence on Balkan affairs. It appears, therefore, that the future of the federation movement will be determined more by the forces and movements now developing in the Balkans rather than by books and articles written abroad.

By all odds the outstanding feature of the Balkan situation today is the remarkable strength and tenacity of the underground movements which have been able to wrest control of large areas in Greece and Yugoslavia from the Axis forces. These movements, however, must not be looked upon as merely organizations of resistance against the enemy. To say that the underground forces are fighting exclusively for national independence and that their activities are purely military is to ignore the meaning and significance of the national independence movements in the Balkans and throughout Europe. These movements are also inevitably schools and laboratories of new political thought regarding the future. In short, they are not only

¹⁶ Dr. Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovak Minister of State, in *News Flashes from Czechoslovakia*, January 17, 1944.

¹⁷ Compare for example the following works: Otto of Austria, "Danubian Reconstruction," *Foreign Affairs*, XX (January, 1942), 243-252; V. Kybal, "The Case against Hapsburg Restoration," *New Europe*, II (June, 1942), 204, 205; and the text of the Eastern European Peasant Programme in the *Central European Observer*, XXIX (July 31, 1942), 246.

¹⁸ The National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia has repudiated the Yugoslav government-in-exile and has proclaimed officially that it will reconsider "all international agreements that have been concluded and obligations undertaken by the government-in-exile on behalf of Yugoslavia, with the aim of correcting or approving them." *Inter-Continental News*, December 28, 1943.

nationalist with respect to the invader but also revolutionary with respect to the past.

In this revolutionary sense the situation at present resembles, in quality though not in degree¹⁹ the situation which developed at the end of the first World War. This historical comparison is of the utmost significance. As has been noted, radical labor and agrarian parties rose to prominence in the years following 1918, and their main objectives were drastic social reform at home and close collaboration—even federation—amongst the Balkan nations. Today the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia, the National Liberation Front of Greece and the Fatherland Front of Bulgaria must be considered as essentially a continuation or a revival of that earlier upsurge. As might be expected under the circumstances, these organizations are concerned at present primarily with the struggle against the German occupation forces. The scanty material which is available, however, indicates that their thinking on the post-war problem is along the lines of their predecessors of the twenties, that is, democratic domestic institutions and a Yugoslav—and if possible—a Balkan federation.

The National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia already has adopted officially the following resolutions:

- 1) The peoples of Yugoslavia never have and do not recognize the division of Yugoslavia into parts by the fascist imperialists and have proved in the common armed struggle their firm will to remain united in Yugoslavia.
- 2) In order to carry out the principles of sovereignty for the peoples of Yugoslavia, in order that Yugoslavia be a real home for all its peoples and in order that it should no longer become an arena for any reactionary clique in Yugoslavia, the federative principle will ensure full equality for the peoples of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Hercegovina.
- 3) In accordance with this the federative organization for Yugoslavia will be based on the fullest democratic rights, and the fact must be noted that already now, during the people's liberation war, the organs for the people's power have been established in the different regions of Yugoslavia in the form of people's liberation committees and regional anti-fascist Veces for the people's liberation.²⁰

¹⁹ The revolutionary potential in the Balkans is much greater now than in 1918 because of various factors, including the infinitely greater socio-economic dislocation resulting from this war, the greatly enhanced power, prestige and attraction of the Soviet Union, and the discrediting of the traditionally privileged and generally anti-democratic elements due either to their unpopular pre-war policies or their present collaboration with the Axis. Thus President Beneš is of the opinion that in Eastern Europe, "This war will conclude with even more profound revolutionary disturbances" than in 1918. E. Beneš, "The Organization of Post-war Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, XX (January, 1942), 232.

²⁰ *Inter-Continental News*, December 15, 1943.

In addition to this formal decision of the Yugoslav Committee it is well known that both in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria there is widespread feeling in favor of the inclusion of Bulgaria in a post-war federal Yugoslav state, and that a Bulgarian detachment, significantly named the Khristo Botev brigade, is now operating as a part of Marshal Tito's National Liberation Army. Furthermore it is not without significance that the National Committee in Yugoslavia, the National Liberation Front in Greece and the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria are in contact with each other, although no precise data is available as to the nature and extent of their relations.²¹ One observer who remained in the Balkans for some time after the German invasion and who was in close touch with underground forces came to the conclusion that,

... strange as it may seem, the foundations of a genuine Balkan union have been laid, during these years of Nazi tyranny by the Balkan peoples themselves. This has been achieved by the forces of the Left. ... In parts of the Balkans I saw these forces at work. ... Their primary aim, of course, is to oust the Nazi invader. But that is not all. More significant for the future is the fact that their attitude toward all Balkan problems is the right one. They regard the political and economical unity of the Balkans as indivisible and their goal is the foundation of a Balkan union. ... Whether we like it or not, this is the general trend of political events in the Balkans.²²

The final question which arises is, what are the prospects for this "general trend." Will it lead at long last to some sort of Balkan unity or will we witness once more the tragic events of the post-1918 period? Precise predictions are naturally impossible but this study of almost two centuries of the federation movement does, in the opinion of the author, provide some clues to the future. It does point to at least two

²¹ A recent report from Cairo referred to "a pretty well substantiated rapprochement between the EAM [initials of the Greek words for National Liberation Front] with the 'Fatherland Front' of Bulgaria as well as with Marshall Tito's Yugoslav Partisans. ..." *New York Times*, January 8, 1944. From the same city came an earlier report that, "Bulgarian and Rumanian Partisan units have joined the People's Army of Liberation under General Josip Broz (Tito) and are fighting beside a formidable Yugoslav guerrilla force. ... This is a matter of considerable political importance, indicating not only the spread of active resistance against the Germans in the satellite Balkan lands but also a possible growth of ties within south-eastern 'peasant Europe,' on which some observers believe the future of that part of the world must rest after the war." *New York Times*, December 1, 1943. See also *New York Times*, December 15, 1943; M. Padev, *Escape from the Balkans* (New York, 1943), 200, 201, 249-251.

²² Padev, *op. cit.*, 87, 88. Another informed observer has summarized the situation as follows: "... the thinking within the Liberation Front of Yugoslavia touches the fringes of the postwar question. ... First of all they are thinking of a Yugoslav federation. ... How many autonomous or semi-autonomous units there will be in the Yugoslav federation is left to the future. ... The Yugoslav Partisans are in close contact with Leftist guerrillas in Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. They talk of bringing Bulgaria into the South-Slavic federation, depending on the will of the Bulgarian people. They know that for a long time many Bulgarians have considered themselves Yugoslavs. ... The idea of a still wider Balkan federation or confederation or union intrigues a great many Balkanites. It might begin with Greece and Yugoslavia, then take in Albania, Bulgaria (if not already in a new South-Slavic combination) and probably Rumania." Adamic, *My Native Land*, 446, 447.

basic principles which must be respected if future federation efforts are not to suffer the same fate as those of the past.

The first of these principles is democracy. Genuinely democratic governments capable of winning the confidence and support of their respective peoples are a prerequisite. It cannot be argued that such governments automatically will make possible a federation, but certainly it can be predicted that failure to set up such governments will make federation impossible. There is no doubt, for example, that Yugoslavia's drift towards the Axis during the late thirties would never have occurred had Yugoslav foreign policy been determined by the wishes of the people rather than by the ambitions and fears of a tiny clique in Belgrade. This intimate connection between domestic affairs and foreign policy is made perfectly clear in the following indictment of the pre-war regime by King Peter.

What at the end of 1940 was the political climate of Yugoslavia?

The country was then governed by a Regency of three members, only one of whom exercised full influence in State affairs. The Lower House of the Yugoslav Parliament—the Skupsntina—did not function—for the simple reason that it did not exist. As for the Upper House, the Senate, it was reduced to a mere rump, bound hand and foot to the Regency, and without any real say in the state of affairs. ...

The Press was not merely controlled. It was wholly subservient to the official directions which covered the last detail of its work. The newspapers were compelled to publish as their own, both leading articles and commentaries, sent to them by various ministries. Public opinion, which had no opportunity to express itself, either at the elections, or by the printed word, was thus completely suppressed. The Budget of a country, whose population numbered 16 million, was drawn up by the Government alone. The people, who had to bear the whole burden of taxation, were allowed no say nor supervision of any kind. In short, the political and social situation in Yugoslavia under the Regency was a classic example of the conditions in which a proud and independent people were driven by their own Government along the path towards revolution.

This internal situation was thus the first great cause of subsequent developments.

The feelings of the people received little consideration in the matters of foreign policy. ...

The Regency made a fatal mistake when it began—at first very cautiously and with a very suspect secrecy, and afterwards more and more openly—to abandon this path of Yugoslav foreign policy. [that is, Alexander's policy of collaboration with his Balkan neighbors and with Britain, France, and the United States.] Our relations with France cooled off first. Afterwards the Little Entente was weakened and destroyed. Czechoslovakia in her long agony enjoyed the full sympathy of our people but not the support and help she needed from our Government.

Italy was allowed, without even a protest on our part, to seize Albania, in defiance of the long-established rule that the Balkans should belong to the Balkan nations. At the end, in fact, if not by any

formal step, the Balkan Pact itself was abandoned. Thus indecisiveness first and fear afterwards, caused the then rulers of Yugoslavia to turn their backs on their country's traditional friends and to seal so-called friendship with manifest aggressors who are waiting simply and solely for the first opportunity to invade. Thus, this miserable foreign policy which shortsightedness and fear led the Regency to pursue had as its consequence even more disgraceful concessions to the Axis Powers.

In the end Yugoslavia to her own sorrow almost ranked among those States that, as it has been said, themselves fed the crocodile who was swallowing them one by one.

This foreign policy was the second great cause of Yugoslav discontent. Taking domestic and foreign policy together, no greater gulf could exist between a people and its rulers than the unhappy Regency had managed to create by its folly, its fear and its miscalculation.

On March 25, 1941 the representatives of the Yugoslav Government and the Regency signed in Vienna a document that was supposed to bring Yugoslavia into the Tripartite Pact. In internal policy, that meant the *stabilization of an evil state of affairs* inside the country itself.

In foreign policy, it meant that Yugoslavia was to step into the camp of the enemies of human freedom and to renounce her national independence. . . .

Once the people realised that their very soul was at stake, they resolved to put a stop to encroachment on their patience. They refused to accept the decision of the Regency which brought Yugoslavia into the Axis orbit. At dawn on March 27, 1941, the immortal spirit of the Kosovo field spoke again, as it always spoke when our nation had to pass through a great spiritual crisis. The people flung out the Government which was trying to sell the nation's soul in the market place. I want to stress the *people* when I speak about this historical event.²³

The second essential principle is effective collective security, at least on a European-wide scale. In the light of the tragic histories of the Little and Balkan Ententes, it is difficult to envisage the continued existence of any federal system in Eastern Europe, or in any other part of Europe, unless this condition is fulfilled. Either post-war Europe will be organized on the basis of some system of collective security, or else Europe will be carved up into spheres of influence, with clusters of small nations seeking the protection of one of the Great Powers, and with these Great Powers continually on the verge of war over the extent of their respective spheres of influence. It is a rhetorical question to ask whether any Balkan or East European federation could survive in a Europe of the latter variety.

These two principles obviously are not cure-alls. They leave a host of pressing questions unanswered—frontier lines, post-war

²³ Speech to the Defence Union Luncheon in London on December 17, 1941. Text in "Yugoslavia's Past and Future," *Central European Observer*, XIX (January 23, 1942), 30, 31.

Germany, economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe, and so forth. It is believed, however, that these principles are basic in this sense: if they are not adopted and applied, it will not prove possible even to begin to consider the various other problems in a realistic and practical fashion, whereas if they are adopted and applied, not only will consideration of the other problems become feasible, but the problems themselves will become less dangerous and complex.

If the above speculations are sound, then the prospect for the future is by no means without hope. Both collective security and democratic institutions are more feasible now, than a few years ago. Certainly the peoples of the Balkans today are politically conscious and aroused to an unprecedented degree and have made clear in their manifestos and programs their determination to set up democratic political, social and economic institutions once the enemy has been expelled.²⁴ Similarly the Moscow, Cairo and Teheran Conferences have opened, in the words of Prime Minister Churchill, "a wide field of friendly cooperation" in both the war and post-war periods amongst the nations of the world. From the federation viewpoint these are the two all important factors in the situation today. Paradoxical though it may seem in the midst of a second World War, the events of the next few years may reveal that a Balkan federation is closer to realization now than at any other period in the modern era.

POSTSCRIPT

Since the writing of the above conclusion, two events of first importance have occurred. The first is the formation on July 7, 1944 by Dr. Ivan Subasich (spokesman of King Peter) of a government which unites the democratic Yugoslav elements outside the country with Marshal Tito's Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia. The significance of this accomplishment is that it demonstrates a fact which is frequently overlooked or outrightly denied—namely that the upsurge of popular mass movements in the Balkans need not necessarily lead to chaos and to civil war. In the case of Yugoslavia it has led rather to a national unity and a national renaissance which is quite unparalleled in the quarter-century history of that country.

The other noteworthy event is the issuance of strong and definite pro-federation statements by representatives of both the Tito and Subasich governments. Mr. Sava Kosanovich, Minister of Interior, Social Welfare, Health and Public Works in the Subasich

²⁴ This political awareness of the Balkan peoples is emphasized in Beneš, "Organization of Postwar Europe," *loc. cit.*, 232; and in the Round Table on "The Battle for the Balkans," *Free World*, VI (November, 1943), 424-439.

government, foresees a post-war South Slav federation stretching "from Trieste to Varna" in which the component units would enjoy cultural autonomy and wide powers of self government. In addition he has stated,²⁵

I believe that post-war federated Yugoslavia will become, in the Balkans, the center of a larger unit—perhaps a Balkan confederation. I am firmly convinced that the Balkans will thus become a pillar of harmonious development in Europe.

Similarly, Dr. Josip Smodlaka, Foreign Minister of the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia has expressed himself as follows:

Our first aim is free federal Yugoslavia. But that's not enough to insure peace in the Balkans. We must have a Balkan federation, and the first step would be a union of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Second, we will invite Albania to enter with full and equal rights. Then we will be strong enough to repel any attacks from whatever quarter.

As far as Greece is concerned, Greece must either be included in the federation or we must have a permanent alliance with her. That, naturally, is up to the Greeks.

The first Balkan entente had only one aim—to hold Bulgaria down. It was an unsound basis for a peaceful bloc. The great bone of contention between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was the status of Macedonia.

I believe the best solution for this problem is to give Macedonia full autonomy within the federal state. That would end the Yugoslav-Bulgarian dispute.

I refer, naturally, only to Slav Macedonia. Greek Macedonia naturally belongs to Greece and is part of Greece.

Formerly that portion of Macedonia probably had a majority of Slavs in its population. However, following the Turkish-Greek population exchange more than two decades ago, it was colonized with Greek money by Greeks from Asia Minor, and it is now part of Greece. I'm sure that Yugoslavia and Greece can easily agree on their frontiers.

The significance of these statements needs no emphasizing. They reveal a desire and an attitude towards Balkan federation which is reminiscent of the revolutionary post-1918 period. They propose autonomy for Macedonia—the only feasible solution for the problem which has poisoned inter-Balkan relations for over half a century. And finally they definitely recognize Greek Macedonia as Greek, thus cutting the ground from under the feet of certain Greek circles afflicted with Slavophobia. These statements may well prove to be the blueprints of the new Balkans.

²⁵ *New York Times*, April, 11, 1944.

APPENDIX A

DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE ALLIANCE TREATY AGAINST TURKEY BETWEEN THE PRINCE OF WALLACHIA AND MOLDAVIA ON THE ONE HAND AND THE PRINCE OF SERBIA ON THE OTHER HAND. SIGNED MAY 14/26, 1866¹

His Highness the Prince of Wallachia and Moldavia on the one hand and His Highness the Prince of Serbia on the other hand, desirous of liberating their States from Turkish suzerainty and of acquiring full and complete independence, have decided by common consent, irrevocably to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance against Turkey, and have named as their plenipotentiaries for this purpose: His Highness the Prince of Wallachia and Moldavia, Sieur N. Valensco, minister of foreign affairs, and His Highness the Prince of Serbia, Sieur Garashanin, Senator. Who, having exchanged their plenipotentiary letters which were found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:

I. The present treaty of alliance is to remain in effect for ten years with the irrevocable aim of liberating their states, if possible, from Turkish suzerainty.

II. To succeed in this the High Contracting Parties will make it known to the Porte on a date set by common consent, that they refuse to pay the tribute required by suzerainty, and, if Turkey attacks by force of arms one of the High Contracting Parties, the other will come to her aid with a supporting army comprising not less than five thousand men completely equipped and armed, to be maintained at its own expense. This army will be placed under the command of the supreme chief of the military forces of the country which is attacked, and will have a right only to the booty which falls into its own hands;

III. Regulations for the strategic positions of the army;

IV. In case of defeat, the High Contracting Parties after previous agreement, will invoke the armed protection of Russia.

V. If the course of operations and military success demand that the war be conducted beyond the frontiers of Wallachia and Serbia, the two armies will fight together, either on the offensive or on the defensive. Neither of the High Contracting Parties may conclude an armistice or suspension of arms, nor sign a peace without the com-

¹ Translated and reprinted from S. T. Lascaris, "La première alliance entre la Grèce et la Serbie. Le traité de Voeslau du 26 août 1867," *Le monde slave*, III (September, 1926), 402, 403. See *supra*, 91, 92 for the question of the correct date of this treaty.

plete consent of the other party. In case Serbia succeeds in extending her boundaries at Turkey's expense, Moldavia-Wallachia, since she is naturally limited by the Danube, will obtain an indemnity of money which will be determined by a special commission;

VII. The Prince of Serbia assumes the obligation of communicating the present treaty to the Prince of Montenegro and of inviting him to take an active part in the execution of the present agreement.

APPENDIX B

PROTOCOL OF THE BULGARIAN BENEVOLENT SOCIETY OF BUCHAREST, APRIL 5/17, 1867¹

Whereas the present circumstances call upon all oppressed nations in Turkey to take measures necessary for their liberation, we, the Bulgarians living in Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia, are assembled to deliberate upon and to discover means for the liberation of our dear fatherland, in order that we also might join the ranks of the free nations and manifest to the world that we exist.

In order to attain this desirable end it is necessary to select a neighboring nation, which, for our mutual benefit, will aid us to attain our liberation, and for such a nation we can prefer no other than the Serbian, which, in its nationality, its faith, and its geographic position, has been near to us for centuries; our interests, therefore, are identical, and hence only with their close brotherhood we can and we will become an independent nation.

And as a basis for such fraternal rapprochement we propose, in accordance with existing conditions, the following twelve points.

1. A fraternal union should be effected between the Serbs and the Bulgars, under the name of Yugoslav Kingdom.
2. The Yugoslav Kingdom shall consist of Serbia and Bulgaria (the Bulgarian lands to include Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia).
3. The head of the new government shall be the present Prince of Serbia, Michael Obrenovich, with the right of succession.
4. The Kingdom shall have one national flag composed of the insignia of the two races. The same shall hold for the future coinage.
5. Each country shall retain its own dialect for official use and hence the officials will be required to belong to that nationality amongst which they serve, and to speak the dialect of that country.
6. The Serbian laws in force today are accepted by us and shall be translated also into the Bulgarian dialect. All the decrees of the Yugoslav Kingdom shall be published simultaneously, without exceptions, in the two dialects, Serbian and Bulgarian.
7. The state religion shall be the Orthodox, but all confessions will be free.
8. Religious matters shall be governed by an independent Synod

¹ Translated and reprinted from A. Toshev, *Balkanskite Voïni* [The Balkan Wars] (Sofia, 1919), I, 77-79. Imperfect translations are given in S. Radeff, "The Serbo-Bulgarian Agreement of 1867 for a Yugoslav Confederation," *Pages from Bulgarian Life* (1927), 27, 28; and in I. Slivensky, *La Bulgarie depuis le traité de Berlin et la paix dans les Balkans* (Paris, 1927), 193, 194.

composed of both races. This Synod shall consist of a Metropolitan Primate and the bishops of the dioceses according to the dialect of the population. These nominations must be confirmed in every case by the governing authority.

9. The head of the state shall select the members of the ministerial cabinet from the two races.

10. The national representation shall be made up in proportion to the population of the state and in accordance with the form existing in Serbia today for this purpose.

11. The capital of the Yugoslav Kingdom shall be selected by the national representatives.

12. The head of the clergy and the Synod shall always reside in the capital.

However, in order to bring into execution the common desire, we find it judicious to choose a committee of seven persons, residing at present in Bucharest, who, because of their position, will find it possible to provide for the attainment of this patriotic aim.

We choose, therefore, as members of this committee, MM. Khristo Georgiev, Dr. G. Atanasovich, Michael Koloni, Dr. D. Protich, Stefan Ivanov, G. Nicolopoulo and Dr. D. Ghicolesco, who, in their agreement for the future Yugoslav Kingdom, must have in view the following two conditions:

I. The agreement to have force on the day on which it is signed by the Serbian government and by the committee.

II. The Serbian Government must obligate itself in the said agreement to render all material and moral assistance for the attainment of the common end as the committee, according to circumstances and necessity, thinks fit, without any material responsibility whatsoever on the part of any of the undersigned.

May Almighty God be Protector and Guide in this sacred decision of ours.

Done in Bucharest in the year from the birth of Christ one thousand eight hundred sixty-seven, of the fifth day of the month of April.

APPENDIX C

THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE OF VOESLAU, AUGUST 14/26, 1867¹

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity, His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Highness the Prince of Serbia, considering that the state of affairs in the East creates rights and obligations for them, that the present position of the Christian peoples of the East is intolerable, and that these peoples should become their own masters and decide on their own destiny by their united action independently of all foreign intervention, have recognized the necessity of an agreement as to the means of bringing about an entente between these peoples and the necessity of a decision as to the measures to be taken to realize their legitimate desires. Since the abnormal condition in which the Ottoman Empire finds itself makes possible armed action by the Turkish forces against Greece and Serbia, His Hellenic Majesty and His Serbian Highness felt it necessary to consult together in view of this eventuality. In consequence, they have resolved to conclude a treaty of alliance, and for this purpose have named as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Greece, Pierre A. Zanos, Member of the Chamber of Deputies, Chevalier of the Gold Cross of the Order of the Saviour, and

His Highness the Prince of Serbia, Milan A. Petronievitch, Under Secretary of State to the Ministry of Justice, Commander of the Order of Saint-Stanislas of Russia, etc. . . .

Who, after exchanging their plenipotentiary letters which were found in good and due form, have agreed on the following articles.

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties engage to pursue the realization of the aim of their alliance by all means in their power. However, with the exception of the case provided for in article 3 of this treaty, declaration of war against Turkey will not be made except after deliberation and mutual agreement.

Article 2. The High Contracting Parties engage to further their military preparations in a manner which will assure the success of the aim which they propose. Consequently Serbia pledges herself to have by next March (1868) an army of sixty-thousand men on war footing in addition to the reserves. Greece, for her part, pledges

¹ Translated and reprinted from S. T. Lascaris, "La première alliance entre la Grèce et la Serbie. Le traité de Voeslau du 26 août 1867," *Le monde slave*, III (September, 1926), 428-437.

herself to have, by the same time, an army of thirty-thousand men and to equip as considerable a fleet as possible.

Article 3. In case the territory of one of the two Contracting States should be attacked by the Ottoman Government before the time agreed upon in the aforesaid article, that is, before March 1868, the Party which is not attacked, without formally entering into war with Turkey, is under obligation to support the attacked country by all other means possible, acting as if it were at war with the Ottoman Government; but after the time agreed upon, the two Parties are bound to enter the conflict even if the Turkish Government attacks only one Party.

Article 4. After the beginning of hostilities, the High Contracting Parties engage to strive with all their force for the complete liberation of all the Christian peoples of European Turkey and of the islands of the Archipelago. However, if insurmountable obstacles prevent the complete accomplishment of the aim of the alliance, it will be permissible for each of the High Contracting Parties to put an end to the war and to lay down arms the moment it can assure its ally of the following results:

For His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, the liberation and annexation of the states of Epirus and Thessaly;

For His Highness the Prince of Serbia, the liberation and annexation of the states of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Article 5. If the eventuality contained in the preceding article occurs, the alliance between Greece and Serbia will nevertheless remain unalterable and indissoluble, and the two States, as soon as circumstances permit, will again take up arms after mutual deliberation, in order to pursue the complete realization of the aim of their alliance.

Article 6. Once the war has begun, the two Contracting Parties are bound to conclude neither a peace nor an armistice until the goal of their alliance has been attained, except by special mutual agreement. Nevertheless, it will be permissible for each of the High Parties to decide on suspension of arms.

Article 7. In case the war realizes its aims completely or to a greater degree than that described in article 4, the High Contracting Parties will consult together for the particular purpose of concluding between themselves a special treaty as much for the designation of the frontiers of their respective States as for the continuation of their relations, in order to guarantee the work of their common effort by a perpetual alliance. However, it is agreed, from this date, that we will not lose sight of the respect due to the wishes of the people, who, after taking up arms in the struggle, may express the solemn wish

either for annexation to the Contracting Parties or for the creation of distinct, confederated states. In the latter case, the constitution which governs the confederation and the countries which will take part in the confederation will be discussed and regulated by common agreement between Greece and Serbia.

Article 8. The High Contracting Parties will work together and separately, each by the means at their disposal, to make known to the friendly Powers the principle that the Christian East belongs to them. Consequently, they pledge themselves to oppose with all their power and by means contrived between themselves, any dismemberment of European Turkey by which any part whatever of its territory would come under the power of any foreign sovereign.

Article 9. The High Contracting Parties promise to act in behalf of the Christian peoples of European Turkey for each of whom, one of the Contracting Parties will be especially responsible for the purpose of persuading them to join this alliance and of preparing them for the struggle. They are also bound to procure at the time specified, each according to his means, arms and munitions of war.

Article 10. The two Parties both engage to enlist the Albanians, each by the means at their command, for the success of the aim of this alliance.

Article 11. The two Parties will also act simultaneously to bring Roumania into their alliance. Serbia will undertake particularly to persuade Montenegro to join the alliance.

Article 12. The High Contracting Parties promise each other mutual aid and assistance during the negotiation of the peace as well as during the course of the war.

Article 13. Neither of the two Contracting Parties may make alliances with a foreign power, relative to the object of the present Treaty, unknown to the other.

Article 14. The two Contracting States will consult with one another in order to arrange a military treaty as soon as possible which will be drawn up to decide all matters relative to the operations of the two allied armies and to the lines which they should take in accordance with the common interest.

Article 15. The present treaty will remain secret.

Article 16. The present treaty will go into effect and become valid from the day it is ratified by His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Highness the Prince of Serbia.

Article 17. The ratifications will be exchanged at Athens in the course of six weeks.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

Concluded at Vooslau, near Vienna, the fourteenth of August, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven.

Signed:

M. A. Petronievitch
(L.S.)

P. A. Zanos
(L.S.)

SEPARATE ACT

In order to anticipate any difficulty which might arise in the future, resulting from the stipulations of article 4 of the secret treaty of today, between Greece and Serbia, the plenipotentiaries of the two States have agreed on the following:

If because of unforeseen events of absolute necessity, it should become impossible for the Contracting Parties to annex the provinces mentioned in the said article 4 as the minimum of territorial acquisition, it is agreed that Greece and Serbia will reserve the right to seek an equivalent among the neighboring provinces which are under the direct domination of the Ottoman Porte.

In case of such an eventuality, His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Highness the Prince of Serbia will come to an agreement to fix the limits of these provinces or districts which are to be annexed to their respective states, taking as their criterion the identity of origin which links these provinces or districts with Greece or Serbia.

This being agreed, the plenipotentiary of Greece declared that the arrangements made above should not be applied to the island of Crete. The bloody struggle which this island has maintained for more than a year, the enormous sacrifices of which she is giving heroic examples, and the countless catastrophes which she has undergone for such a long time, have placed this island in a position which gives her exceptional and incontestable rights; therefore the Hellenic plenipotentiary proposed that the island of Crete should not be considered in any way as an equivalent and should remain outside all stipulations and arrangements concerning the choice of territorial acquisition which might be transferred to one or the other of the two Contracting Parties.

M. Zanos added that he would give this statement the same force as if it had been included in the treaty. The Serbian plenipotentiary who recognized that the statement advanced by the plenipotentiary of Greece was not only fundamentally just, but also agreeable to the feelings of his Sovereign and to the sympathies which the island of Crete has inspired in the whole Serb nation, raised no objection to this statement.

The present separate act shall be ratified, and these ratifications will be exchanged at the same time as those of the treaty of this day.

Drawn up in two copies and signed after reading.

Vooslau, near Vienna, the fourteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven.

Signed:

M. A. Petronievitch
(L.S.)

P. A. Zanos
(L.S.)

PROTOCOL SIGNED AT ATHENS, JANUARY 10, 1868 (O.S.)

The undersigned, Michael G. Antonopoulos, Chief of the First Class Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, and François Zach, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Artillery in the service of His Majesty the Prince of Serbia, duly authorized by their respective governments to carry out the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia, concluded and signed at Vooslau the fourteenth of August, 1867, have met for this purpose today, the tenth of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, at Athens.

It was first settled and agreed between them, following an understanding between their respective governments, that the time limit fixed in article 2 of the Treaty for the first of March of this year, should be extended to the first of September, 1868.

After this arrangement was settled and accepted by the undersigned in the name of their respective governments, the instruments of ratification having been produced and found in good and due form, the exchange of ratifications was made.

In faith whereof, they have signed the present protocol in two copies and have affixed their seals thereto.

Concluded at Athens, the tenth of January, 1868.

Signed:

Michael G. Antonopoulos
(L.S.)

François Zach
(L.S.)

MILITARY TREATY SIGNED AT ATHENS, FEBRUARY 16, 1868 (O.S.)

By virtue of article 14 of the Treaty of Alliance concluded the fourteenth of August, 1867, between the Principality of Serbia and the Kingdom of Greece, the two respective governments having agreed to conclude a military treaty in execution of the aforesaid treaty, have named two delegates *ad hoc*, the Serbian Governments, M. François Zach, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Artillery, and the

Hellenic Government, M. Nicolas Manos, Chief Lieutenant-Colonel of the Cavalry of the Staff-Office, who have agreed upon the following:

1. *Means*

In accordance with article 2 of the aforesaid treaty and with the protocol of January 10, 1868, Serbia will have, at the end of the month of August, 1868, an army of sixty thousand men on war footing, with a reserve force of twenty thousand men. This army will include infantry, cavalry, artillery engineers and officers of health and administration. The proportions between these different services will be for the artillery, two fluted pieces of ordnance per one thousand men, each one of which will be provided with two hundred and fifty shots, the cavalry will make up one-twentieth and the engineers one-thirtieth of the army.

The infantry as well as the reserves will be armed with fluted rifles in a ratio of one hundred and twenty shots per man and a supply of provisions for four months which will be ready at the beginning of the campaign. Greece, for her part will have, by the same time, an army of thirty thousand men, including reserves, composed equally of the different services and the artillery of which will have the same proportion of two fluted pieces of ordnance per one thousand men, each of which will be provided with two hundred and fifty shots. This army will be provided with the necessary provisions and armaments.

2. *Mission of Officers*

The Governments of Greece and Serbia will name officers who will be sent to Belgrade and to Athens and whose mission will be to make sure that the war preparations agreed upon are being carried out and to serve, at the same time, as intermediaries for the communications which the said Governments will have to have before and during the war.

3. *Time of Opening the Campaign*

The precise time of the opening of the campaign will be decided after mutual agreement on this subject by the two respective Governments, in accordance with the stipulations already agreed upon in the Treaty of Alliance and the Protocol.

4. *Revolutionary Bands*

The organization of revolutionary bands will be included in war preparations. Greece and Serbia will secretly organize guerrilla corps for the purpose of invasion, of about five thousand men each.

5. *Beginning of the War by the Bands*

The war will be begun by the revolutionary bands which will have the task of furnishing the necessary means to the Christians and inciting them to a general armed insurrection. These detachments will serve afterwards to carry on manoeuvres against the Turkish forces.

6. *Sudden and Urgent Departure of the Bands*

In the case provided for in article 3 of the aforesaid treaty, that the territory of one of the two Contracting Parties should be attacked by Turkey before the declaration of war or before the time fixed for opening the campaign, the Party not attacked, besides the measures which it must take in accordance with the aforementioned article, will immediately send the revolutionary bands or guerrilla corps already formed, or if they are not yet formed, will hasten their formation as vigorously as possible and their entry into the campaign.

7. *General Theatre of the War*

Following the stipulation of article 4 of the aforesaid treaty, all European Turkey will constitute the general theatre of the war which will consequently be common ground for the united action of the two Allied Armies, with the exception made formerly of all which concerns the maritime war which Greece will wage alone as understood.

8. *Strategic Operations*

It is agreed that with regard to strategic operations of the Hellenic army in Epirus or in Thessaly as well as those of the Serbian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since they can not be fixed in advance nor decided by the present treaty, each of the Contracting Parties shall act according to whatever plan of campaign seems suitable and proper to attain the proposed end.

9. *Strategic Considerations with respect to the Intermediate Countries*

The isolated situation of each of the two Allied Armies at the beginning of the war, and perhaps during all of the first campaign, having necessitated a preliminary examination of the strategic importance of the intermediate countries which are formed by the basins of the Vardar and the Drin, it has been realized:

a) That the Turks will undoubtedly establish their base of operations against Greece and Serbia in these countries, operating with three divisions: The division of the North, including Kossovo-Polic

and the Ovtche-Polic; that of the Middle, formed by the plain of the Tchernia (tributary of the Vardar) between Peristeri and Babouni, and that of the South formed by the plain which includes the mouth of the Vardar and of the Vistriza;

b) That the principle strategic points are Salonica, Monastir, Velessa (bridge across the Vardar), Skopia (bridge across the Vardar), Koumanovo, Prizrene and Prichtina, the principal center of which is Monastir;

c) That we must consequently attach the greatest importance to the routes leading to Monastir and particularly to those which lead to Salonica, Velessa and Ochrida;

And we have reached the following conclusions:

a) That it should fall to Greece to concern herself with the southern division and above all to intercept the communications around Salonica which lead in the direction of Monastir;

b) That to Serbia falls the task of cutting the communications which lead to Velessa;

c) That it is Albania which, by its geographical position, is called upon to close the routes which lead from the Adriatic to the Vardar and to the separate Drins (the Black and the White) and especially to Monastir.

10. *Importance of Albania*

The great importance of the cooperation of Albania having been thoroughly recognized, it has been agreed that the two Governments of Greece and Serbia shall watch by all practical means possible for the execution of article 10 of the Treaty.

11. *Revolt of the Bulgarians*

Since both sides realize the advantages of a revolt of the Bulgarians of the Balkans, we have agreed that Serbia will, by all possible means, urge the aforesaid peoples to take up arms and to create thus a strong diversion which should doubtless have very important consequences for the success of the war.

12. *Suspension of Arms*

The Commanders in Chief of the Armies will have the power to conclude suspensions of arms which will be only local and of short duration, but the aforesaid suspensions of arms will never have the character and the validity of an armistice which, according to article 6 of the Treaty, may not take place until a special mutual agreement is reached.

13. *Telegraph lines*

The Hellenic Government engages to connect its telegraph lines with those of Italy.

14. *Secrecy of the Treaty*

The present Military Treaty will remain secret.

15. *Ratification of the Treaty*

The present Treaty will go into effect and become valid the day it is ratified by the two Ministers of War of Greece and Serbia.

16. *Exchange of Ratifications*

The ratifications will be exchanged within a period of three months at the latest from the present signing.

In faith whereof, the two delegates *ad hoc* have signed the present Military Treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

Concluded at Athens, February 16, 1868.

Signed:

L. Menos

Chief Lieutenant-Colonel of Cavalry
of the Staff Office

Fr. Zach

Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery

APPENDIX D

THE ENGELHARDT VERSION OF THE SERBO-ROUMANIAN TREATY OF JANUARY 1868¹

Article 1. There will always be friendship and sincere unity between the Prince of Roumania and the Prince of Serbia and between their hereditary successors and their respective subjects.

Article 2. The two Contracting Parties formally pledge themselves to consult together and to combine forces if necessary, whenever they have a common interest to pursue or to defend, whether it be against one or several of the Great Powers, or against Turkey.

Article 3. Consequently all overtures or negotiations having as their aim the recognition or consecration of one or both sides, of new rights and privileges judged inseparable from the autonomy of the principalities, will be the object of a preliminary agreement between the two Parties, so that the benefits of the said overtures or negotiations can be assured, as far as possible, for both of them.

Those matters especially considered by the two Parties as an integral part of their autonomy and logically incontestable are the right of jurisdiction over foreign residents, the power to conclude commercial treaties with the neighboring Powers and others, and that of accrediting the consular agents directly with the aforesaid Powers.

Article 4. The two Parties forbid themselves particularly to enter into any political agreement with one or several Powers which will be of such a nature as to affect the agreement stipulated in the present Treaty.

Article 5. In all political and commercial negotiations in which the two States will be called upon to participate competitively they will make known their views to one another and as far as the object of the negotiations will allow, they will provide their agents with identical instructions.

Article 6. (secret) The two Contracting Parties engage to act together especially when circumstances demand cooperation, be it by their moral influence, or by arms, in order to emancipate the Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire.

If there is reason, they will combine their military operations after a plan drawn up jointly.

They must each have at their command, if need be, an active

¹ Translated and reprinted from E. Engelhardt, "La confédération balkanique," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, VI (1892), 36-39.

force of 60,000 men, which will be made up of the three corps of troops, in the usual proportions which compose an army of campaign.

A later treaty will determine, if necessary, if these two armies should operate separately or under a single head and, in the latter case, to whom will fall the supreme direction of their movements.

Article 7. (secret) If the eventuality of war, foreseen in the preceding article, is realized, the Princes of Roumania and Serbia will address a joint proclamation to the Christian peoples announcing that they have taken up arms to help them gain the franchise and to assure them of the benefits of a Christian, paternal and liberal government.

The provinces or districts which the fortunes of war may place in the possession of the Allied States, will be administered provisionally by councils in which the Contracting Parties will be equally represented.

Article 8. (secret) If Providence blesses their efforts and gives them the free disposition of territories removed from Ottoman domination, the two Contracting Parties will make the following arrangements between themselves:

The islands forming the delta of the Danube and the eastern region of Bulgaria bounded by Ruschuk and Varna, on one side, and the Black Sea on the other, will be annexed and reunited with Roumania in perpetuity.

Old Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria, except the region of this province attached to Roumania, will be annexed and reunited with Serbia in perpetuity.

Article 9. Since the essential aim of the present Treaty is to establish, from the present time, an intimate solidarity between the different Christian peoples of European Turkey in view of a solution of the Eastern Question beneficial to them, the Contracting Parties will strive to obtain the consent of Greece and Montenegro to those clauses of this Treaty which might be applicable to them.

The Roumanian government will negotiate, to this effect, with the Hellenic Kingdom, and that of Serbia with the Principality of Montenegro.

Article 10. The present stipulations, especially those included in articles 6, 7, and 8 above, will remain secret.

However, since the sole fact of a real agreement between the two countries will be of a nature to raise the moral authority of their governments and the confidence of the autonomous populations or those who are still subject, care will be taken to announce the existence of this treaty by the usual means of publicity.

Article 11. To give one another ostensible testimony of the in-

imate rapprochement which has taken place between them and to satisfy, in part, the aim indicated in paragraph 2 of the preceding article, the Contracting Parties will formally give to their accredited agents at Belgrade and Bucharest, the status of public ministers and will accord them the honors, dignity and prerogatives due this rank.

APPENDIX E

RESOLUTIONS OF THE FIRST BALKAN SOCIAL
DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE, BELGRADE,
JANUARY 7-9, 1910¹

I

Under the enforced guardianship and by the preponderating influence of European diplomacy, instrument of the political expansion of European capitalism, there has been created, in the historic past of South-Eastern Europe and especially in the Balkan peninsula, territorial and national situations, which hinder the modern economic development and the culture of the people, and which are most strenuously opposed to their interests and to their needs. From these contradictions arise all those crises, perturbations and events, which serve as pretexts for European diplomacy and its monarchic reactionary agents, to uphold their policy of interference, guardianship, conquest and reaction.

The first Balkan social-democratic conference declares, in opposition to this policy, that the movements and the struggles of the nations of South-Eastern Europe and of the Balkans, who possess all the conditions of culture for autonomous development, are the expression of inevitable aspiration to economic and political enfranchisement.

The fewer the countries not under foreign rule, the more will capitalism without any consideration, hurl itself on those agricultural countries, which are industrially undeveloped and incapable of political resistance, in order there to place its surplus gained from the exploitation of the workers in its own country. By the interest to be paid on State loans, by the super-profits gained on undertakings of unlimited concessions, and finally by commercial treaties and taxes on transport, European capitalism has drawn the Balkans and the countries of South-Eastern Europe into the sphere of its ruthless exploitation. In acting thus, the economic forces of the Balkan countries are exhausted, their development and their progress are kept down and their very existence is threatened.

This territorial and national subdivision is not in accordance with the transformation which the triumphal march of capitalism has created in the conjuncture of economic life. All the progressive force of the people must strive to enfranchise itself from Particularism and

¹ Reprinted from *Bulletin périodique du bureau socialiste internationale*, no. 2 (1910), 64-66.

from Isolation which only satisfies patriarchal life and the limitation of such to the clan and to the village; they must aspire, moreover, to do away with the numerous frontiers, which, on the one hand separate people of identical language, nationality and culture, and on the other, separate countries whose economic and political destinies are united; they must finally aim at shaking off the yoke of direct or indirect foreign rule, which takes away from the people the right to dispose of their own fate.

However, while the working class, by class struggle, aims at the realization of this aspiration, the capitalists, supported by the monarchy, and thanks to the economic, political and national conditions existing in South-Eastern Europe, create a new national antagonism which prevents the solution of the Balkan question by the amalgamation of the nations.

II

While recognizing the necessity and the justification of the aspirations of the people of South-Eastern Europe, the Balkan conference is of the opinion that these aspirations cannot be realized except by the coalition of economic forces, by the suppression of artificially created frontiers, by the complete reciprocity and community of existence and protection from a common danger. For this reason the Conference of Social-democracy thinks it advisable to combat all antagonism existing between the people of South-Eastern Europe, bring about an understanding between them and support, with all their might, all aspirations tending to materialize the complete democratic autonomy of the people and the independence of the nations, which are the first conditions needed to wrest the lives of these people from the hands of their reactionary, foreign and native rulers, in order thus to open the path to union demanded by modern economic and political autonomy. Social-Democracy must formulate these desires first because this solution of the question corresponds best with the interests of social and united development, and also because the activity of social-democracy is permanently determined by the development of the people, whom it influences, and because the strength of the class struggle develops most completely in independent nations.

III

The first social-democratic conference in the Balkans points out especially that this inevitable transformation cannot be realized in the sense of the interests of the people by the militarist policy of the Balkan monarchies and by reactionary bourgeois rule, because these stir up antagonism between nations, sow hatred and distrust, and

destroy the economic and political force of the people. Nor can the policy of appeal to the capitalist states of Europe be of use to the people, for the governing classes, whether they be monarchist, or republican, whether they be united nationally or composed of different nations, never can or will give up their privileged position. Social-democracy, acting as representative of the working class, which is not divided by the antagonism dividing the governing classes, has undertaken the important mission of constituting itself the most conscious, energetic and consistent champion of the idea of the solidarity of the nations of South-Eastern Europe, and, by the struggle of the proletarian class, of strengthening the force of resistance of the people against the policy of conquest of European capitalism. It raises itself especially against the imperialist tendency of Austria-Hungary and against the influence of Russian Czarism, which throws itself with more vigor into its profit earning and sanguinary policy in the Balkans, now that it has been repulsed in the Far East and lives in greater enmity with the people of its own country.

IV

It is the duty of the secretaries of the social-democratic parties of the Balkans and of South-Eastern Europe, through the intermediary of the secretary of the social-democratic party in Belgrade, to remain in close touch with each other, and thus to make it possible to act simultaneously, uniformly and in agreement in carrying out the present resolutions. For the next conference, which will be held in 1911 at Sofia a detailed programme of our political and national claims must be drawn up, as well as an outline of the organization of the relations of social-democratic parties in the Balkans and South-Eastern Europe.

APPENDIX F

RESOLUTION ON THE BALKAN WARS PASSED BY THE SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS AT BASEL, NOVEMBER 24-25, 1912¹

At its Congresses in Stuttgart (1907) and Copenhagen (1910), the International Bureau laid down the following principles for the war against war:

"In the case of war being imminent, the working classes and their parliamentary representatives in the countries concerned shall be bound to do all they can, assisted by the International Bureau, to prevent the war breaking out, using for this purpose the means which appear to them the most efficacious but which must naturally vary according to the acuteness of the class war and of the general political conditions.

"Should war nevertheless break out, it would be their first duty to intervene in order to bring it to a speedy termination and to employ all their power to utilize the economic and political crisis created by the war in order to rouse the masses of the people and thereby to hasten the downfall of capitalistic class domination."

The Balkan crisis which is already responsible for so many calamities, if allowed to spread, would become the most frightful danger to civilization and the workers. It would likewise be one of the most scandalous events which has ever taken place in history, because of the disproportion between the immensity of the catastrophe and the triviality of the interests invoked in justification of it.

For this reason the Congress rejoices that all Socialist Parties and labor unions of all countries are unanimous in their desire to make war upon war. By simultaneously rising in revolt against imperialism, and every section of the international movement offering resistance to its government, the workers of all countries are bringing public opinion to bear against all warlike desire. Thus a splendid co-operation of the workers has been brought about which has already contributed much to maintain the threatened peace of the world. The fear of the ruling classes that a revolution of the workers would follow the declaration of a European war has proved an essential guarantee of peace. The Congress therefore asks all Socialist Parties to continue their efforts with all means that appear to them efficacious. Each

¹ Reprinted from W. E. Walling, *The Socialists and the War. A Documentary Statement of the Position of the Socialists of all Countries; with Special Reference to their Peace Policy* (New York, 1915), 99-104. Also published in *Bulletin périodique du bureau socialiste international*, no. 10 (1913), 9-12; and in *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, VI (1916), 393-397.

Socialist organization will be asked to do its own part in furthering common action.

The Balkan Socialists

The Socialist Parties in the Balkan peninsula have a difficult task. The Powers of Europe, by systematically postponing all reforms in Turkey, have contributed to the growth of intolerable economic, national, and political conditions, which necessarily led to unrest and to war. The Balkan Socialists with great courage have fought against the use of these conditions as an excuse for war in the interests of the dynasties and the middle-class capitalists, and have demanded the establishment of a democratic federation of the Balkan states.

The Congress urges them to persevere in their admirable endeavors, believing that the Socialists of the Balkans will leave no stone unturned after the war to prevent these states being robbed of what they have gained at such heavy cost by the dynasties, the militarists, and capitalists of the Balkans, ever thirsting for expansion. The Congress above all calls on the Balkan Socialists to oppose everything likely to lead to a renewal of the old animosities between Servians, Bulgarians, Roumanians, and Greeks, as well as to all violence against those Balkan peoples whom they are at the present moment fighting—the Turks and Albanians. The Socialists in the Balkans should also strongly oppose any depriving of rights of these peoples and proclaim the fraternity of all Balkan peoples, including Turks, Albanians, and Roumanians as against any national jingoism that may have been let loose.

Austria and Italy

The Socialists of Austria-Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina must continue with all their strength their successful efforts to prevent any attack of the Austrian monarchy upon Serbia. They must continue to resist in the future as they have done in the past any attempt to take by force from Serbia the fruits of war or to transform that country into an Austrian province, and thereby to embroil the peoples of Austria-Hungary and other nations of Europe in conflict in the interests of the ruling dynasty. The Social Democratic Parties of Austria-Hungary will also have to struggle in the future to secure democratic autonomy for all the southern Slav nations within the frontiers of Austria-Hungary and at present governed by the Hapsburg dynasty. The Socialists of both Austria-Hungary and of Italy will have to give special attention to the Albanian question. The Congress admits the right of the Albanians to autonomy, but recognizes the danger that, under the guise of autonomy, Albania

might become the victim of Austro-Hungarian and Italian ambitions. This might not only constitute a danger for Albania herself, but might in the near future threaten the peace between Austria-Hungary and Italy. Albania can only become really independent as an autonomous unit in a democratic federation of the Balkan states. Therefore, the Congress calls upon the Austro-Hungarian and Italian Socialists to combat any action of their respective governments which aims at drawing Albania within the sphere of their influence and to persevere in their efforts to consolidate the peaceful relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy.

Russia

The Congress heartily congratulates the Russian workers who organized protest strikes, as proving that the Russian and Polish workers are beginning to recover from the blows received during the Czar's counter-revolution. The Congress recognizes these strikes as a guarantee against the criminal intrigues of Czarism, which, after having shed the blood of the Russian people and after having so often betrayed and delivered the Balkan nations to their enemies, is now wavering between dread of the consequences that a war would mean for itself and the fear of a renewed national uprising which it has itself created. If Czarism is once more pretending to play the part of liberator of the Balkan nations, it is in order to reconquer by means of this pretext Russian predominance in the Balkans. The Congress expects that the town and country workers of Russia, Poland, and Finland, now recovering their strength, will tear asunder this fabric of lies, will oppose all bellicose Czarist undertakings, and resist every Czarist attack, whether upon Armenia or Constantinople, by concentrating all their energy towards a renewal of their revolutionary fight for freedom against Czarism. As Czarism is the hope of all reactionary forces in Europe, so it is also the most inexorable enemy of democracy and of the peoples under its rule, and to bring about its downfall is one of the first duties of the international movement.

Germany, France, and Great Britain

The most important task of the international movement falls to the lot of the workers of Germany, France, and Great Britain—to demand from their governments at the present moment an undertaking to refuse all support to either Austria-Hungary or Russia and to abstain from all intervention in the Balkan trouble, and in every respect to observe an unconditional neutrality. A war between the three leading civilized nations over the question of an outlet to the sea, concerning which Austria and Servia are in dispute, would be

criminal folly. The workers of Germany and France do not recognize that any secret treaties make it necessary for them to interfere in the Balkan conflict.

Remedies

If, however, as a consequence of the military defeat of Turkey, the downfall of the Osman dominion in Asia Minor became inevitable, it would be the duty of British, French, and German Socialists to oppose with all their might a policy of conquest in Asia Minor, since the result would lead straight to a European war. The Congress is of opinion that the greatest danger to European peace is the artificially-fostered animosity between Great Britain and Germany. It therefore welcomes the workers of both countries in their efforts to improve the situation. It believes that the best means of removing friction would be an understanding between Germany and Great Britain concerning the arrest in the increase of their respective navies and the abolition of the right of capture of private property at sea. The Congress invites the Socialists of Great Britain and Germany to continue their agitation for such an understanding.

To overcome all outstanding differences between Germany on the one side and France and Great Britain on the other, would be to remove the greatest danger to international peace. It would weaken the powerful position of Czardom, now profiting by these differences, it would render impossible an attack on Servia by Austria-Hungary, and it would finally secure the peace of the world. To this end, above all, the efforts of the international movement must be directed.

The Congress notes with satisfaction that Socialists of all nations are agreed as to these main lines of foreign policy. It calls upon the workers of all countries to pit against the might of capitalism and imperialism the solidarity of the international labor movement. It warns the ruling classes in all countries to put an end to the economic misery produced by the capitalistic system and not to increase it by warlike action. It insists on its demand for peace. Governments must not forget that, in the present frame of mind of the workers, war will not be without disaster for themselves. They must remember that the Franco-German War resulted in the revolutionary movement of the Commune; that the Russo-Japanese War put into motion the revolutionary movement in Russia, and that the competition in armaments in England and on the Continent has increased class conflicts and led to great strikes. It would be madness if the governments did not comprehend that the mere notion of a European war will call forth resentment and fierce protest from the workers who consider it a crime to shoot each other down in the interest, and for the profit of

capitalism, or for the sake of dynastic ambition and of secret diplomatic treaties.

If governments interrupt the possibility of normal development of the peoples and thereby provoke them to take desperate steps, they will have to take the whole responsibility.

APPENDIX G

MANIFESTO OF THE SOCIALISTS OF TURKEY
AND THE BALKANS, 1912¹

To the working people of the Balkans and Asia Minor.—To the Labour International! To public opinion!

War is at our doors. When these lines appear, it will, in all probability, be an accomplished fact.

But we, the socialists of the Balkan countries as well as of the Near East, whom the war touches more directly, we will not allow ourselves to be swept on by the chauvinist wave. We raise our voices still more loudly against war and we ask the labor and peasant masses together with every sincere democracy, to unite with us in opposing the policy of sanguinary violence, which carries such disastrous consequences in its wake, with our conception of international solidarity.

The proletariat of the Balkans has nothing to gain in this adventure, for both the conquered and the conquerors will see, rising from the mounds of corpses and smoking ruins, militarism, bureaucracy, political reaction and financial speculation with their usual aftermath of heavy taxes and increase in the price of food, of exploitation and profound misery.

Moreover, the war will have for the Balkan provinces other consequences resulting from their political and geographical situation.

In the event of their being victorious in the struggle and of the Ottoman Empire being divided up, the lion's share, that is the economically richer parts and the most important strategic points, may become the prey of the great capitalist powers who for centuries have been snatching the territories of the East, piece by piece.

Austria at Salonica, Russia on the Bosphorus and in Eastern Anatolia, England in Arabia, Germany occupying the rest of Anatolia and Italy in South Albania—such will probably be the map of the East after the eventual downfall of the Ottoman Empire.

Therefore, on the day when they fall into the clutches of the powers, the Balkan states will bid goodbye to their independence. The political and public liberty of the people will be destroyed by militarism and monarchic autocracy, which, strengthened by its victory over the Turks, will demand new credits for its armies as well

¹ The precise date of this manifesto is not available. The International Socialist Bureau published it on October 12 with the statement that it had just been received. Translated and reprinted from *Bulletin périodique du bureau socialiste international*, no. 9 (1912), 5-7. Text also available in *Archiv für die Geschichte Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, VI (1916), 385-390.

as new privileges for its sovereigns. And after these hard trials, the national struggles between the nations will not be finished. They will become still more bitter, each one aspiring to hegemony.

Should Turkey be the victor, we would have a recrudescence of religious fanaticism and Mohammedan chauvinism—the triumph of political reaction—the loss of the few improvements obtained at the price of so many sacrifices in the internal government of the country. It will, moreover, bring about the triumph of the imperialism of Austria and Russia, who will pose as the saviours of the conquered Balkan powers, in order to extend their interested protectorate to the ruined nations.

In order to justify the war, the nationalists of the Balkan States invoke the necessity of realizing their national unity, of obtaining political autonomy for their nationals under Turkish domination.

It is not the socialist parties which will oppose the realization of the political unity of the elements of each nation.

The right of nationalities to autonomous life is the direct consequence of political and social equality and of the abolition of all class, caste, race or religious privileges, demanded by the Labour International. But will this unity be realized by a division of the population and the territories of Turkey among the small Balkan States?

Will the Turks who have fallen under the domination of the Bulgarians, Serbs or Greeks, have their national unity? Will the Serbs of Novi-Bazar or of Old Serbia, the Bulgarians, the Greeks, the Albanians of Macedonia, who would, by a division be eventually placed under the yoke of Austria or of Italy, the Armenians and the Kurds of Eastern Anatolia, the Turks, the Greeks, the Bulgarians of the vilayet of Adrianople, who may become the prey of Russia, will they realize their national unity?

Bourgeoisie and nationalism are powerless to set up a true lasting national unity. That which is created by the war may be destroyed by another war.

National unity founded on the subjugation of the national elements of other races carries within it a basic fault which threatens it unceasingly. Nationalism only alters the names of the masters and the degrees of oppression, but it does not abolish them. Political democracy alone, with true equality for every element, without racial, religious or class discrimination, can create real national unity.

The nationalist argument is, really, nothing but a pretext for the Balkan governments.

The true motive of their policy is nothing but the desire for economic and territorial expansion which characterizes all capitalist countries. Turkey's neighbors seek for themselves the same advan-

tages as the great powers, who are concealing themselves behind the small states: they want markets for the disposal of their goods, for the investment of their capital and for the employment of their superfluous personnel for whom there is no longer room in the offices of the city.

But if we emphasize the grave responsibility of the Balkan States in the prospective war, as well as in the past, when they hindered the internal reorganization of Turkey, if we accuse European diplomacy which has never desired serious reforms in Turkey, of duplicity, we do not wish to minimize, in any way, the responsibility of the Turkish governments. We denounce them also to the civilized world, to the people of the empire and particularly to the Mohammedan masses, without whose help they would not have been able to maintain their domination.

We reproach the Turkish regime for the complete absence of real liberty and equality for their nationalities—an absolute lack of security and of guarantee for life of the rights and privileges of citizenship—the non-existence of justice and of a well-organized and impartial administration. It has upheld a system of extremely heavy and onerous imposts. It has turned a deaf ear to all demands for reform for Mohammedan and other working men and peasants. It has supported only its feudal subjects and nomadic tribes who were armed against the defenceless agriculturalists.

By their proverbial inertia the Turkish governments have done nothing but provoke and perpetuate misery, ignorance, emigration and brigandage, massacres without number in Anatolia and in Roumelia, in a word anarchy which serves today as a pretext for intervention and for war.

The hope that the new regime would put an end to the past by inaugurating a new policy, has been unfulfilled. The successive "Young Turk" governments not only continued the errors of the past, they made use of the authority and prestige of a seeming parliamentarism granted to Turkey, in order to apply a system of denationalization and of oppression, together with an excessive bureaucratic centralism, smothering the rights of the nationalities and the claims of the labor masses.

The men of the new regime, in certain respects even surpassed the old which had elevated the systematic assassination of political adversaries to the height of a government system.

But we acknowledge that the people—and the people only—have the right to dispose of their fate. Against the war, which we repudiate with all our forces, as a means of solving political and social problems, we oppose the action of the conscious and organized masses.

To the outrageous ideal of the nationalists of disposing of the lives of their peoples by war, and of haggling for their rights and their territories, we reply by the declaration of the imperative necessity, already proclaimed at the Inter-Balkan and Socialist Conference of Belgrade in 1909, of uniting all the people of the Balkans and of the Near East in the most democratic form of government, without racial or religious discrimination.

Without such a federation of the people of Eastern Europe, national unity is neither possible nor enduring for them. There will be no rapid economic and social progress for their development will be continually threatened by the perpetual return of internal reaction and foreign domination. With regard to the Ottoman Empire, more especially, we consider that only radical reforms in its internal relations can establish peace and normal conditions of life, remove foreign intervention and the danger of war, and finally, render possible the democratic federation of the Balkans.

It is not by trying to revive projects half a century old, inherited from shortsighted bureaucracy, that the Turkish government will be able to solve the problem of nationalities.

It is by granting true equality, by granting complete autonomy to the nations for their educational institutions,—schools, churches, etc.,—and by establishing local government (self-government) in districts, cantons and communes, with proportional representation of the ethnic elements, and of the parties, with equality of languages.

Only an administration in which the various ethnic elements of the empire are represented, will furnish the necessary guarantee of impartiality.

Only agrarian reform, a reform of the imposts, social legislation with guarantees of the right of organization and assembly, can give to the Mohammedan labor and peasant masses the minimum of satisfaction which will attach them to the new regime.

These reforms will annoy Turkish bureaucracy, that is to say those few thousand individuals attached to their privileges. But they will benefit to the highest degree the Turkish people, whom the present regime reduces to the exclusive role of soldier and policeman, hurrying to every frontier and into every province to combat the disasters built up in this country by Turkish incapacity and oligarchy.

The solution of the great problems which trouble the people of the Ottoman Empire will guarantee the national security of the Mohammedans and will enable them peacefully to turn their attention to their economic, political and social development. Such is the program for the realization of which we make our appeal for help not only to the Balkan proletariat but also to international Socialism.

We, the socialists of the Balkans and of the Near East, have the deep consciousness of the double role we have to play in regard to the proletariat of the world and to ourselves.

Holding back the belligerent current let loose by the governments and by the chauvinistic press, struggling against the sentiments ingrained and nourished by a false education, destined to favour the struggle between nationalities and the domination of the ruling classes, we will not fail to fulfill our duty of international solidarity. In fact, we are simply the out-posts, for the Balkan war brings with it an imminent danger for general peace. By rousing all the capitalist appetites of the Great Powers, by giving preponderance in politics to imperialist elements, greedy for conquest, it may not only provoke a conflict between nations, but also a civil war. And, as the capitalist governments of several countries have been driven by the successful victories of the proletariat into their last strongholds, they will not fail to take the opportunity offered them of drowning the masses in blood or by enacting restrictive legislation in order to stifle our movement of emancipation, civilization and human progress.

For weeks and months we have led a campaign against war. But it is particularly at the present moment that we protest the most loudly. We express our firm determination to uphold with all our strength the fight of the world's proletariat against war, against militarism, against capitalist exploitation, for liberty, for equality, for the emancipation of the classes and of the nationalities, in a word, for peace.

Down with the war!

Long live the international solidarity of the people!

The Socialists of Turkey and of the Balkans.

APPENDIX H

SPECIAL RESOLUTION NUMBER SIX, CONCERNING THE BALKANS, PASSED BY THE CONGRESS OF THE LABOR AND SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL, LUCERNE, AUGUST 1-9, 1919¹

The Conference is in favour of a rapprochement among the Balkan peoples and their union in a federation of independent states. The frontiers of the federated States will be determined by the right of the Balkan nationalities and peoples to dispose of their own fate. This right will be expressed in a plebiscite under neutral control.

The Conference is of the opinion that, to-day more than ever, peace in the Balkans will only be re-established by the exercise of the free disposition of the peoples and that no peace which is not based on these principles can be lasting or salutary for the life of the Balkan peoples.

Accepting these principles, the Conference appeals to all Socialists of the Balkans, that the peoples of these countries may live in concord and liberty and devote their strength in the future to Socialism.

¹ *The International at Lucerne, 1919. The Resolutions. The Provisional Constitution* (London, 1919), 12. A summary of this resolution was also published in the *New York Times*, August 11, 1919.

APPENDIX I

RESOLUTIONS OF THE BALKAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE, SOFIA, JANUARY 1920¹

1. The problems of the Communist and Socialist Parties in the Balkans

The world war, far from having resulted in a national union of the Balkan nations and in their liberation, far from having solved their national problems and removed the cause of their mutual hatreds, has left them economically exhausted, totally bankrupt and politically subject to the great imperialistic Entente powers, under conditions which contain new sources of hatred and new wars. It is becoming evident to all the Balkan peoples that instead of having achieved, as a result of the wars, the national unity promised by the ruling bourgeoisie, they have arrived at the loss of their independence, at a state of political enslavement and starvation and extreme want among the working masses.

Totally ruined, burdened with enormous debts and taxes, financially and politically dependent upon Entente imperialism and having become a species of Entente colonies, the Balkan states are unable to restore by their own means the economic life within their territorial boundaries, and are moreover unable to improve the terrible conditions of the working and the propertyless masses. The enormous war debts oppressing the Balkan nations suck out their lifeblood for the benefit of the European bankers and hamper their economic development. The nations applying for help from the great imperialistic powers will be deprived of free economic development, they will have to export their raw materials into these empires and import manufactured goods.

Nothing but the Social Revolution will secure to the small nations a free existence and an independent development. It will rid them of the enormous state debts, it will set free the productive forces of all countries, saving them from the narrowness of state frontiers, and will open a free way out into the large space by uniting the small nations into an economic union.

The liberation of the Balkan nations from the political, financial and economic rule of the imperialistic Entente, their national free-

¹ Reprinted from the *Communist International*, no. 11-12 (June, July, 1920), 2455-2460. This conference is referred to as both socialist and communist. The reason for this confusion is that the conference was assembled as a continuation of the pre-war Balkan socialist conferences and then it affiliated itself with the Communist International and adopted the name "Balkan Communist Federation."

dom and union, the creation of conditions necessary for the development of their productive forces, all this can be achieved only if they become united and form one Balkan Socialist Soviet Republic.

The Conference of the Balkan Communist Federation declares in consequence that nothing but the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat with its organization of the councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Red Army deputies, will liberate the Balkan nations from all oppression and will afford them a possibility of self-determination, uniting them all into one Balkan Socialist Soviet Republic.

The Conference therefore calls upon the proletariat and the poor of the Balkan towns and villages, urging them to unite under the red banner of Communism, and to form powerful revolutionary organizations. It calls upon them to prepare and to arm themselves with force, with revolutionary spirit and discipline, the objective development of the conditions of life having allotted them a great historic mission. Their full liberation from all oppression, peace and welfare for the ruined and enslaved Balkan nations who have shed so much blood, depend on how they fulfil this great mission.

The Conference makes it a duty of the Balkan Communist and Socialist parties to educate the proletarian and propertyless masses in a revolutionary Socialist (Marxist) spirit, in order to make them conscious of their historic problems and the great aim of the proletarian liberating movement, and to unite them into mass organizations to struggle for the victory of the great international Communist Revolution.

The Conference of the Balkan Socialist Federation, composed of the Bulgarian Communist Party ("Narrow Socialists"), the Socialist Labour Party (Communists) of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Labour Party of Greece and the Rumanian Socialist Party, with the participation of the representatives of all the named parties, discussed in its session of January 15, 1920, in Sofia the question of the affiliation of the Balkan Socialist Federation to the Third Communist International and arrived at the following conclusions:

1. The international revolutionary situation in the whole world, and more especially in Europe, caused by the five years of the world's war and the irreconcilable class opposition roused by this war in modern capitalistic society, has created a new revolutionary epoch, urging with an irresistible force the proletariat of all capitalist countries to seize the political power. Inevitable proletarian Socialistic Revolutions are therefore to be anticipated in the advanced European countries, most of which have already entered the primary stages of this revolution.

2. In such a revolutionary epoch, and being given such an international revolutionary situation, the Balkan Communist and Socialist Parties consider that one of their chief problems is to coordinate their actions, and using their influence on the popular masses of the Balkans, to give all possible support to the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic in the coming proletarian Socialist Revolution in Europe, and to paralyze thereby the counter-revolutionary forces moved against it from the Balkans or through the Balkans.

3. The position of the Balkan nations created by the war and resulting in the deepest changes in economic life, is marked on the one hand by a colossal concentration of capital, a colossal monopolization of the means of production and of exchange, and an irreconcilable class opposition, and on the other by economic ruin, starvation, dire want and fatal exhaustion of the working classes. The Balkan bourgeois parties are incapable of coping with the present situation and of satisfying the enormous needs and desires of the working masses.

In view of such conditions, the Balkan states are facing financial bankruptcy as a result of the war, of the unbearable burden of enormous state debts and heavy financial obligations imposed on them by the great imperialistic Entente powers. Disunited, hostile to each other and subject to the imperialistic Entente powers the Balkan states are unable to restore their economic life within their territorial boundaries, and on a capitalist base without the help of the European capital. But even were this help to be granted them, it would hamper the economic development of the Balkans, and European capital will moreover itself founder in the near future under the blows of the coming Social Revolutions in Europe.

There is also in addition the lack of space, the complication of unsolved national problems and the reactionary, arbitrary forms of government employed by the bourgeoisie in the Balkans. This all leads to very hard conditions, with no possible issue for the Balkan nations, considering their disunion and the present capitalist relations. They are unable to unite and form a federation of the Balkan states under the rule of their national bourgeoisie because of the stubbornness and megalomania of the bourgeoisie, and because of the obstacles sure to be set up in this case in each of the states by the dynasties, autocracy and militarism.

All these conditions, creating such a situation in the Balkan states, as well as the growth of the Communist movement, and the fact of the proletarian Revolutions in Europe, will force the Balkan Communist and Socialist parties to seize the political power, to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat and the propertyless masses based on

Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Councils, and to found the Balkan Socialist Soviet Republic.

4. The victory of the Proletarian Socialist Revolution and the transformation of modern capitalistic society into a Communism, based on Socialist principles, will be accomplished with greater promptitude and less victims on the part of the proletariat, in proportion to the courage and the full comprehension of its necessity that will be shown in the carrying out of the dictatorship of the proletariat based on the Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Councils, and in proportion to the mutual help which the proletarians of all countries will afford each other in their revolutionary action and in proportion as they unite their revolutionary home struggles with the universal international revolutionary liberating struggle, subjecting their own separate cause to the interests of the victory of the International Proletarian Revolution.

5. In view of the accomplishment of these important tasks, the Balkan Communist and Socialist parties consider it necessary to establish close connections with each other, in order to coordinate their acts and their struggle with the activity of those proletarian parties which are fighting for the Proletarian Revolution as their immediate aim, and acknowledge the necessity of relentless class warfare for the victory of the Revolution, as well as for the proletarian dictatorship expressed in Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Councils.

6. The Third Communist International, founded in Moscow in March 1919, has set as its aim: a) to liberate the labour movement from the impure ingredients of opportunism and social patriotism which caused the bankruptcy of the Second International in 1914, and are contrary to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, b) to unite the forces of all genuinely revolutionary parties of the world proletariat, putting into practice the principles and methods of revolutionary relentless class struggle and the proletarian dictatorship in the form of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Councils, and c) to secure and accelerate in such a way the victory of the universal Communist Revolution.

In consideration of all this the Conference decides:

1. The Balkan Communist Federation, consisting of the Communist and Socialist parties of Bulgaria, Servia, Greece and Rumania joins the Third Communist International and forms its Balkan section, accepting the principles and methods of the revolutionary class struggle and the proletarian dictatorship based on the Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Councils.

2. The Balkan Socialist Federation, as the union of the Balkan Communist and Socialist parties was called up till now, will be hereafter called the "Balkan Communist Federation."

APPENDIX J

POLISH-CZECHOSLOVAK AGREEMENT, NOVEMBER 11, 1940¹

The Polish Government and the Provisional Czechoslovak Government have decided to issue the following statement:

I

Imbued with an inflexible faith that the heroic struggle now being waged by Great Britain, together with her Allies, against German tyranny will end in the final defeat of the forces of evil and destruction, and

Animated by the profound conviction that the future order of the world must be based on the cooperation of all elements which recognize the principle of freedom and justice, as constituting the moral foundation of all our common civilization,

The two Governments consider it imperative to declare solemnly even now that Poland and Czechoslovakia, closing once and for all the period of past recriminations and disputes, and taking into consideration the community of their fundamental interests, are determined, on the conclusion of this war, to enter as independent and sovereign States into a closer political and economic association, which would become the basis of a new order in Central Europe and a guarantee of its stability. Moreover, both Governments express the hope that in this cooperation, based on respect for the freedom of nations, the principles of democracy and the dignity of man, they will also be joined by other countries in that part of the European continent. The two Governments are resolved already now to cooperate closely for the defence of their common interest and for the preparation of the future association of the two countries.

II

The two Governments also stigmatize in the gravest terms the cynical farce which the leaders of Nazi Germany are endeavouring to stage by proclaiming themselves the builders of a New European Order. The hypocrisy of these assertions is most clearly revealed in the light of German endeavours aiming at the complete destruction of our two ancient nations, which have contributed so greatly to human civilization. The violence and cruelty to which our two nations are being subjected, the expulsions of the native populations from im-

¹ *Journal of Central European Affairs*, I (April, 1941), 97, 98.

mense areas of its secular homelands, the banishing of hundreds of thousands of men and women to the interior of Germany as forced labour, mass executions and deportations to concentration camps, the plundering of public and private property, the extermination of the intellectual class and of all manifestations of cultural life, the spoliation of the treasures of science and art and the persecution of all religious beliefs—are unparalleled in all human history. They offer a striking example of the spirit and methods of the Germanic New Order.

The two Governments address this burning appeal to all free peoples immune from the German terror, that in the measure of their strength they should help the nations allied in the struggle for the freedom of all nations to achieve the speediest possible deliverance of the world from its present monstrous nightmare.

APPENDIX K

POLISH-CZECHOSLOVAK AGREEMENT,
JANUARY 23, 1942¹

In execution of the declaration of the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia of November 11, 1940, whereby both Governments decided that after the war Poland and Czechoslovakia shall form a Confederation of States in that area of Europe with which the vital interests of the two countries are bound, the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia conducted uninterrupted negotiations on the subject of the method of bringing the above declaration to fruition. At the same time both Governments adopted a resolution expressing their satisfaction with the conclusion of the Greek-Yugoslav agreement of January 15, and their conviction that the security and prosperity of the area of Europe situated between the Baltic and Aegean Seas depend primarily on the collaboration of two confederations, the foundation of one of which had been laid by the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement and of the other by the Greek-Yugoslav agreement. Both governments reached agreement with regard to a number of principles of the projected Confederation which were defined in the following declaration adopted during the current week. The Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia have agreed on the following points with regard to the future Confederation of Poland and Czechoslovakia:

1. The two Governments desire that the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation should embrace other States of the European area with which the vital interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia are linked up.
2. The purpose of the Confederation is to assure common policy with regard to foreign affairs, defense, economic and financial matters, social questions, transport, posts and telegraphs.
3. The Confederation will have a common general staff, whose task it will be to prepare the means of defense, while in the event of war a unified supreme command will be appointed.
4. The Confederation will coordinate the policy of foreign trade and customs tariffs of the States forming the Confederation with a view to the conclusion of a customs union.
5. The Confederation will have an agreed monetary policy. Autonomous banks of issue of the States forming the Confederation will be maintained. It will be their task to assure that the parity established between the various national currencies shall be permanently maintained.

¹ *Journal of Central European Affairs*, II (April, 1942), 91, 92.

6. The Confederation will coordinate the financial policies of the States forming the Confederation, especially with regard to taxation.
7. The development and administration of railway, road, water and air transport as also of the telecommunication services will be carried out according to a common plan. An identical tariff for postal and telecommunication services will be binding on all the territories of the Confederation. The States in possession of sea and inland harbors will take into consideration the economic interests of the Confederation as a whole. Moreover, the States forming the Confederation will mutually support the interests of the sea and inland harbors of the States forming the Confederation.
8. Coordination will also be applied in the realm of social policy of the various States of the Confederation.
9. The Confederation will assure cooperation among its members in educational and cultural matters.
10. Questions of nationality will remain within the competence of the individual States forming the Confederation. The passenger traffic between the various States included in the Confederation will take place without any restrictions, in particular without passports and visas. The question of free domicile and of right to exercise any gainful occupation of the citizens of the individual States forming the Confederation, over the whole territory of the Confederation will be regulated.
11. The question of the mutual recognition by the States forming the Confederation of school and professional diplomas or documents and sentences of court, as well as the question of mutual legal aid in particular in the execution of court sentences will be regulated.
12. The constitution of the individual States included in the Confederation will guarantee to the citizens of these States the following rights: Freedom of conscience, personal freedom, freedom of learning, freedom of the spoken and written word, freedom of organization and association, equality of all citizens before the law, free admission of all citizens to the performance of all state functions, the independence of the courts of law, and the control of government by representative national bodies elected by means of free elections.
13. Both Governments have agreed that in order to ensure the common policy with regard to the above mentioned spheres, the establishment of common organs of the Confederation will be necessary.
14. The States included in the Confederation will jointly defray the costs of its maintenance.

APPENDIX L

GREEK-YUGOSLAV PACT, JANUARY 15, 1942¹

Having observed past experience, and more particularly recent experiences, which have demonstrated that a lack of close understanding between the Balkan peoples has caused them to be exploited by the powers of aggression in their aim toward political and military penetration and domination of the peninsula, and considering that in order to assume the independence and peace of the Balkan states, the fundamental principle of their policy must be the principle of "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples," His Majesty, King of the Hellenes, and His Majesty, King of Yugoslavia, have decided to conclude the present Agreement concerning the Constitution of a Balkan Union and to that effect have named their plenipotentiaries: His Majesty, King of the Hellenes, has named His Excellency, Emanuel Tsouderos, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and His Excellency, Charlamos Simopoulos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary and Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; His Majesty, the King of Yugoslavia, has named His Excellency, Professor Slobodan Yovanovitch, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior, and His Excellency Momtchilo Nanchitch, Minister of Foreign Affairs. After receiving the communications of their plenary powers, which were found to be drawn up in good and due form, these Ministers have agreed to the following dispositions:

CHAPTER I

ORGANS OF THE UNION

Article I. The Organs of the Union which will meet at regular intervals are:

1. A political Organ constituted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and
2. An Economic and Financial Organ constituted by two members of each Government who will be competent in economic and financial matters.

Article II. The Permanent Military Organ. This Organ, wherein the Governments will be represented by their Chiefs or by their Representatives will constitute at the side of the National General Staffs a Common General Staff of the National Armies. This Organ

¹ *Journal of Central European Affairs*, II (April, 1942), 88-90.

will comprise two bureaux, one for the Army and Aviation and the other for the Navy.

Article III. A Permanent Bureau will comprise three sections:

- A. Political
- B. Economic and Financial
- C. Military

Article IV. The Presidents of the Councils of Ministers of the States composing the Union will meet whenever circumstances require, in order to discuss questions of a general order of interest to the Union.

Article V. Collaboration between Parliaments: The governments of the Union will facilitate regular meetings between parliamentary delegations of the States of the Union, allowing these delegations to proceed to exchanges of views and to expressions of their wishes in the form of questions of common interest which would be submitted to them by competent organs.

CHAPTER II

BUSINESS OF THE ORGANS OF THE UNION

Article VI. (1), the task of the political organ will be:

- A. To coordinate the foreign policy of the members with a view to enabling the Union to act in a uniform manner on an international plane and to proceed with preliminary consultation at all times when the vital exterior interests of the members of the Union should be menaced.
- B. To prepare projects for agreements of conciliation and arbitration between the members of the Union. The political Organ will undertake the constitution of the following Organizations:
 - a. A commission charged with the elaboration of agreements of intellectual cooperation between members of the Union and with the supervision of their application.
 - b. A commission charged with the coordination of the efforts of the Organs of the press in view of the reciprocal rapprochement of public opinion in States which are members of the Union, and of the defense of their interests.

Article VII. (2) The task of the Economic and Financial Organ will be:

- A. To coordinate the policies of exterior commerce and customs tariffs with a view to the conclusion of a customs union.
- B. An elaborate common economic plan for members of the Union.
- C. To constitute by means of special organs all means which will permit the amelioration of communications between members of

the Union (railways, roads, navigation by sea, air and river, posts and telegraph), as well as tourist development within the Union.

- D. To prepare a draft of an Agreement instituting a Balkan monetary union.

Article VIII. (3) The task of the Military Organ will be to coordinate activities concerning collaboration between the national armed forces of the members of the Union, adoption of a common plan of defense and a common type of armament, etc. The mission of the armed forces of the Union will be to defend the European frontiers of the States of the Union.

Article IX. (4) The permanent bureau will form a secretariat of the different organs of the Union and its task will be:

- A. To prepare material for the labors of the Organs of the Union.
- B. To study all questions the solution of which may render more efficacious the political, economic, financial and military cooperation of the members of the Union.
- C. To supervise the application of the decisions of the Organs of the Union.

CHAPTER III

Article X. The high contracting parties declare that this agreement presents the general foundations for the organization of a Balkan Union. They consider themselves bound by the foregoing dispositions from the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification, and they envisage with satisfaction the future adhesion to this agreement of other Balkan states ruled by governments freely and legally constituted.

Article XI. The present Agreement will be ratified, and the ratifications will be exchanged, as soon as this is possible. In witness whereof, the representative plenipotentiaries have hereto placed their signatures and their seals.

Done in London in duplicate, the original in French, on the 15th day of January, one thousand nine hundred and forty-two.

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- Abdul Aziz, 89
 Adamic, Louis, 268 f.
 Aehrenthal, Alois, 155, 158, 160, 180
 Agrarian Parties
 Balkan, 202, 203
 Bulgarian, 206, 207, 217
 Croatian, 214, 215, 222
 Albania
 Italian invasion of, 251
 Alberoni, Giulio, Cardinal, 5
 Aleksandrov, T., 218, 219
 Alexander, Prince of Bulgaria
 favors anti-Russian Balkan bloc, 123, 124
 1885 crisis, 127
 Serbian war, 128, 129
 abdication, 130
 Alexander I (Russia)
 Near Eastern policy, 37, 39–42
 Alexander II (Russia)
 favors Greek-Serb alliance, 90, 97, 98
 relations with Milan of Serbia, 109
 Alexander Karageorgevich, Prince of Serbia, 51, 55, 59
 Alexander Obrenovich, Prince of Serbia
 accession, 133
 seeks Turkish alliance, 136
 visits Sofia 1897, 141
 relations with Bulgaria and Greece, 142, 143
 adopts pro-Austrian policy, 142, 143
 murder of, 153
 Aldrovandi, Count, 211
 Allotti, Baron, 210
 Anagnosti, 61
 Andrássy, Jules, 67
 Antonescu, Victor, 245
 Antonopoulos, Michael, 95, 97
 Aprilov, Vasil, 20
 Argyriades, P.
 Balkan federation plan, 151
 Ausgleich 1867
 effect on Danubian federation movement, 79
 model for Bulgarian Central Committee, 89
 effect on inter-Balkan relations, 104, 105
 Austro-Prussian War and Danubian federation movement, 78, 79, 90
 Austrian-Roumanian alliance 1883, 126
 Austrian-Serbian alliance 1881, 126
 Baduchnost, 119
 Bakunin, Michael, 65
 Balănescu, Nicolae Rosetti, 92
 Balănescu, Nicholas
 negotiations with L. Kossuth, 67
 efforts for Danubian entente, 69, 70
 Balkan alliance system, first, 1860–78
 formation, 85–102
 interpretation of, 102–104

INDEX

- disintegration, 104–113
 Balkan alliance system, second, 1912–13
 formation, 162–168
 analysis, 168–170
 disintegration, 170–174
 Russia urges recreation, 174
 Balkan Committee
 formation, 178
 stand on Macedonia, 179
 stand on Young Turks, 181
 view of Balkan Wars and Treaty of Bucharest, 181
 decline in influence, 181, 182
 post-war activities, 225, 226
 Balkan Conferences 1930–1933
 diplomatic background, 227, 228
 economic background, 229, 230
 foundation and organization, 230, 231
 accomplishments, 231–236
 analysed, 239–241, 257, 258
 Balkan Entente 1934
 diplomatic background, 236–239
 analysed, 239–241
 weakening of, 1934–37, 242–247
 1938 treaty with Bulgaria, 249
 condition in 1938, 250, 251
 neutrality diplomacy 1938–39, 252, 253
 summary, 257, 258
 Balkan Entente Conferences
 Belgrade 1936, 244, 245
 Bucharest 1938–39, 249, 250
 Belgrade 1940, 253, 254
 Balkan federation
 analysis of history to 1941, 259–261
 present conditions, 261–269
 prospects, 269–273
 Balkan Pact 1934
 diplomatic background, 236–239
 provisions, 239, 240
 interpretation, 240, 241
 Balkan Wars
 first, 170–173
 second, 173–174
Balkanski Zgovor, 224
 Ban, Mathias, 55
 Benaroya, A., 186, 200
 Benevolent Society (Bulgarian)
 negotiates with Prince Michael, 93, 94
 Benès, Edouard, 265 f., 267 f., 271f.
 Berchtold, Count Leopold, 169
 Berovich, Peter, 20
 Bib Doda
 seeks aid of Garibaldi, 81
 relations with Serbia 1876, 111
 Bikelas, Demetrius
 Balkan federation plan, 146
 Bismarck, negotiations with Serbs and Hungarians in 1866, 78, 79
 Blagoev, Dimităr, 183, 199, 200
 Blanqui, Jerome Adolphe, 62
 Bosnian crisis (1908), 157, 158
 Botev brigade, 268

- Botev, Khristo, 118, 119, 182
 Bouchier, James, 159, 164, 165, 180, 224
 Brătianu, Dumitru, 54
 Bulgarian-Greek alliance 1912, 164-166
 Bulgarian-Montenegrin alliance 1912, 167, 168
 Bulgarian-Serbian agreement
 1867, 93, 94
 1904, 153-156, 161, 162
 1912, 161-164
Bulgarie, La, 219
 Bulgaris, Leonidas, 108, 112
 Bülow, Bernhard, 160
 Buxton, Charles Roden
 mission to Bulgaria 1914, 225, 226
 Buxton, Noel
 founds Balkan Committee, 178
 views on Macedonia, 179
 visit to Turkey 1908, 180
 views on Young Turks, 181
 estimates of, 182
 mission to Bulgaria 1914, 225, 226
 Canini, Marc' Antonio
 efforts for Balkan federation, 79-81, 88 f.
 Capodistrias, John
 Ottoman partition and federation proposals, 42
 Carol I (Roumania), 95, 110, 143, 251, 253
 Carra, Jean Louis, 5
 Catherine II, 8-10
 Cavour and Canubian federation movement, 75-78
 Central and East European Planning Board, 262
 Central European Democratic Committee, 71
 Champagny, Jean B. N. de,
 Ottoman partition proposal, 40
 Charikov, N., 160, 161
 Chaulev, P., 218, 219, 221
 Christich, Philip
 negotiations with Renieris, 86, 87
 Churchill, Winston
 urges Balkan confederation 1914, 225
 on present situation, 271
 Codrika, M.,
 federation proposals, 38
 Committee of Union and Progress, 156, 180
 Communist, see also socialist
 Communist Conferences, Balkan
 Sofia 1920, 205
 later conferences, 206 f.
 Communist International, 198, 203, 204, 218, 219
 Communist Party, Bulgarian
 electoral successes 1919-20, 207, 208
 urges Balkan Communist Federation, 208
 forced underground, 217
 Communist Party, Yugoslavia
 formation, 213
 suppression, 213
 Constantine I (Greece), 197
 Cousin, Victor, 62
 Crete
 effect of 1866 revolt on inter-Balkan relations, 90, 95, 96, 104
 precipitates Greco-Turkish war, 139
 and Balkan League, 166
 Crimean War
 effect on Danubian federation movement, 73, 74
 Crispi, Francesco
 favors Balkan federation, 149, 150
 Cuza, Prince Alexander, 74, 75, 77, 89, 91
 Czartoryski, Adam
 federation proposal 1803, 37
 influence on J. A. Blanqui, 62
 relations with Balkan statesmen, 63, 64
 Czechoslovak-Polish agreements
 1940, 261, 262
 1942, 263, 264, 266
 Dandolo, A. C.
 federation proposal, 66f.
 Danev, S., 161, 172, 173
 Danilevski, Nicholas
 pan-Slavist views of, 120, 121
 Desprez, Hippolyte, 48
 Djuvara, T. G., 140
 Dobrogeanu-Gherea, C., 185
 Dragiev, Dimităr, 206
 Dragoumis, John, 177
 Drakoules, Platon, 184, 200
 Drashkovich, Janko, 49
Dreikaiserbund, 109, 110
Eastern Confederation, 150
 Engelhardt, E., version of Serb-Roumanian treaty 1868, 101, 102
 Engels, Friederich, 65
 Enver Bey, 170, 173
Ethnike Hetairia, 139
 Exarchate, Bulgarian, 89, 106, 107, 132
 Fadeiev, Rotislav
 pan-Slavist views of, 120
 Fatherland Front (Bulgaria), 267
Fédération balkanique, La, 218-221, 225
 Ferdinand I (Bulgaria)
 character, 130, 131
 dismisses Stambulov, 137
 visits Belgrade 1901, 142
 policies in 1909, 160
 1912 negotiations with Balkan neighbors, 162, 165, 167
 attacks Balkan allies 1913, 173
 pro-Austrian policy 1913-14, 175
 joins Central Powers, 196
 opposed by Agrarian Party, 206
 imprisons Stamboliŭski, 207
 abdicates, 207
 Freeman, Edward
 Near East federation plans, 148, 149
 French post-war diplomacy in Balkans, 227, 228, 251

- French Revolution
 influence on Balkan races, 17, 18
 influence on Roumanians, 26, 27
 influence on Greeks, 31, 32
 Ga, Ljudevit, 49-51, 56, 58
 Garashanin, Ilya
 foreign policy, 51, 52
 policy in 1848, 55, 59
 relations with Kossuth, 68, 69
 negotiations with Renieris, 85, 86
 negotiations with Bulgarians, 93, 94
 negotiations with Greeks, 99, 101
 Garashanin, Milutin, 112, 128, 129
 Garibaldi urges Balkan federation, 81
 Geneva Balkanites urge federation, 177
 Geography
 influence on Balkan history, 1-4
 George I (Greece), 95, 101, 112, 123, 143
 Georgevich, C.
 favors Balkan customs union, 224
 Germany, Nazi
 military threat to Balkans, 242, 248
 economic domination of Balkans, 242, 248
 fascist propaganda in Balkans, 242, 243, 248, 249
 commercial treaty with Roumania, 251
 occupation of Roumania, 255
 occupation of Bulgaria, 256
 invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, 256, 257
 Geshov, I. E., 161, 162, 165, 166, 224
 Ghica, Ion
 writings on Roumanian question, 61, 62
 negotiations with L. Kossuth, 69
 Giannios, N., 184, 200
 Gulescu brothers
 relations with L. Kossuth, 69
 Great Britain
 Near Eastern policy based on trade, 14, 15
 Greece
 Italian attack on, 1940, 255
 German attack on, 256, 257
 Greek-Bulgarian alliance 1912, 164-166
 Greek Political League of Constantinople, 177
 Greek-Serbian alliance
 1867, 96-102
 1913, 171, 172
 Greek-Yugoslav agreement 1942, 262, 266
 Grey, Sir Edward, 160, 179, 180
 Hartvig, Nicholas, 161
 Hauterive, Alexander M. B. de L.
 federation proposal, 38, 40
 Hertzberg, Ewald Friedrich, Count von, 5
 Hodza, Milan, 265f.
 Ignatiev, Count Nicholas Pavlovich
 report on 1866 Balkan conditions, 91
 on Servian-Roumanian alliance, 92
 interpretation of first Balkan alliance system, 103
 report on 1868 Balkan conditions, 105
 comments on Exarchate, 107f.
 report on 1870 Balkan conditions, 107, 108
 pan-Slav views, 121
 Illyrianism, 22-25, 48-51
 Inter-Balkan Association for Peace and Prosperity, 224
 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
 founding, 138
 reaction in Serbia and Greece to, 138, 139
 relations with Balkan Committee, 180
 degeneration of, 211
 post-war raids, 211
 fights Stamboliŭski, 217
 Federalists v.s. Supremists, 217-221
 International Bureau of Peace, 230
 International League for Peace and Liberty
 favors Balkan federation, 150
 Isvolski, Alexander, 157, 158, 160, 161
 Italian-Austrian War and Danubian federation movement, 75-78
 Italian post-war diplomacy in Balkans, 227, 228, 251, 255
 Italo-Turkish war, 160
 Izzet Pasha
 Balkan bloc plan, 147
 Jellachich, Joseph, 56, 58, 60
 Joseph II (Hapsburg), 9, 10
 Kallergis, D., 85
 Kamarowski, L.
 Balkan federation plan, 147, 148
 Karadjich, Vuk Stefanovich, 49
 Karageorge
 appeal to Napoleon I, 24, 25
 Karavelov, Lyuben, 117, 118
 Karich, Vladimir
 Balkan federation plan, 147
 Khalil Pasha
 plan for Balkan bloc, 108
 Kirchovski, H. J., 20
 Klapka, George
 efforts for Danubian federation, 70, 75-77
 Kolettes, John, 47
 Kollar, John, 50
 Kolokotronis, T., 18f.
 Korais, Adamantios, 32
 Kosanovich, Sava N., 262, 271
 Kossuth, Louis
 negotiations with D. Brătianu, 54
 relations with Serbs, 57
 negotiations for Danubian entente, 1849-62, 67-68
 Kukuljevich, Ivan, 51, 58
 Kutzo-Vlachs, 139, 140, 143, 144

- Lansdowne, Marquess of, 179
 Lapchevich, D., 191, 202
 "Latin"
 Balkan federation plan, 176
 Latin movement in Roumania, 27, 28
 League for Balkan Confederation, 151
 League for the Rapprochement of the
 Serbs and Bulgars and for the Union
 of all the South Slavs, 225
 League of the Working Classes of Greece,
 184
 Lenin, Vladimir I., 198, 199, 202
 Leroy-Beaulieu, A.
 reports on pan-Slavism in Balkans, 12
 Levski, Vasil, 118
 Little Entente, 227, 245, 246, 247, 254
 Lüders, General, 54f.
 Macedonia
 background of problem, 131-133
 1903 revolt in, 152
 effect on Serbian-Bulgar relations, 156,
 160
 in 1912 Serb-Bulgar alliance, 162-164
 in 1912 Green-Bulgar alliance, 165, 166
 causes second Balkan war, 171
 Malinov, A., 224
 Mano, G.
 federation proposal, 66f.
 Margarites, Apostolos, 139
 Markovich, Svetozar, 115-117, 183
 Marx, Karl, 65
 Mavrogheni, Petru, 92, 95
 Mavrokordatos, Alexander, 47
 Maximos, M., 244
 Mazzini, Giuseppe
 views on Ottoman partition and Balkan
 federation, 64, 81, 82
 relations with Kossuth, 71-73
 Melas, Leon, 95
 Metaxas, John, 244, 245, 255
 Michael Obrenovich (Prince of Serbia)
 meeting with Napoleon III, 76
 negotiations with L. Kossuth, 76, 77
 relations with Canini, 79
 character of, 84
 efforts for Balkan cooperation, 1861-
 68, 85-105
 death of, 105
 attitude to Omladina, 115
 Michiewicz, Adam, 62
 Milan Obrenovich (King of Serbia)
 character, 105
 relations with Russia and Austria, 109
 relations with Turkey and Roumania,
 109, 110
 decides on Turkish war, 110, 111
 seeks Albanian aid 1876, 111
 seeks Greek aid 1876, 112, 113
 seeks Roumanian aid 1876, 112
 relations with Greece 1883, 123
 concludes Austrian alliance 1881, 126
 war against Bulgaria, 128, 129
 abdication, 133
 Millet system in Ottoman Empire, 12
 Military League (Greece, 1908), 164
 Military strength of Balkan allies 1860,
 103, 104
 Milosh Obrenovich (Prince of Serbia),
 77, 85
 Milovanovich Milovan M. G., 160, 161
 Mishev, D., 224
 Montenegrin-Bulgar alliance 1912, 161,
 168
 Montenegrin-Serbian alliance
 1866, 92
 1912, 167, 168
 Montreux Straits Conference, 244
 Moore, W. A., 180
Munca, 185
 Mürzsteg Program, 152
 Mürzsteg, 179
Nachertanye, 51
 Napoleon I
 Illyrian policy, 22-25
 Turkish policy, 38-41
 Napoleon III
 relations with Danubian federation
 movement, 73-77
 plan for Balkan reorganization, 89
 favors Balkan entente, 91
 National awakening of Balkan races
 of Bulgarians, 18-21
 of Serbs, 21, 22
 of Croats, 22-25
 of Roumanians, 25-28
 of Greeks, 28-33
 National Committee for the Liberation
 of Yugoslavia, 267, 272
 National Liberation Front (Greece), 267
 Nazos, C., 128
 Neklyudov, A. V., 161
Nezavisimost, 117
 Nicolson, Arthur, 160
 Nicholas I (Montenegro), 92, 96, 103,
 106, 111, 123, 167, 168, 176
 Nicholas I (Russia)
 Turkish policy, 45f., 51, 74f.
 Novakovich, Stojan, 159
Novi Chas, 216
Novo Vreme, 199
Omladina, 115
Organosis, 177, 178
Orient européen, 67
 Orloff revolt in Peloponnesus, 9, 28, 29
 Orthodox Church
 looks to Russia, 6
 relations with Slavs, 12-14
 Ottoman decline
 causes of, 11f.
 Paisii, 20
 Palauzov, Nicolai, 20
 Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Vis-
 count, 66f.
 Panas, D., 165, 166
 Pan-Slavism and Balkans, 119-122
 Papanastassios, Alexander, 230, 231, 240

- Pashich, Nikola
 foreign policy in 1889-90, 133, 134
 suspicious of Ferdinand in 1912, 170
 centralization policies in Yugoslavia,
 212
 Pavlovich, Christaki, 20
 Petelinovich, K., 20
 Peter I (Russia), 7, 8
 Peter II (Montenegro), 60
 Peter I (Serbia), 153, 160, 167
 Peter II (Yugoslavia), 269-71
 Philharmonic Society, 47
Philike Hetairia, 33
 Phylaxenides, N.
 Balkan federation plan, 145, 146
 Pirochanats, Milan
 Balkan federation plan, 146
 Pispion-Bey, J. G.
 federation proposal, 66f.
 Polignac, Jules Auguste Armande Prince
 de
 Ottoman partition proposal, 44
 Polish-Czechoslovak agreements
 1940, 261, 262
 1942, 263, 264-266
Political Review, 177
Pologne, journal des slaves confédérés, 67
 Poulos brothers, 22, 32
 Piggos, John, 8f., 11
 Protogerov, A., 218
 Pulasky, Francis, 66
Rad, 116
 Radich, Stefan, 214, 215, 216, 222
Radnik, 115
 Radoslavov, Vasil, 174, 206, 207
 Rajachich, Patriarch, 55, 57-59
 Rakovski, C., 185
 Rakovski, Georgi, 47, 87-89
 Rattos, D.
 federation proposal, 66f.
 Renieris, Marc, 85
 Revolutions of 1848, effect on
 Bulgarians, 53
 Greeks, 53
 Roumanians, 53-55
 South Slavs, 55-60
 Rhigas, Pheraios (Velestinlis), 32, 34-37
 Richemont, General
 Ottoman partition proposal, 43
 Rizov, M., 153, 161, 162
 Robert, Cyprien, 19, 21, 63, 67
Romania Muncitoare, 185
 Roumania
 partitioning of, 1940, 254
 Roumanian-Austrian alliance 1883, 126
 Roumanian-Serbian alliance
 1866 or 1865, 91, 92
 1868, 101, 102
 Russia
 influence on Balkan Christians, 7-10
 Sakizov, Yanko, 183, 190, 193
 Saracoglu, Shukru, 253
 Sarajevo assassination, 176
 Sazonov, Sergei D., 161, 172, 173, 176
 Savov, S., 173
 Schopov, A., 200
 Second International, see Socialist Inter-
 national
 Serbian-Austrian alliance, 1881, 126
 Serbian-Bulgarian agreement
 1867, 93, 94
 1904, 153-156, 161, 162
 1912, 161-164
 Serbian-Greek alliance
 1867, 96-102
 1913, 171, 172
 Serbian-Montenegrin alliance
 1866, 92
 1912, 167, 168
 Serbian-Roumanian alliance
 1866 or 1865, 92, 91
 1868, 101, 102
 Slavophil movement, 119
 Slivnitza, battle of, 129, 132
Slovenski Glas, 210
 Smolaka, Josip, 272
 Social Democratic Party, Bulgarian
 formation and schism, 183
 opposes Balkan Wars, 190, 193
 split on World War, 199, 200, 204
 electoral results 1919, 207
 Social Democratic Party, Serbian
 formation, 183, 184
 convenes Balkan Socialist Conference,
 186
 opposes Balkan Wars, 190, 191, 193
 opposes World War, 202
 communist-socialist split, 203, 204
 Socialism in
 Serbia, 115-117, 183
 Bulgaria, 117-119, 182, 183
 Macedonia, 184-186
 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 184
 Voivodina, 184
 Greece, 184
 Roumania, 185
 Turkey, 185, 186, 204
 Socialist, see also communist
 Socialist Bureau, International
 protests Roumanian government bru-
 tality, 185
 resolution on Macedonia, 186
 opposes Tripolitan War, 187, 188
 opposes Balkan Wars, 189
 Socialist Centre of Athens, 184
 Socialist Conferences, Balkan
 Belgrade 1910, 186, 187
 Belgrade 1911, 188
 Bucharest 1915, 198
 Socialist Congresses, International
 Stuttgart 1907, 186
 Copenhagen 1910, 187
 Basel 1912, 189
 Zimmerwald 1915, 198
 Kienthal 1916, 198
 Lucerne 1919, 204
 Socialist Congress, Macedonia 1911, 186
 Socialist Federation (Salonica)

- formation, 186
 persecution of, in 1912-13, 189
 opposes World War, 201
 Socialist International, 198, 203, 204
 Socialist Party, Greek
 formation, 184
 no delegates to Balkan Socialist Conference, 186f.
 passive during Balkan Wars, 189
 stand on World War, 200, 201
 communist-socialist split, 203
 Socialist Party, Roumanian
 formation, 185
 opposes Balkan Wars, 189, 190, 192
 opposes World War, 201
 Sofronii, 20
 Souliotis, Athanase, 177
 Spalaikovich, Miroslov, 162
 Stambolitsky, Aleksandŭr
 opposes World War, 207
 overthrows Ferdinand, 207
 crushes Communists, 208
 favors Balkan federation, 208-211
 assassination of, 217
 Stambulov, Stephen
 supports Prince Alexander, 130
 pro-Turkish foreign policy, 134-137
 dismissal, 137
 Steed, H. Wickham, 165
 Stoyadinovich, Milan, 246, 247f.
 Stratimirovich, George, 57-59
Survey of Central and Eastern Europe, 262
Svoboda, 117
 Tariff war, Austro-Serbian, 155, 156
 Tchihatchef, P. de
 federation proposal, 66f.
 Teleki, Ladislav
 efforts for Danubian entente, 70, 72
 Theodorov, T., 210
 Third International, see Communist International
 Tito, Marshal, 268
 Titulescu, Nicholas, 245, 246
 Treaties
 Ackermann 1826, 26
 Adrianople 1829, 26
 Amiens 1802, 37
 Berlin 1878, 114, 115, 127, 132
 Bucharest 1886, 129
 Bucharest 1913, 173, 174, 176
 Jassy 1792, 10, 26, 30
 Kutchuk-Kainarji 1774, 9, 26, 30
 London 1913, 171
 Neuilly 1919, 207, 210, 227
 Nish 1923, 211
 Paris 1856, 108
 Pressburg 1805, 23, 37
 Schoenbrunn 1809, 23
 Sistova 1791, 10
Tribune des peuples, 67
Tribune of the Nationalities, 178
 Tricoupis, Charilaos, 95, 97, 98, 100f.
 113, 123, 124, 126, 135
 Tripolitan War, 160
 Turkish-Bulgarian state, proposal for, 89, 90
 Turkish-Italian war, 160
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
 relation to Balkan federation, 265, 266
 Universal Peace Congress, 230
 Urquhart, David, 72
 Venelin, Yurii, 20
 Venizelos, Eleutherios, 164, 165, 172, 197, 200
 Villafranca armistice
 effect on Danubian federation movement, 76, 77
 Vladimirescu, Tudor, 26
 Voeslau, 98, 99
 Volney, Constantin F. C., comte de, 5
 Voltaire, François Marie Arouet, 6
 Xivray, J. Berger de
 federation proposal, 66f.
 Young Turks
 revolt in 1908, 157, 158
 Turkification policy of, 158, 159
 opposed by *Organosis*, 177
 relations with Balkan Committee, 180, 181
 denounced by Balkan socialists, 192
 Yugoslav-Greek agreement 1942, 262, 266
 Zaimes, Alexander, 108
 Zanos, 98-101
Zemledelsko Zname, 206

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